948 resultados para REVOCATION OF ACTS


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It is with increasing frequency that States undertake unilateral acts. For that reason this article undertakes to demonstrate the development of unilateral acts of States in the heart of the International Law Commission of the United Nations - ILC. It analyzes unilateral and autonomous acts which can by themselves have juridical effects. In this sense, silence acquiescence and acceptance may have an influence in these acts.The ILC has studied this issue for ten years, analyzing its interpretation, the specific rules which are applicable, their modification, termination and the revocation of unilateral acts.

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We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.

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We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.

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"Names of the mayors of the city of Schenectady, from the incorporation of said city to the present time, and the periods of their continuance in office respectively, with the name of the recorder appointed for said city, under the act of April 29, 1833": p. 2.

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Mode of access: Internet.

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Binding reads:--"Fishery acts."

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Mode of access: Internet.