Comments on "Exact solution for horizontal redistribution by general similarity"

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Scope for further analytical solutions for constant flux infiltration into a semi-infinite soil profile or redistribution in a finite soil profile

[1] We attempt to generate new solutions for the moisture content form of the one-dimensional Richards' [1931] equation using the Lisle [1992] equivalence mapping. This mapping is used as no more general set of transformations exists for mapping the one-dimensional Richards' equation into itself. Starting from a given solution, the mapping has the potential to generate an infinite number of new solutions for a series of nonlinear diffusivity and hydraulic conductivity functions. We first seek new analytical solutions satisfying Richards' equation subject to a constant flux surface boundary condition for a semi-infinite dry soil, starting with the Burgers model. The first iteration produces an existing solution, while subsequent iterations are shown to endlessly reproduce this same solution. Next, we briefly consider the problem of redistribution in a finite-length soil. In this case, Lisle's equivalence mapping is generalized to account for arbitrary initial conditions. As was the case for infiltration, however, it is found that new analytical solutions are not generated using the equivalence mapping, although existing solutions are recovered.

Ill-defined causes of death in Brazil: a redistribution method based on the investigation of such causes

OBJECTIVE To propose a method of redistributing ill-defined causes of death (IDCD) based on the investigation of such causes.METHODS In 2010, an evaluation of the results of investigating the causes of death classified as IDCD in accordance with chapter 18 of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) by the Mortality Information System was performed. The redistribution coefficients were calculated according to the proportional distribution of ill-defined causes reclassified after investigation in any chapter of the ICD-10, except for chapter 18, and used to redistribute the ill-defined causes not investigated and remaining by sex and age. The IDCD redistribution coefficient was compared with two usual methods of redistribution: a) Total redistribution coefficient, based on the proportional distribution of all the defined causes originally notified and b) Non-external redistribution coefficient, similar to the previous, but excluding external causes.RESULTS Of the 97,314 deaths by ill-defined causes reported in 2010, 30.3% were investigated, and 65.5% of those were reclassified as defined causes after the investigation. Endocrine diseases, mental disorders, and maternal causes had a higher representation among the reclassified ill-defined causes, contrary to infectious diseases, neoplasms, and genitourinary diseases, with higher proportions among the defined causes reported. External causes represented 9.3% of the ill-defined causes reclassified. The correction of mortality rates by the total redistribution coefficient and non-external redistribution coefficient increased the magnitude of the rates by a relatively similar factor for most causes, contrary to the IDCD redistribution coefficient that corrected the different causes of death with differentiated weights.CONCLUSIONS The proportional distribution of causes among the ill-defined causes reclassified after investigation was not similar to the original distribution of defined causes. Therefore, the redistribution of the remaining ill-defined causes based on the investigation allows for more appropriate estimates of the mortality risk due to specific causes.

While the crisis proceeds: A world redistribution of economic power?

The crisis has drawn attention to the fact that not only emerging powers but other regions of the world as well may be offering different development models and may constitute into alternative, in some dimensions more positive agents, in the conduct of the present stage of globalisation. Notwithstanding, the traditional western powers have not lost a large amount of control of the world economy. And the crisis proceeds, reallocating world power as in a Hobbesian anarchy. It is difficult to foresee smooth developments in the near future. On the contrary, multilateralism seems to be losing ground to unilateral action or bilateral arrangements. More or less disguised currency wars may lead to serious disequilibria, and turf wars may become more frequent, with motives ranging from securing captive markets to control of specific commodities and energy goods, or targeted regulatory frameworks. As economic policy becomes even more involved with defence and security affairs, the feedbacks from each side to the other seem likely to keep dissent and animosity high, rather than contributing to peaceful and constructive approaches. A more trouble-prone world may be easily expected.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Redistribution and subsidies for higher education

The financing of higher education through public spending imposes a transfer of resources from taxpayers to university students and their parents. We provide an explanation for this phenomenon. Those who attend higher education will earn more income in the future and will pay more taxes. People whose children do not attend higher education, however should agree to help pay the cost of such education, providing that the taxes are sufficiently high to ensure that there will be an adequate redistribution in favor of their own children at some time in the future.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Work values, endogenous sentiments and redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of "social cohesion" and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.

Is it redistribution or centralization? On the determinants of government investment in infrastructure

The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode’s (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.

In vitro heat exposure induces a redistribution of nuclear matrix proteins in human K562 erythroleukemia cells.

By using both conventional and confocal laser scanning microscopy with three monoclonal antibodies recognizing nuclear matrix proteins we have investigated by means of indirect fluorescence whether an incubation of isolated nuclei at the physiological temperature of 37 degrees C induces a redistribution of nuclear components in human K562 erythroleukemia cells. Upon incubation of isolated nuclei for 45 min at 37 degrees C, we have found that two of the antibodies, directed against proteins of the inner matrix network (M(r) 125 and 160 kDa), gave a fluorescent pattern different from that observed in permeabilized cells. By contrast, the fluorescent pattern did not change if nuclei were kept at 0 degrees C. The difference was more marked in case of the 160-kDa polypeptide. The fluorescent pattern detected by the third antibody, which recognizes the 180-kDa nucleolar isoform of DNA topoisomerase II, was unaffected by heat exposure of isolated nuclei. When isolated nuclear matrices prepared from heat-stabilized nuclei were stained by means of the same three antibodies, it was possible to see that the distribution of the 160-kDa matrix protein no longer corresponded to that observable in permeabilized cells, whereas the fluorescent pattern given by the antibody to the 125-kDa polypeptide resembled that detectable in permeabilized cells. The 180-kDa isoform of topoisomerase II was still present in the matrix nucleolar remnants. We conclude that a 37 degrees C incubation of isolated nuclei induces a redistribution of some nuclear matrix antigens and cannot prevent the rearrangement in the spatial organization of one of these antigens that takes place during matrix isolation in human erythroleukemia cells. The practical relevance of these findings is discussed.

Social spending and demographics: The role of public policies in the intergenerational redistribution of income. Empirical evidence from Spain and Catalonia

The demographic shift underway in Southern Europe requires a revision of some of the fundamental principles of the traditional welfare state. We analyze the evolution of several aspects of welfare and social expenditure over the last two decades. We find that in the context of the present demographic changes and real estate boom current social and pension policy leads to a new distribution of benefits and burdens which is highly intergenerationally unequal. We argue for a revised definition of public policy based on Musgrave's proposition as a possible rule for an intergenerationally fair distribution.

Supply side interventions and redistribution

In this paper we study the welfare impact of alternative tax schemes on laborand capital. We evaluate the e_ect of lowering capital income taxes on thedistribution of wealth in a model with heterogeneous agents, restricting ourattention to policies with constant tax rates.We calibrate and simulate the economy; we find that lowering capital taxeshas two effects: i) it increases effciency in terms of aggregate production, andii) it redistributes wealth in favor of those agents with a low wage/wealth ratio.We find that the redistributive effect dominates, and that agents with a lowwage wealth ratio would experience a large loss in utility if capital income taxeswere eliminated.