Geodesics and Almost Geodesic Cycles in Random Regular Graphs

A geodesic in a graph G is a shortest path between two vertices of G. For a specific function e(n) of n, we define an almost geodesic cycle C in G to be a cycle in which for every two vertices u and v in C, the distance d(G)(u, v) is at least d(C)(u, v) - e(n). Let omega(n) be any function tending to infinity with n. We consider a random d-regular graph on n vertices. We show that almost all pairs of vertices belong to an almost geodesic cycle C with e(n)= log(d-1)log(d-1) n+omega(n) and vertical bar C vertical bar =2 log(d-1) n+O(omega(n)). Along the way, we obtain results on near-geodesic paths. We also give the limiting distribution of the number of geodesics between two random vertices in this random graph. (C) 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Graph Theory 66: 115-136, 2011

Strongly regular graphs from differences of quadrics

In this note strongly regular graphs with new parameters are constructed using nested "blown up" quadrics in projective spaces. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

On a family of strongly regular graphs with λ = 1

Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt.

Energies of some non-regular graphs

The energy of a graph G is the sum of the absolute values of its eigenvalues. In this paper, we study the energies of some classes of non-regular graphs. Also the spectrum of some non-regular graphs and their complements are discussed.

Fixed block configuration GDDs with block size 6 and (3, r)-regular graphs

Chapter 1 is used to introduce the basic tools and mechanics used within this thesis. Most of the definitions used in the thesis will be defined, and we provide a basic survey of topics in graph theory and design theory pertinent to the topics studied in this thesis. In Chapter 2, we are concerned with the study of fixed block configuration group divisible designs, GDD(n; m; k; λ1; λ2). We study those GDDs in which each block has configuration (s; t), that is, GDDs in which each block has exactly s points from one of the two groups and t points from the other. Chapter 2 begins with an overview of previous results and constructions for small group size and block sizes 3, 4 and 5. Chapter 2 is largely devoted to presenting constructions and results about GDDs with two groups and block size 6. We show the necessary conditions are sufficient for the existence of GDD(n, 2, 6; λ1, λ2) with fixed block configuration (3; 3). For configuration (1; 5), we give minimal or nearminimal index constructions for all group sizes n ≥ 5 except n = 10, 15, 160, or 190. For configuration (2, 4), we provide constructions for several families ofGDD(n, 2, 6; λ1, λ2)s. Chapter 3 addresses characterizing (3, r)-regular graphs. We begin with providing previous results on the well studied class of (2, r)-regular graphs and some results on the structure of large (t; r)-regular graphs. In Chapter 3, we completely characterize all (3, 1)-regular and (3, 2)-regular graphs, as well has sharpen existing bounds on the order of large (3, r)- regular graphs of a certain form for r ≥ 3. Finally, the appendix gives computational data resulting from Sage and C programs used to generate (3, 3)-regular graphs on less than 10 vertices.

On strongly regular graphs with m2 = qm3 and m3 = qm2

2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 05C50.

Evaluating links through spectral decomposition

Spectral decomposition has rarely been used to investigate complex networks. In this work we apply this concept in order to define two kinds of link-directed attacks while quantifying their respective effects on the topology. Several other kinds of more traditional attacks are also adopted and compared. These attacks had substantially diverse effects, depending on each specific network (models and real-world structures). It is also shown that the spectrally based attacks have special effects in affecting the transitivity of the networks.

UNIVERSALITY OF RANDOM GRAPHS

We prove that asymptotically (as n -> infinity) almost all graphs with n vertices and C(d)n(2-1/2d) log(1/d) n edges are universal with respect to the family of all graphs with maximum degree bounded by d. Moreover, we provide an efficient deterministic embedding algorithm for finding copies of bounded degree graphs in graphs satisfying certain pseudorandom properties. We also prove a counterpart result for random bipartite graphs, where the threshold number of edges is even smaller but the embedding is randomized.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

A Note on Energy of Some Graphs

Eigenvalue of a graph is the eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix. The energy of a graph is the sum of the absolute values of its eigenvalues. In this note we obtain analytic expressions for the energy of two classes of regular graphs.