Homonymy in natural language processes: A representation using Pustejovsky's Qualia Structure and ontological information

This paper presents a proposal for the semantic treatment of ambiguous homographic forms in Brazilian Portuguese, and to offer linguistic strategies for its computational implementation in Systems of Natural Language Processing (SNLP). Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon was used as a theoretical model. From this model, the Qualia Structure - QS (and the Formal, Telic, Agentive and Constitutive roles) was selected as one of the linguistic and semantic expedients for the achievement of disambiguation of homonym forms. So that analyzed and treated data could be manipulated, we elaborated a Lexical Knowledge Base (LKB) where lexical items are correlated and interconnected by different kinds of semantic relations in the QS and ontological information.

A homonímia no português: tratamento semântico segundo a estrutura Qualia de Pustejovsky com vistas a implementações computacionais

No presente trabalho, apresentamos uma proposta de tratamento semântico de formas ambíguas do português do Brasil, no caso, lexias homógrafas, com o escopo de oferecermos estratégias lingüísticas para a sua implementação computacional em Sistemas de Processamento das Línguas Naturais (SPLN). O Léxico Gerativo de Pustejovsky foi usado como modelo teórico. Nesse modelo, a Estrutura Qualia - EQ (e os papéis Formal, Télico, Agentivo e Constitutivo) foi selecionada como um dos expedientes lingüístico-semânticos para a realização da desambiguação das formas homônimas. Para que os dados analisados e tratados pudessem ser manipulados, elaboramos uma Base de Conhecimento Lexical (BCL) cujo repertório lingüístico possui seus itens lexicais correlacionados e interligados por diferentes tipos de relações semânticas presentes na EQ.

Dretske e o problema dos qualia

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske's (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel's discussion in his classical paper What is it like to be a bat. In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject's experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.

Dretske e o problema dos qualia

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske’s (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel’s discussion in his classical paper “What is it like to be a bat”. In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject’s experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.

Do termo à estruturação semântica: representação ontológica do domínio da Nanociência e Nanotecnologia utilizando a Estrutura Qualia

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

De incerto, fallaci urinarum judicio, quo uromantes, ad perniciem multorum aegrotantium, utuntur: & qualia illi sint observanda, tum praestanda, qui recte de urinis sit judicaturus, libri tres ...

"Ex Joan. Langii Epistolarum medicinalium tomo 1 [epist. 11 & 83]": p. 282-293.

Vestigia diatribae, qualia reperiuntur in aliquot Plutarchi scriptis moralibus.

Thesis (doctoral)--Vratislaviae.

Remembering beliefs

Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis’ coherence argument for memorial knowledge.

Experience, recursive awareness and understanding in autism spectrum disorders : insights of parents and teachers in Singapore

Provision of an individually responsive education requires a comprehensive understanding of the inner worlds of learners, such as their feelings and thoughts. However, this is difficult to achieve when learners, such as those with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and cognitive difficulties, have problems with communication. To address this issue, the current exploratory descriptive study sought the views of 133 Singaporean parents and teachers of school-age learners with ASD and cognitive difficulties regarding the inner experience of their children and students. The findings highlight the variety of abilities and difficulties found in how these learners experience their own mental states and understand those of others. These abilities and difficulties are characterized according to type of mental state and analysed in line with three qualia, those of experience, recursive awareness and understanding. The findings indicate that learners show a greater awareness of their own mental states compared to their ability to understand these same mental states in others. Educational implications are discussed.

A Bayesian model of source monitoring

The Source Monitoring Framework is a promising model of constructive memory, yet fails because it is connectionist and does not allow content tagging. The Dual-Process Signal Detection Model is an improvement because it reduces mnemic qualia to a single memory signal (or degree of belief), but still commits itself to non-discrete representation. By supposing that ‘tagging’ means the assignment of propositional attitudes to aggregates of anemic characteristics informed inductively, then a discrete model becomes plausible. A Bayesian model of source monitoring accounts for the continuous variation of inputs and assignment of prior probabilities to memory content. A modified version of the High-Threshold Dual-Process model is recommended to further source monitoring research.

A Orquestra Oculta, os estudos da consciência e a literatura

Dissertação apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Mestre em Estudos Portugueses

Vers une phénoménologie de la danse : une approche merleau-pontienne

La présente étude vise à dégager les paramètres élémentaires d’une analyse phénoménologique de la danse. D’emblée, la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty s’impose comme cadre privilégié pour révéler l’expérience vécue de cet art qui met en scène un savoir corporel complexe. À partir de sa théorie de la perception, dont découlent les phénomènes relatifs au corps moteur, à l’espace et à l’intersensorialité, notre étude aménage les contours d’une analyse existentielle du geste dansé. Ce faisant, nous nous heurtons à un constat : le phénomène de la danse se présente comme un élément perturbateur de la pensée merleau-pontienne. En effet, il incite à en questionner les aspects fondamentaux, voire à en constater certaines limites. Informée par les études de Rudolf Laban, instigateur de la « danse libre » allemande et par les celles des philosophes contemporains Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Michel Bernard, Laurence Louppe et Renaud Barbaras, notre étude démontre en effet que la thèse merleau-pontienne de la perception empêche de cibler le travail kinesthésique du corps propre dans l’empire du « sentir » qui l’anime et de reconnaitre sa constitution profondément dynamique. Pour combler cette carence, nous invitons à une phénoménologie de la danse qui puisse embrasser sa nature poétique, la sensibilité créatrice qu’elle requiert et le travail sensible qu’elle habilite. Nous envisageons alors, avec le philosophe de la sensation Renaud Barbaras, de nous inspirer d’une heuristique aux traits vitalistes pour réhabiliter certaines notions battues en retraite par la tradition phénoménologique. En nous tournant vers les concepts de force, de désir, d’intensification, nous tentons de retrouver dans la logique de la sensation elle-même un dynamisme fondamental que l’expérience esthétique amplifie. La recherche nous montre que la danse est l’art qui, mieux que nul autre, rend compte de ce phénomène complexe.

What is Consciousness? Towards a Preliminary Definition

There is little or no general agreement about what researchers should focus on when studying consciousness. The most active scientific studies often use the methods of Cognitive Neuroscience and focus mainly on vision. Other aspects and contents of consciousness, namely thoughts and emotions, are much less studied, possibly leading to a biased view of what consciousness is and how it works. In this essay we describe what we call a referential nucleus, implicit in much of consciousness research. In this context, 'consciousness' refers to (partially) reportable content experienced by living individuals. We then discuss the philosophical concept of a phenomenal world and another contemporary view that conscious experience involves, besides integration of information in the brain, participation in action-perception cycles in a natural, social and cultural environment. These views imply a need to reconceptualize 'qualia' as the conscious aspect of subjective experiences, thus stating properties of consciousness that pose serious challenges to an exclusive approach via Cognitive Neuroscience, because experimental settings oversimplify conscious experiences, narrowing them to fragments correlated with measured brain activity and behaviour In conclusion we argue that a science of consciousness requires a broad interdisciplinary range of research, including qualitative methods from the Human Sciences.

A natureza comportamental da mente: behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

Duas diferentes perspectivas para o estudo da consciência na Filosofia contemporânea da mente

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)