"Swift and effective retribution" : the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the confrontation with Qaddafi /

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Libya under Qadhafi : a pattern of aggression

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In the green zone : 40 years with Colonel Qaddafi

Colonel Muammar Qaddafi has been the leader of Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since September 1969. After 40 years in control of his nation, Qaddafi is actually the world’s longest serving non‐monarchial head of state. This year’s anniversary makes it timely to review his four decades of rule. From being the leader of a successful military coup to being America’s bête noire of the 1980s and then the head of a much‐vilified rogue state under twenty‐seven years of UN sanctions, the mercurial Qaddafi has lately steered his nation to something of a rapprochement with the West, been elected to the chairmanship of the African Union and simultaneously had a very public falling out with some of his Arab leaders. This paper examines the highs and lows of Qaddafi’s leadership and where his small but prominent North African state may be heading.

The charismatic persona of Colonel Qaddafi

In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it.

These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals.

Muammar as-Sulami und der unbekannte Gaon in Ibn Esra's Jesod Mora

David Kaufmann

Libya and the international community’s 'responsibility to protect'

The Libyan regime’s attacks on its own civilian population are a test case for the international community’s commitment to the notion of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The UN Security Council’s statement on 22 February 2011 explicitly invoked this concept by calling on “the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population”. Yet, with Muammar Gaddafi encouraging further violence against protesters and threatening to fight “until the last drop of blood” it seems unlikely that the Security Council’s warning will be heeded. Greater pressure from the international community will be needed to bring an end to the atrocities in Libya. The international response to the Libyan crisis represents an opportunity to translate the theory of R2P into practice.

Análisis de las relaciones de cooperación política y económica entre Italia y Libia. Una aproximación desde el perfil de sus líderes Gadafi-Berlusconi

Con la elaboración y firma del tratado de amistad de 2009 en materia política y económica se puede evidenciar la infuencia del liderazgo transformacional y del liderazgo carismático que se le pueden atribuir tanto a Muhamar Gadafi como a Silvio Berlusconi, y que actúa como elemento que transforma los procesos de cooperación entre Italia y Libia a pesar del constreñimiento de la estructura sobre estos dos agentes. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar como las características de los líderes Muhamar Gadafi y Silvio Berlusconi ayudan a superar el constreñimiento de la estructura del sistema internacional e influyen en la cooperación política y económica por medio de la elaboración y firma del tratado de amistad entre Italia y Libia en el año 2009.

Securitización en el desierto: Una respuesta al terrorismo en Malí y en Níger, 2009 - 2013.

Este es un estudio sobre las dinámicas de seguridad en Malí durante el periodo de 2009 a 2013. La investigación busca explicar de qué manera se ha dado un proceso de securitización de los grupos insurgentes frente a la amenaza generada por la proliferación de grupos armados no estatales en el territorio comprendido entre Malí y Níger. Se toma a Níger con el ánimo de ver la existencia de un subcomplejo regional de seguridad entre este país y Malí. De esta manera se afirma que el aumento de las actividades insurgentes y terroristas en la zona compuesta por Malí y Níger se da por la proliferación de actores armados no estatales, entre los cuales se encuentran los grupos seculares e insurgentes Tuareg, las agrupaciones islamistas fundamentalistas y los grupos que se componen entre rebeldes Tuareg, criminales e islamistas, éstos actores han afectado la percepción que tiene Malí sobre su seguridad.

The rise and decline of Libya as a rogue state

From 1980 until 2006, the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) was considered by the United States as a “Rogue State”. However, in May 2006, the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, welcomed Libya back into the world community and declared that this erstwhile enemy had reformed. But has the American public registered this change in Libya’s status? Has this return to the fold influenced U.S. public opinion about Libya and its eccentric leader, Colonel Qaddafi? Or is it merely a case of new foes pushing old ones out of mind? What might some of America’s new “Rogue State” enemies learn from Libya’s example? This paper explores the nexus between the tumultuous U.S.-Libyan relationship and the U.S. public, and analyses how and why perceptions of Libya have changed.

Respiratory pattern in awake rats : effects of motor activity and of alerting stimuli

Our aim was to assess the impact of motor activity and of arousing stimuli on respiratory rate in the awake rats. The study was performed in male adult Sprague–Dawley (SD, n = 5) and Hooded Wistar (HW, n = 5) rats instrumented for ECG telemetry. Respiratory rate was recorded using whole-body plethysmograph, with a piezoelectric sensor attached for the simultaneous assessment of motor activity. All motor activity was found to be associated with an immediate increase in respiratory rate that remained elevated for the whole duration of movement; this was reflected by: i) bimodal distribution of respiratory intervals (modes for slow peak: 336 ± 19 and 532 ± 80 ms for HW and SD, p < 0.05; modes for fast peak 128 ± 6 and 132 ± 7 ms for HW and SD, NS); and ii) a tight correlation between total movement time and total time of tachypnoea, with an R2 ranging 0.96–0.99 (n = 10, p < 0001). The extent of motor-related tachypnoea was significantly correlated with the intensity of associated movement. Mild alerting stimuli produced stereotyped tachypnoeic responses, without affecting heart rate: tapping the chamber raised respiratory rate from 117 ± 7 to 430 ± 15 cpm; sudden side move — from 134 ± 13 to 487 ± 16 cpm, and turning on lights — from 136 ± 12 to 507 ± 14 cpm (n = 10; p < 0.01 for all; no inter-strain differences). We conclude that: i) sniffing is an integral part of the generalized arousal response and does not depend on the modality of sensory stimuli; ii) tachypnoea is a sensitive index of arousal; and iii) respiratory rate is tightly correlated with motor activity.

When good dictators go bad: examining the 'transformation' of Colonel Gaddafi

On October 20, 2011, the 42 year rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi came to a violent end after months ofintense and brutal fighting. The violence in which Gaddafi died and the ensuing abuse of his dead body by his killers wascaptured on film and broadcast around the world. This gruesome end was the antithesis to his rise to power in 1969,where he was welcomed as a savior and a hero. Until his death, Gaddafi was the longest-serving non-monarchical Headof State and was considered by most scholars more likely to die of natural causes than be overthrown by his people. Sowhat happened in those 42 years that caused Gaddafi to go from beloved liberator to hated oppressor? And what is hislasting legacy for the country he ruled for over four decades?

The future of human rights protection in the new Libya: prospects and challenges. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 6/2014

There is no doubt that demand for the respect of human rights was one of the factors behind the Arab Spring and Libya is no exception. Four decades of absolute dictatorship headed by Muammar Gaddafi had been further tainted with gross violations of human rights of Libyan citizens and restrictions on their basic freedoms. Before the revolution, Libya was a country where no political parties were allowed. Freedom of expression and the press were extremely restricted. Reports about the country’s human rights violations published by a number of international organizations documented large scale human rights abuses at the hands of the Gaddafi regime. The 17 February 2011 revolution in Libya led to a turning point in the country’s history. The regime of Muammar Gaddafi which had dominated the country since 1969 eventually collapsed, leading to the beginning of the painful task of reconciliation and state building. Nonetheless it is estimated that more than 7000 prisoners are held captive by various militias and armed groups without due process. This in addition to thousands of internally displaced persons. State building involves the consolidation of a democratic state based on a democratic constitution. In 2011, a constitutional declaration was adopted to replace the one that had been in effect since 1969. This was intended as a stop-gap solution to allow the new political forces unleashed in the country time to write a new democratic constitution. To help consolidate the democratic state, three elements are required: that human rights be placed at its core; that these rights are truly implemented and applied; and lastly that the independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. For all this to happen it is also essential to strengthen education on human rights by encouraging non-governmental organizations to take a stronger role in promoting human rights. Libyan citizens can only avail themselves of these rights and strengthen their implementation if they know what they are and how they can benefit from their implementation

Saving Libya from itself: What the EU should do now. CEPS Commentary, 1 December 2014

Libya is experiencing its worst security crisis since the 2011 revolution, the intervention by NATO and the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. While the parliamentary elections of July 2012 provided “an opportunity to put the transition process back on track and overcome the recent political polarisation”, the country has instead descended into a deadly vortex of conflicting political groups, militias and tribes. Without the international political attention that is needed to save it from itself, Libya is now breaking up in at least two parts. Each faction is under pressure to declare its allegiance to the two biggest rival coalitions: either ‘Libyan Dignity’ or ‘Libyan Dawn’. The authors suggest that EU action take place on three levels.