Don’t trust your poll lead: how public opinion changes during referendum campaigns

Politicians call (or call for) referendums with increasing frequency. But how can they know they will win? Looking at the polls is not enough: opinion during referendum campaigns is often volatile. But this chapter shows that there are nevertheless some recurring patterns that allow us to make reasonable predictions in most cases.

Framing infectious diseases and U.S. public opinion

The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat posed by infectious diseases. Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. To influence American public opinion and enlist support for related domestic and foreign policies, both domestic agencies and international organizations have framed infectious diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and as medical dangers. This study investigates whether American attitudes and opinions about infectious diseases are influenced by how the issue is framed. It also asks which issue frame has been most influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases when people are exposed to multiple frames. The impact of media frames on public perception of infectious diseases is examined through content analysis of newspaper reports. Stories on SARS, avian flu, and HIV/AIDS were sampled from coverage in The New York Times and The Washington Post between 1999 and 2007. Surveys of public opinion on infectious diseases in the same time period were also drawn from databases like Health Poll Search and iPoll. Statistical analysis tests the relationship between media framing of diseases and changes in public opinion. Results indicate that no one frame was persuasive across all diseases. The economic frame had a significant effect on public opinion about SARS, as did the biomedical frame in the case of avian flu. Both the security and human rights frames affected opinion and increased public support for policies intended to prevent or treat HIV/AIDS. The findings also address the debate on the role and importance of domestic public opinion as a factor in domestic and foreign policy decisions of governments in an increasingly interconnected world. The public is able to make reasonable evaluations of the frames and the domestic and foreign policy issues emphasized in the frames.

Communism and Public Opinion in Queensland, 1939-1951 : An Explanation of Queensland's Vote in the 1951 Anti-Communist Referendum

The starting point of this thesis was a desire to explain the rapid demise in the popularity which the Communist Party enjoyed in Queensland during the second world war. Wartime Queensland gave the Australian Communist Party its highest state vote and six years later Queensland again gave the Communist Party its highest state vote - this time however, to ban the Party. From this I was led into exploring the changing policies, beliefs and strategies of the Party, as well as the many sub-groups on its periphery, and the shifts in public response to these. In 1939 Townsville elected Australia's first Communist alderman. Five years later, Bowen elected not only Australia's first but also the British Empire's first, Communist state government member. Of the five electorates the Australian Communist Party contested in the 1944 Queensland State elections, in none did the Party's candidate receive less than twenty per-cent of the formal vote. Not only was the Party seemingly enjoying considerable popular support but this was occurring in a State which, but for the Depression years (May 1929 - June 1932) had elected a Labor State Government at every state election since 1915. In the September 1951 Constitution Alteration Referendum, 'Powers To Deal With Communists and Communism', Queensland regist¬ered the nation's highest "Yes" majority - 55.76% of the valid vote. Only two other states registered a majority in favour of the referendum's proposals, Western Australia and Tasmania. As this research was undertaken it became evident that while various trends exhibited at the time, anti-Communism, the work of the Industrial Groups, Labor opportunism, local area feelings, ideological shifts of the Party, tactics of Communist-led unions, etc., were present throughout the entire period, they were best seen when divided into three chronological phases of the Party's history and popularity. The first period covers the consolidation of the Party's post-Depression popularity during the war years as it benefited from the Soviet Union's colossal contribution to the Allied war efforts, and this support continued for some six months or so after the war. Throughout the period Communist strength within the trade union movement greatly increased as did total Party membership. The second period was marked by a rapid series of events starting in March 1946, with Winston Churchill's "Official Opening" of the Cold War by his sweeping attack on Communism and Russia, at Fulton. Several days later the first of a series of long and bitter strikes in Communist-led unions occurred, as the Party mobil¬ized for what it believed would be a series of attacks on the working class from a ruling class, defending a capitalist system on the verge of an economic collapse. It was a period when the Party believed this ruling class was using Labor reformism as a last desperate 'carrot' to get workers to accept their lot within a capitalist economic framework. Out of the Meat Strike emerged the Industrial Groups, who waged not only a determined war against Communist trade union leadership but also encouraged the A.W.U.-influenced State Labor apparatus to even greater anti-Communist antagonisms. The Communist Party's increasing militancy and Labor's resistance to it, ended finally in the collapse of the Chifley Labor government. Characteristically the third period opens with the Communist Party making an another about-face, desperately trying to form an alliance with the Labor Party and curbing its former adventurist industrial policy, as it prepared for Menzies' direct assault. The Communist Party's activities were greatly reduced, a function of both a declining member-ship and, furthermore, a membership reluctant to confront an increasingly hostile society. In examining the changing policies, beliefs and strategies of the Party and the shifts in public response to these, I have tried to distinguish between general trends occurring within Australia and the national party, and trends peculiar to Queensland and the Queensland branch of the Party, The Communist Party suffered a decline in support and membership right across Australia throughout this period as a result of the national policies of the Party, and the changing nature of world politics. There were particular features of this decline that were peculiar to Queensland. I have, however, singled out three features of particular importance throughout the period for a short but more specifically detailed analysis, than would be possible in a purely chronological study: i.e. the Party's structure, the Party's ideological subservience to Moscow, and the general effect upon it of the Cold War.

Public opinion and foreign policy in João Goulart's Brazil (1961-1964): Coherence between national and foreign policy perceptions?

Abstract This paper analyses public opinion during the João Goulart government in Brazil (1961-1964), focusing on public perceptions on domestic and foreign policies. We employ a recently declassified public opinion survey conducted on behalf of United States Information Agency (USIA) in urban areas. We found that the Brazilian public opinion was somewhat coherent, supporting redistributive reforms domestically and a neutralist approach in foreign affairs.

Humor and the framing of the public sphere and public opinion in Portugal (1797-1834)

In his Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment (1784), Kant puts forward his belief that the vocation to think freely, which humankind is endowed with, is bound to make sure that “the public use of reason” will at last act “even on the fundamental principles of government and the state [will] find it agreeable to treat man – who is now more than a machine – in accord with his dignity”. The critical reference to La Mettrie (1747), by opposing the machine to human dignity, will echo, in the dawn of the 20th century, in Bergson’s attempt to explain humor. Besides being exclusive to humans, humor is also a social phenomenon. Freud (1905) assures that pleasure originated by humor is collective, it results from a “social process”: jokes need an audience, a “third party”, in order to work and have fun. Assuming humor as a social and cultural phenomenon, this paper intends to sustain that it played a role in the framing of the public sphere and of public opinion in Portugal during the transition from Absolute Monarchy to Liberalism. The search for the conditions which made possible the critical exercise of sociability is at the root of the creation of the public sphere in the sense developed by Habermas (1962), whose perspective, however, has been questioned by those who point 2 out the alleged idealism of the concept – as opposed, for example, to Bakhtin (1970), whose work stresses diversity and pluralism. This notwithstanding, the concept of public sphere is crucial to the building of public opinion, which is, in turn, indissoluble from the principle of publicity, as demonstrated by Bobbio (1985). This paper discusses the historical evolution of the concept of public opinion from Ancient Greece doxa, through Machiavelli’s “humors” (1532), the origin of the expression in Montaigne (1580) and the contributions of Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Swift (1729), Rousseau (1762) or Hume (1777), up to the reflection of Lippman (1922) and Bourdieu’s critique (1984). It maintains that humor, as it appears in Portuguese printed periodicals from 1797 (when Almocreve de Petas was published for the first time) to the end of the civil war (1834) – especially in those edited by José Daniel Rodrigues da Costa but also in O Piolho Viajante, by António Manuel Policarpo da Silva, or in the ones written by José Agostinho de Macedo, as well as in a political “elite minded” periodical such as Correio Braziliense –, contributed to the framing of the public sphere and of public opinion in Portugal.

Media coverage outside the courtroom : public opinion of restrictions imposed on news journalists and psychological effects on crime victims

Comme les études sur la couverture médiatique ont démontré qu’elle influence pratiquement toute personne qu’elle touche, des consommateurs aux jurés aux témoins, les deux études de cette thèse doctorale ont respectivement examiné l’opinion du public sur l’imposition de restrictions sur les médias dans les palais des justices et l’impact de la couverture médiatique sur la santé mentale des victimes de crime. Le gouvernement québécois a récemment introduit des restrictions sur les médias dans les palais de justice afin de minimiser l’influence des journalistes et des caméramans. Bien que l’affaire a atteint la Cour suprême du Canada, une étude préliminaire a trouvé que le public est largement favorable à ces restrictions (Sabourin, 2006). La première partie de cette thèse doctorale cherchait à approfondir ce sujet avec un échantillon plus représentatif de la population. Deux cent quarante-trois participants comprenant six groupes expérimentaux ont rempli des questionnaires mesurant leur opinion de ces restrictions. Les participants ont été divisé en deux conditions expérimentales où ils ont visionné soit des clips audiovisuels démontrant une atmosphère de débordement dans des palais de justice ou des clips plutôt calmes. Un troisième groupe n’a visionné aucun clip audiovisuel. De plus, il y avait deux versions du questionnaire ayant 20 items où les questions ont été présenté en sens inverse. L’étude a trouvé qu’une grande majorité des participants, soit presque 79 pourcent, ont supporté la restriction des médias dans les palais de justice. Il est intéressant de noter qu’un des groupes n’a pas supporté les restrictions – le groupe contrôle qui a lu les énoncés supportant l’absence des restrictions en premier. La deuxième composante de cette thèse doctorale a examiné l’impact des médias sur les victimes de crime. De nombreuses études expérimentales ont démontré que les victimes de crime sont particulièrement susceptibles à des problèmes de santé mentale. En effet, elles ont trois fois plus de chances de développer un trouble de stress post-traumatique (TSPT) que la population générale. Une étude a confirmé cette conclusion et a trouvé que les victimes de crimes qui avaient une impression plutôt négative de leur couverture médiatique avaient les taux les plus élévés de TSPT (Maercker & Mehr, 2006). Dans l’étude actuelle, vingt-trois victimes de crimes ont été interviewé en utilisant une technique narrative et ont complété deux questionnaires mésurant leur symptômes du TSPT et d’anxiété, respectivement. Une grande proportion des participantes avaient des symptômes de santé mentale et des scores élévés sur une échelle évaluant les symptômes du TSPT. La majorité des narratives des participants étaient négatives. Les thèmes les plus communs incluent dans ces narratives étaient l’autoculpabilisation et une méfiance des autres. La couverture médiatique ne semblaient pas être liée à des symptômes de santé mentale, quoique des facteurs individuels pourraient expliquer pourquoi certains participants ont été favorables envers leur couverture médiatique et d’autres ne l’été pas. Les résultats de ces deux études suggèrent que le public approuve la restriction des médias dans les palais de justice et que des facteurs individuels pourraient expliqués comment la couverture médiatique affecte les victimes de crime. Ces résultats ajoutent à la littérature qui questionne les pratiques actuelles qu’utilisent les médias.

Public Opinion and Global Justice

The concept of global justice has been developed to stress the worldwide implications of moral problems. Not much, however, has been written about the actual politics of global justice. This article focuses on public opinion and argues that attitudes about international redistribution are not a simple projection of attitudes about the domestic situation. In countries where domestic income redistribution is seen as an important priority, foreign aid is less popular; where this is less so, there is more concern for the fate of the poor in the South. Far from reflecting a lack of coherence in public opinion, these counterintuitive results need to be understood in connection with policy achievements in donor countries. The authors' empirical findings suggest that although the commitment to redistribute is stronger at the national level, relationships of solidarity do not stop at national boundaries. The achievement of justice at home in fact sustains justice abroad.