Mutual perceptions of Asia and the EU/Europe. Media, elite and public opinion in Singapore and Germany. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 12, December 2012

In an increasingly interlinked and interdependent world, Europe and Asia are key players. Free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the ones the EU concluded with South Korea and Singapore, are indicative of strong mutual economic interests. It is therefore timely to take a closer look at the mutual perceptions of Asians and Europeans – not only at the governmental and policymaking levels, but also in terms of public opinion and the media. Drawing on data from an extensive research project led by the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), New Zealand, the empirical study in this paper assesses the mutual perceptions of the EU/Europe and Asia, and their respective actors, focusing on two countries – Germany and Singapore. It seeks to do so through an analysis of the data collected from print and broadcast media, interviews with media practitioners, and the findings from public opinion surveys.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

Political Depolarization in German Public Opinion, 1980–2010

Little is known about political polarization in German public opinion. This article offers an issue-based perspective and explores trends of opinion polarization in Germany. Public opinion polarization is conceptualized and measured as alignment of attitudes. Data from the German General Social Survey (1980 to 2010) comprise attitudes towards manifold issues, which are classified into several dimensions. This study estimates multilevel models that reveal general and issue- as well as dimension-specific levels and trends in attitude alignment for both the whole German population and sub-groups. It finds that public opinion polarization has decreased over the last three decades in Germany. In particular, highly educated and more politically interested people have become less polarized over time. However, polarization seems to have increased in attitudes regarding gender issues. These findings provide interesting contrasts to existing research on the American public.

Marketing to change public opinion on climate change : a case study

Corporate advertisers spend far greater budgets than any social marketing campaign and have great potential to change public opinion on the urgent need for action on climate change. However “green-washing” has become a widespread practice by companies that wish to appear to be socially responsible without a genuine commitment and consumers can be very cynical about green marketing campaigns. Can companies be climate change advocates and still satisfy shareholders? This paper offers a case study on an Australian insurance company that argues it can make money from doing the right thing.

Speed enforcement in Australia : a changing policy landscape shaped by public opinion

- Speeding and crash involvement in Australia - Speed management in Australia - Jurisdictional differences - National Road Safety Strategy (2011-2020) - Auditor-General reviews of speed camera programs - The role of public opinion/feedback - Implications for speed management

Automated speed enforcement in Australia : recent examples of the influence of public opinion on program sustainability

In Australia, speeding remains a substantial contributor to road trauma. The National Road Safety Strategy (2011-2020) highlighted the need to harness community support for current and future speed management strategies. Australia is known for intensive speed camera programs which are both automated and manual, employing covert and overt methods. Recent developments in the area of automated speed enforcement in Australia help to illustrate the important link between community attitudes to speed enforcement and subsequent speed camera policy developments. A perceived lack of community confidence in camera programs prompted reviews in New South Wales and Victoria in 2011 by the jurisdictional Auditor-General. This paper explores automated speed camera enforcement in Australia with particular reference to the findings of these two reports as they relate to the level of public support for and community attitudes towards automated speed enforcement. It also provides comment on the evolving nature of automated speed enforcement according to previously identified controversies and dilemmas associated with speed camera programs.

The Citizen’s Round Table process : canvassing public opinion on energy technologies to mitigate climate change

This study draws on communication accommodation theory, social identity theory and cognitive dissonance theory to drive a ‘Citizen’s Round Table’ process that engages community audiences on energy technologies and strategies that potentially mitigate climate change. The study examines the effectiveness of the process in determining the strategies that engage people in discussion. The process is designed to canvas participants’ perspectives and potential reactions to the array of renewable and non-renewable energy sources, in particular, underground storage of CO2. Ninety-five people (12 groups) participated in the process. Questionnaires were administered three times to identify changes in attitudes over time, and analysis of video, audio-transcripts and observer notes enabled an evaluation of level of engagement and communication among participants. The key findings of this study indicate that the public can be meaningfully engaged in discussion on the politically sensitive issue of CO2 capture and storage (CCS) and other low emission technologies. The round table process was critical to participants’ engagement and led to attitude change towards some methods of energy production. This study identifies a process that can be used successfully to explore community attitudes on politically-sensitive topics and encourages an examination of attitudes and potential attitude change.

Setting the agenda, influencing public opinion, and advocating for social change

This study seeks to contribute to the systematic explanation of journalists’ professional role orientations. Focusing on three aspects of journalistic interventionism – the importance of setting the political agenda, influencing public opinion and advocating for social change – multilevel analyses found substantive variation in interventionism at the individual level of the journalist, the level of the media organizations, and the societal level. Based on interviews with 2100 journalists from 21 countries, findings affirm theories regarding a hierarchy of influences in news work. We found journalists to be more willing to intervene in society when they work in public media organizations and in countries with restricted political freedom. An important conclusion of our analysis is that journalists’ professional role orientations are also rooted within perceptions of cultural and social values. Journalists were more likely to embrace an interventionist role when they were more strongly motivated by the value types of power, achievement and tradition.

Public opinion on useful languages in Europe

This article analyses the results of five Eurobarometer surveys (of 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2005) designed to measure which languages Europeans consider most useful to know. Most Europeans are of the opinion that English is the most useful, followed by French and German. During the last decade the popularity of French and German as useful languages has been decreasing significantly, while English has remained universally favoured as the most useful language. French and German have lost their popularity especially among those who do not speak them as a foreign language. On the other hand, Spanish, Russian and other languages (often these include languages of neighbouring countries, minority languages or a second official language of the country in question) have kept and even increased their former level of popularity. Opinions about useful languages vary according to a respondent’s knowledge of languages, education and profession. This article analyses these differences and discusses their impact on the study of foreign languages and the future of the practice of foreign languages in Europe.

Are State legislatures responding to public opinion when allocating funds for tobacco control programs?

This study explored the factors associated with state-level allocations to tobacco-control programs. The primary research question was whether public sentiment regarding tobacco control was a significant factor in the states' 2001 budget decisions. In addition to public opinion, several additional political and economic measures were considered. Significant associations were found between our outcome, state-level tobacco-control funding per capita, and key variables of interest including public opinion, amount of tobacco settlement received, the party affiliation of the governor, the state's smoking rate, excise tax revenue received, and whether the state was a major producer of tobacco. The findings from this study supported our hypothesis that states with citizens who favor more restrictive indoor air policies allocate more to tobacco control. Effective public education to change public opinion and the cultural norms surrounding smoking may affect political decisions and, in turn, increase funding for crucial public health programs.