Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes

We construct an empirically informed computational model of fiscal federalism, testing whether horizontal or vertical equalization can solve the fiscal externality problem in an environment in which heterogeneous agents can move and vote. The model expands on the literature by considering the case of progressive local taxation. Although the consequences of progressive taxation under fiscal federalism are well understood, they have not been studied in a context with tax equalization, despite widespread implementation. The model also expands on the literature by comparing the standard median voter model with a realistic alternative voting mechanism. We find that fiscal federalism with progressive taxation naturally leads to segregation as well as inefficient and inequitable public goods provision while the alternative voting mechanism generates more efficient, though less equitable, public goods provision. Equalization policy, under both types of voting, is largely undermined by micro-actors' choices. For this reason, the model also does not find the anticipated effects of vertical equalization discouraging public goods spending among wealthy jurisdictions and horizontal encouraging it among poor jurisdictions. Finally, we identify two optimal scenarios, superior to both complete centralization and complete devolution. These scenarios are not only Pareto optimal, but also conform to a Rawlsian view of justice, offering the best possible outcome for the worst-off. Despite offering the best possible outcomes, both scenarios still entail significant economic segregation and inequitable public goods provision. Under the optimal scenarios agents shift the bulk of revenue collection to the federal government, with few jurisdictions maintaining a small local tax.

L'impôt progressif en France.

At head of title: Jules Dufay.

Rapport et projet de résolution présentés au nom de la Commission des contributions de l'an 5 : séance du 10 nivôse l'an 5 /

Goldsmiths'-Kress no. 17079.14-4, suppl.

On inequality tax evasion and progressive taxes

This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. We study an overlapping generations framework i n which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report. We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduced the extent of evasion in the economy. This outcome is the result of an anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modelling the issue. We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade-or-not’ choice have strikingly different political economy implications, , which suggest fruitful avenues of empirical research.

On the optimality of progressive income redistribution

We compute the optimal non-linear tax policy for a dynastic economy with uninsurable risk, where generations are linked by dynastic wealth accumulation and correlated incomes. Unlike earlier studies, we find that the optimal long-run tax policy is moderately regressive. Regressive taxes lead to higher output and consumption, at the expense of larger after-tax income inequality. Nevertheless, equilibrium effects and the availability of self-insurance via bequests mitigate the impact of regressive taxes on consumption inequality, resulting in improved average welfare overall. We also consider the optimal once-and-for-all change in the tax system, taking into account the transition dynamics. Starting at the U.S. status quo, the optimal tax reform is slightly more progressive than the current system.

Implementing change within a school science department: progressive and dissonant voices

The purpose of this study was to describe the teaching and leadership experiences of a science teacher who, as head of department, was preparing to introduce changes in the science department of an independent school in response to the requirements of the new junior science syllabus in Queensland, Australia. This teacher consented to classroom observations and interviews with the researchers where his beliefs about teaching practice and change were explored. Other science teachers at the school also were interviewed about their reactions to the planned changes. Interpretive analysis of the data provides an account of the complex interactions, negotiations, compromises, concessions, and trade-offs faced by the teacher during a period of education reform. Perceived barriers existing within the school that impeded proposed change are identified