Determinants of Profit Sharing in the Finnish Sector

This study investigates the role of factors that determine individual employee’s and firms participation in profit sharing schemes. Using a large panel data of Finnish employees for the period 1996-2000 we analyse individual and workplace characteristics that make firms employ profit sharing schemes and workers susceptible of receiving profit sharing bonuses. In particular two links between profit sharing schemes and workers performance have been analysed. First, in looking at profit sharing as an incentive device the results show a positive link between firm size and monitoring costs. Second, we find that younger individuals with higher mean salary and capacity to bear risk are more susceptible to profit sharing schemes. The industrial sector in which the individual is employed is also an important determinant factor. We find weak evidence of a relationship between performance of firms and employment of profit sharing schemes at the industrial sector level.

Cooperative Profit Sharing in Coalition-Based Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks

We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.

Profit sharing with heterogeneous entrepreneurial prowess

This paper analyzes the impact of profit sharing on the incentives that individuals face to set up their own business. It presents a model of capital accumulation in which individuals are equally skilled to be workers but differ in their abilities to manage a firm Given an exogenous profit sharing parameter, an individual chooses whether to be an employer or an employee in order to maximize his net income. It is shown that profit sharing can inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the number of firms in operation, the aggregate output and the economy's long run capital stock.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Profit sharing with heterogeneous entrepreneural prowess

This paper analyzes the impact of profit sharing on the incentives that individuals face to set up their own business. It presents a model of capital accumulation in which individuals are equally skilled to be workers but differ in their abilities to manage a firmo It is shown that profit sharing can inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, reducing the number of firms in operation, the aggregate output and the economy's long run capital stock.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

A NEO-KALECKIAN MODEL OF PROFIT SHARING, CAPACITY UTILIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This paper sets forth a Neo-Kaleckian model of capacity utilization and growth with distribution featuring a profit-sharing arrangement. While a given proportion of firms compensate workers with only a base wage, the remaining proportion do so with a base wage and a share of profits. Consistent with the empirical evidence, workers hired by profit-sharing firms have a higher productivity than their counterparts in base-wage firms. While a higher profit-sharing coefficient raises capacity utilization and growth irrespective of the distribution of compensation strategies across firms, a higher frequency of profit-sharing firms does likewise only if the profit-sharing coefficient is sufficiently high.

Profit-sharing and co-partnership: a fraud & a failure?

Portrait on cover.

Profit sharing and other forms of deferred compensation

"This brochure is intended for use with the C.L.U. Study Guide for Part II--M-2."

Practical profit sharing : a survey of existing schemes, at home and abroad /

Mode of access: Internet.