Performance Benchmarking of Australian Business Regulation : Submission to the Productivity Commission

The need to “reduce red tape” and regulatory inconsistencies is a desirable outcome (OECD 1997) for developed countries. The costs normally associated with regulatory regimes are compliance costs and direct charges. Geiger and Hoffman (1998) have noted that the extent of regulation in an industry tends to be negatively associated with firm performance. Typically, approaches to estimation of the cost of regulations examine direct costs, such as fees and charges, together with indirect costs, such as compliance costs. However, in a fragmented system, such as Australia, costs can also be incurred due to procedural delays, either by government, or by industry having to adapt documentation for different spheres of government; lack of predictable outcomes, with variations occurring between spheres of government and sometimes within the same government agency; and lost business opportunities, with delays and red tape preventing realisation of business opportunities (OECD 1997). In this submission these costs are termed adaptation costs. The adaptation costs of complying with variations in regulations between the states has been estimated by the Building Product Innovation Council (2003) as being up to $600 million per annum for building product manufacturers alone. Productivity gains from increased harmonisation of the regulatory system have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (ABCB 2003). This argument is supported by international research which found that increasing the harmonisation of legislation in a federal system of government reduces what we have termed adaptation costs (OECD 2001). Research reports into the construction industry in Australia have likewise argued that improved consistency in the regulatory environment could lead to improvements in innovation (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2002), and that research into this area should be given high priority (Hampson & Brandon 2004). The opinion of industry in Australia has consistently held that the current regulatory environment inhibits innovation (Manley 2004). As a first step in advancing improvements to the current situation, a summary of the current costs experienced by industry needs to be articulated. This executive summary seeks to outline these costs in the hope that the Productivity Commission would be able to identify the best tools to quantify the actual costs to industry.

Submission to the Productivity Commission issues paper business set-Up, transfer and closure

The Commission has been asked to identify appropriate options for reducing entry and exit barriers including advice on the potential impacts of the personal/corporate insolvency regimes on business exits...

Submission to the Productivity Commission draft report business set-up, transfer and closure

The Commission has released a Draft Report on Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure for public consultation and input. It is pleasing to note that three chapters of the Draft Report address aspects of personal and corporate insolvency. Nevertheless, we continue to make the submission to national policy inquiries and discussions that a comprehensive review should be undertaken of the regulation of insolvency and restructuring in Australia. The last comprehensive review of the insolvency system was by the Australian Law Reform Commission (the Harmer Report) and was handed down in 1988. Whilst there have been aspects of our insolvency laws that have been reviewed since that time, none has been able to provide the clear and comprehensive analysis that is able to come from a more considered review. Such a review ought to be conducted by the Australian Law Reform Commission or similar independent panel set up for the task. We also suggest that there is a lack of data available to assist with addressing questions raised by the Draft Report. There is a need to invest in finding out, in a rigorous and informed way, how the current law operates. Until there is a willingness to make a public investment in such research with less reliance upon the anecdotal (often from well-meaning but ultimately inadequately informed participants and others) the government cannot be sure that the insolvency regime we have provides the most effective regime to underpin Australia’s commercial and financial dealings, nor that any change is justified. We also make the submission that there are benefits in a serious investigation into a merged regulatory architecture of personal and corporate insolvency and a combined personal and corporate insolvency regulator.

Australian Property Institute Inc, Submission to the Productivity Commission on Intellectual Property Arrangements – Issues Paper

This submission responds to the document Intellectual Property Arrangements Issues Paper (Issues Paper) released by the Productivity Commission in October 2015 for public consultation and input by 30 November 2015. The API is grateful for the extension of time granted by the Commission to complete and lodge this submission. The overall need for an inquiry into intellectual property is supported by API. In particular it is noted with approval that the Commission states in its Issues Paper that it is to consider the appropriate balance between “incentives for innovation and investments, and the interests of both individuals and businesses in assessing products”.1 However, API is of the view that intellectual property in the area of real property presents a number of issues which are not fully canvassed in the abovementioned Issues Paper. Intellectual property embedded in valuation and other property-related reports of API members involves the acquisition of information which may possibly be confidential. Yet, when engaged in banks and financial institutions the intellectual property in such valuations and/ or reports is commonly required to be passed to the client bank or financial institution. In the Issues Paper it is proposed that there are seven different forms of intellectual property rights.2 It is the view of API that an eight form exists, namely private agreements. The Issues Paper, however, regards private agreements between firms as alternatives to intellectual property rights. The API considers that “secrecy or confidentiality arrangements”3 as identified in the Issues Paper form a much larger part of the manner in which intellectual property is maintained in Australia for the purposes of trade secrecy or more often, financial confidentiality...

Microeconomic reform and productivity in Australia-boom or blip

The impact of microeconomic reform in Australia as indicated by aggregate productivity growth estimates is examined. Aggregate evaluations are few. The Productivity Commission / Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates of ‘market sector MFP’ since the mid 1960s showing recent increasing productivity growth for the Australian economy are examined. ‘Market sector’ series for 62 per cent of the economy are reconstructed for whole economy. The whole economy estimates add support to a spike shown in ‘multifactor’ productivity growth in the 1990s rather than sustained increase with a microeconomic reform as a factor. Simple regression estimates support the point findings and indicate the presence of unknown factors and cyclicality in the estimates.

The politics of productivity growth in Australia

A prominent feature of recent Australian economic discourse is the assertion that there was a ‘productivity surge’ during the 1990s, resulting from the neoliberal microeconomic reforms inaugurated in the early 1980s. However, the evidence for the productivity surge is routinely overstated, thus undermining the rationale for many past and future microeconomic reforms. There is also substantial evidence that productivity growth can have perverse socioeconomic and/or environmental consequences. Nonetheless, many policymakers, economists and commentators remain preoccupied with increasing productivity growth. This article examines the Australian productivity debate and concludes that this is driven more by neoliberal norms than socioeconomic necessity. These are manifest in a disciplinary discourse that constructs productivity growth as a national imperative, unencumbered by negative social and environmental externalities.

Barriers and drivers of new public-private infrastructure: sewer mining

The rate of water reform in Australia is gathering pace with Federal and State initiatives promoting a more integrated approach to water management. This approach encompasses a more competitive environment and a greater role for the private sector. There is a growing recognition of the importance of water recycling in these initiatives and the need to provide opportunities for its development. In March 2008 the Productivity Commission published its discussion paper on urban water reform (Productivity Commission, 2008). The paper cited inadequate institutional arrangements for the management of Australian urban water resources and noted the benefits to be gained from a comprehensive public review of urban water management. This development can be supported through the promotion of a sewer mining industry. This industry, offers flexible and innovative solutions to water recycling demands in a variety of situations and structures. In addition it has the capability of satisfying government competition and private sector policy initiatives.

Developing a consumer policy for the 21st century

In light of the Productivity Commission's inquiry into Australia's consumer policy framework and administration, this article explores three assumptions that have underpinned our consumer protection framework to date: assumptions about the benefits of competition, self-regulation, and information. It argues that the benefits can be over-stated, and do not always reflect the reality of consumer experience. The article calls for the development of an overarching framework or principles document, with a more moderated approach to competition, self-regulation and information. While the Productivity Commission's draft report has admirably dealt with many of these issues, there is scope for the proposed objectives and recommendations in the final report to reflect more consistently the disparate impact of markets and competition on consumers, and the findings of behavioural economics.

Consumer guarantees in Australia : putting an end to the blame game

The focus of this article is on the proposed consumer guarantees component of the Australian Consumer Law. The Productivity Commission (PC), in its review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, noted that it had not ‘undertaken the detailed analysis necessary to reach a judgment on the adequacy or otherwise of the existing regulation in this area, or the merits of alternative models such as those adopted in countries such as New Zealand’. Accordingly, it recommended that: ‘The adequacy of existing legislation related to implied warranties and conditions should be examined as part of the development of the new national generic consumer law’.

Behavioural biases and information disclosure laws relating to residential property sales : narrowing the gap between existing laws and calls for future reforms

Market failures involving the sale of complex merchandise, such as residential property, financial products and credit, have principally been attributed to information asymmetries. Existing legislative and regulatory responses were developed having regard to consumer protection policies based on traditional economic theories that focus on the notion of the ‘rational consumer’. Governmental responses therefore seek to impose disclosure obligations on sellers of complex goods or products to ensure that consumers have sufficient information upon which to make a decision. Emergent research, based on behavioural economics, challenges traditional ideas and instead focuses on the actual behaviour of consumers. This approach suggests that consumers as a whole do not necessarily benefit from mandatory disclosure because some, if not most, consumers do not pay attention to the disclosed information before they make a decision to purchase. The need for consumer policies to take consumer characteristics and behaviour into account is being increasingly recognised by governments, and most recently in the policy framework suggested by the Australian Productivity Commission

Unfair terms in residential land contracts : will the Australian consumer law improve a buyer’s bargaining position?

The prohibition on unfair contract terms in standard form consumer contracts has the potential to significantly impact on the terms of contracts for the sale of land. The definition of ‘consumer contract’ includes contracts for the sale or grant of an interest in land to an individual wholly or predominantly for personal or domestic use. Therefore, a contract for the purchase of a residence for personal occupation by the buyer, as opposed to a purchase for investment purposes, will be a consumer contract potentially attracting the application of the unfair terms provisions. Significant consumer protection mechanisms already exist in most state jurisdictions requiring disclosure of relevant matters to the buyer and providing remedies for the provision of misleading conduct. Minimal evidence of unfair terms in land contract was presented to the Productivity Commission Inquiry into the Australian Consumer Policy Framework raising the question as to whether there is an identified problem of unfair terms in real estate contracts and if so, whether the same economic and ethical rationales justify regulatory intervention. This article examines what effect if any the introduction of the unfair contract provisions will have on the enforcement of residential land contracts and the viability of previously accepted conditions if challenged as being “unfair terms”. The article concludes that despite the existence of several potentially unfair terms in some land contracts, the intervention of the rules of equity to overcome perceived hardship or unfairness to buyers from strict enforcement of terms means the unfair terms provisions are only likely to operate on terms untouched by those principles. In the authors’ view the scope for operation of the unfair terms provisions will be limited to terms untouched by the principles of equity and consumer protection legislation making it unlikely that there will be any significant realignment of the contractual obligations and rights of buyers and sellers of land.

"Fair" government contracts for community service provision : time to curb unfettered executive freedom?

All Australian governments are significantly increasing the use of contracted community service provision through not for profit (NFP) organisations. These transactions occur through grant arrangements which take the form of standard contracts or deeds rather than drawing on statutory authority. Government inquiries bodies have consistently reported and raised concerns about the fairness of such standard grant contract terms, but failed to provide any mechanism whereby fairness can be assured. The Productivity Commission has suggested that the resulting poor relationship results in inappropriate risk transfer, micro-management, disincentives to innovate and poor service provision. This paper develops and tests a fairness measure based on the principles of the Australian Consumer Law which legislates fairness protections for standard consumer contracts.  

Government grants - an abrogation or management of risks?

New public management (NPFM), with its hands-on, private sector-style performance measurement, output control, parsimonious use of resources, disaggreation of public sector units and greater competition in the public sector, has significantly affected charitable and nonprofit organisations delivering community services (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy, 1994; George & Wilding, 2002). The literature indicates that nonprofit organisations under NPM believe they are doing more for less: while administration is increasing, core costs are not being met; their dependence on government funding comes at the expense of other funding strategies; and there are concerns about proportionality and power asymmetries in the relationship (Kerr & Savelsberg, 2001; Powell & Dalton, 2011; Smith, 2002, p. 175; Morris, 1999, 2000a). Government agencies are under increased pressure to do more with less, demonstrate value for money, measure social outcomes, not merely outputs and minimise political risk (Grant, 2008; McGreogor-Lowndes, 2008). Government-community service organisation relationships are often viewed as 'uneasy alliances' characterised by the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressurs of funding and security (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 308; McGregor-Lowndes, 2008, p. 45; Morris, 200a). Significant community services are now delivered to citizens through such relationships, often to the most disadvantaged in the community, and it is important for this to be achieved with equity, efficiently and effectively. On one level, the welfare state was seen as a 'risk management system' for the poor, with the state mitigating the risks of sickness, job loss and old age (Giddens, 1999) with the subsequent neoliberalist outlook shifting this risk back to households (Hacker, 2006). At the core of this risk shift are written contracts. Vincent-Jones (1999,2006) has mapped how NPM is characterised by the use of written contracts for all manner of relations; e.g., relgulation of dealings between government agencies, between individual citizens and the state, and the creation of quais-markets of service providers and infrastructure partners. We take this lens of contracts to examine where risk falls in relation to the outsourcing of community services. First we examine the concept of risk. We consider how risk might be managed and apportioned between governments and community serivce organisations (CSOs) in grant agreements, which are quasiy-market transactions at best. This is informed by insights from the law and economics literature. Then, standard grant agreements covering several years in two jurisdictions - Australia and the United Kingdom - are analysed, to establish the risk allocation between government and CSOs. This is placed in the context of the reform agenda in both jurisdictions. In Australia this context is th enonprofit reforms built around the creation of a national charities regulator, and red tape reduction. In the United Kingdom, the backdrop is the THird Way agenda with its compacts, succeed by Big Society in a climate of austerity. These 'case studies' inform a discussion about who is best placed to bear and manage the risks of community service provision on behalf of government. We conclude by identifying the lessons to be learned from our analysis and possible pathways for further scholarship.

Will the TPP destroy our healthcare system?

Could the TPP force Australia to adopt an American-style model of private health? Dr Matthew Rimmer, Professor of intellectual property and innovation law at QUT, explains. There has been much concern that Australian citizens and residents are being ripped off on the price of medicines by multinational pharmaceutical drug companies. And the problem is only likely to be exacerbated by global trade deals — like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a regional agreement under negotiation at the moment, involving a dozen countries across the Pacific Rim, including Australia and the United States. The secret trade agreement covers a score of topics — including such matters as intellectual property, investment, transparency in health procedures, and trade in services. The Trans-Pacific Partnership will have a significant impact upon the health of everyone in the Pacific Rim — particularly their ability to buy affordable medicines.