Enforcing Copyright Infringements Online: In Search of Balanced Private International Law Rules

Enforcement of copyright online and fighting online “piracy” is a high priority on the EU agenda. Private international law questions have recently become some of the most challenging issues in this area. Internet service providers are still uncertain how the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) provisions would apply in EU-wide copyright infringement cases and in which country they can be sued for copyright violations. Meanwhile, because of the territorial approach that still underlies EU copyright law, right holders are unable to acquire EU-wide relief for copyright infringements online. This article first discusses the recent CJEU rulings in the Pinckney and Hejduk cases and argues that the “access approach” that the Court adopted for solving jurisdiction questions could be quite reasonable if it is applied with additional legal measures at the level of substantive law, such as the targeting doctrine. Secondly, the article explores the alternatives to the currently established lex loci protectionis rule that would enable right holders to get EU-wide remedies under a single applicable law. In particular, the analysis focuses on the special applicable law rule for ubiquitous copyright infringements, as suggested by the CLIP Group, and other international proposals.

Report on the possibility of revision of the Bustamante code or the Code of private international law /

Mode of access: Internet.

Principles of private international law /

Includes index.

A treatise on the conflict of laws, or private international law ... /

Mode of access: Internet.

Infringement and Exclusive Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property: a Comparison for the International Law Association

The following comparison was written for the first meeting of the International Law Association newly established (2010) Committee on Intellectual Property and Private International Law (Chair: Professor Toshiyuki Kono, Kyushu University; Co-Rapporteurs: Professors Pedro de Miguel Asensio, Madrid Complutense University, and Axel Metzger, Hannover University) (hereinafter: ILA Committee), which was hosted at the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon in March 16-17, 2012. The comparison at stake concerns the rules on infringement and exclusive (subject-mater) jurisdiction posed (or rejected, in case of exclusive jurisdiction) by four sets of academic principles. Notwithstanding the fact that the rules in question present several differences, those differences in the majority of cases could be overcome by further studies and work of the ILA Committee, as the following comparison explains.

The Right to Self-Defence in National and International Law: The Role of the Imminence Requirement

This article explores the doctrine of self-defence within the context of the challenges directed at the imminence requirement, from the perspective of both national and international law. The article will attempt to illustrate that the requirement of imminence underlines the political character of the self-defence doctrine wherein private force may only be resorted to in the absence of institutional protection. This study will argue that the imminence rule can not merely be regarded as a "proxy" for establishing necessity; rather, the elements of imminence, necessity, and proportionality are inextricably connected to ensure that defensive force is only resorted to when national or international authorities are not in a position to prevent an illegal aggression, and that the defensive lethal force is not abused.

Transnational Law for Transnational Communities The Emergence of a Lex Mercatoria (or Lex Informatica) for International Creative Communities

Open Source Communities and content-oriented projects (Creative Commons etc.) have reached a new level of economic and cultural significance in some areas of the Internet ecosystem. These communities have developed their own set of legal rules covering licensing issues, intellectual property management, project governance rules etc. Typical Open Source licenses and project rules are written without any reference to national law. This paper considers the question whether these license contracts and other legal rules are to be qualified as a lex mercatoria (or lex informatica) of these communities.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

International law and the regulation of violence : shifting perceptions of the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum?

International law’s capacity to influence state behaviour by regulating recourse to violence has been a longstanding source of debate among international lawyers and political scientists. On the one hand, sceptics assert that frequent violations of the prohibition on the use of force have rendered article 2(4) of the UN Charter redundant. They contend that national self-interest, rather than international law, is the key determinant of state behaviour regarding the use of force. On the other hand, defenders of article 2(4) argue first, that most states comply with the Charter framework, and second, that state rhetoric continues to acknowledge the existence of the jus ad bellum. In particular, the fact that violators go to considerable lengths to offer legal or factual justifications for their conduct – typically by relying on the right of self-defence – is advanced as evidence that the prohibition on the use of force retains legitimacy in the eyes of states. This paper identifies two potentially significant features of state practice since 2006 which may signal a shift in states’ perceptions of the normative authority of article 2(4). The first aspect is the recent failure by several states to offer explicit legal justifications for their use or force, or to report action taken in self-defence to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. Four incidents linked to the global “war on terror” are examined here: Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2007 and in Sudan in 2009, Turkey’s 2006-2008 incursions into northern Iraq, and Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia. The second, more troubling feature is the international community’s apparent lack of concern over the legality of these incidents. Each use of force is difficult to reconcile with the strict requirements of the jus ad bellum; yet none attracted genuine legal scrutiny or debate among other states. While it is too early to conclude that these relatively minor incidents presage long term shifts in state practice, viewed together the two developments identified here suggest a possible downgrading of the role of international law in discussions over the use of force, at least in conflicts linked to the “war on terror”. This, in turn, may represent a declining perception of the normative authority of the jus ad bellum, and a concomitant admission of the limits of international law in regulating violence.