Redlining, the Community Reinvestment Act, and Private Mortgage Insurance

This paper examines whether neighborhood racial or income composition influences a lender's treatment of mortgage applications. Recent studies have found little evidence of differential treatment based on either the racial or income composition of the neighborhood, once the specification accounts for neighborhood risk factors. This paper suggests that lenders may favor applicants from CRA-protected neighborhoods if they obtain Private Mortgage Insurance (PMI) and that this behavior may mask lender redlining of low income and minority neighborhoods. For loan applicants who are not covered by PMI, this paper finds strong evidence that applications for units in low-income neighborhoods are less likely to be approved, and some evidence that applications for units in minority neighborhoods are less likey to be approved, regardless of the race of the applicant. This pattern is not visible in earlier studies because lenders appear to treat applications from these neighborhoods more favorably when the applicant obtains PMI.

An Assessment of FHA's Section 203 (b) program : a comparison with private mortgage insurance /

"HUD-1087-PDR"--P. [4] of cover.

Supplementary private health insurance: The characteristics of subscribers

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Supplementary private health insurance: The characteristics of subscribers

Despite the fact that public medical care has being heavily subsidized through a statutory national health system there has been a growing number of people who opt to enroll in extra private coverage. Using a two part model to infer the insurance decision and subsequent amount of insurance chosen we found out that people’s decision over private health coverage is not related with their health. The pattern of consumption of medical care that is not available in the public sector and a good socio economic background were found significant modeling the demand for private health insurance.

Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives

The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.

Price policies and Price dispersion in the private healthcare insurance industry: The Catalan case

We present an overlapping generations model that explains price dispersion among Catalonian healthcare insurance firms. The model shows that firms with different premium policies can coexist. Furthermore, if interest rates are low, firms that apply equal premium to all insureds can charge higher average prices than insurers that set premiums according to the risk of insured. Economic theory, health insurance, health economics.

White Paper on Private Health Insurance

This White Paper, which arises from commitments in the Action Programme for the New Millennium, sets out the Government’s policy objectives and proposals regarding the role of private health insurance in the overall healthcare system, the regulation of the health insurance market, and the corporate structure and status of the Voluntary Health Insurance Board Download the Report here

Private Medical Insurance in Ireland

Private Medical Insurance in Ireland On 17 January 2007 The Minister for Health and Children announced that she had appointed a three person group comprising Colm Barrington (chair), Seamus Creedon and Dorothea Dowling (the Group) to carry out a business appraisal of the private medical insurance (PMI) market in Ireland and to report back to her on the subject by 31 March 2007. The Ministerâ?Ts announcement included the following terms of reference for the Group: Click here to download PDF 351kb

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2013

Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council Click here to download PDF 179KB  

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2013

This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the insurers support, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers.  All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The Phase 1 report contains 32 recommendations under 9 headings as follows: Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation. Some of the key recommendations to drive down costs are can be summarised as follows: Controlling costs in private health insurance Care settings and use of resources Age structure of the market Clinical audit and utilisation management Industry approach to private psychiatry Fraud, waste and abuse Chronic disease management Claims processing Admission and discharge procedures and processes. Most of the recommendations in the Phase 1 report could be implemented on an administrative basis, while a small number, if adopted, would require legislation.

Report to the Minister for Health and Children on Risk Equalisation in the Irish Private Health Insurance Market

Provision for risk equalisation was first made in the Health Insurance Act, 1994, section 12 of which empowered the Minister to prescribe a scheme for risk equalisation. A Risk Equalsiation Scheme was introduced in 2003. In December 2005, the Minister decided, on the Authorityâ?Ts recommendation, which referred to risks now materialising, to commence risk equalisation payments under the Scheme as from 1 January 2006, but in the event the relevant legislation was overturned by the Courts in 2008. Download document here

Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014

5.11.2014 This report was prepared independently by Mr McLoughlin with the support of the health insurers, and the Health Insurance Authority, for consideration by the Minister for Health and the insurers.  All parties were very conscious of the importance of respecting competition law when dealing with issues such as prices and costs. The work of the Group has been conducted in two phases, with the first phase report published on 26 December 2013. The Phase 1 report sets out the context, establishment, membership and terms of reference for both phases of the Groups work.  The report also outlines the legislative provisions for private health insurance in Ireland, the objectives of both phases of the review and the approach and methodology followed. Phase 2 of the process focused on the compilation and analysis by the Health Insurance Authority (HIA) of claims data to assess the cost drivers for health insurance, the effects of medical technology and innovations on costs, and claims processing issues.The report and submissions from relevant stakeholders which were examined and considered under the Phase 2 Review can be downloaded below. Download the Review of Measures to Reduce Costs in the Private Health Insurance Market 2014 -  Independent Report to the Minister for Health and Health Insurance Council here. Submissions received HSE Submission to Pat McLoughlin, Chair of Review Group IHAI submission 11 April 2014 IHCA submission to Chair 1 May 2014 Insurance Ireland submission Society of Actuaries in Ireland submission St. Patricks Mental Health Services submission April 2014 St John of Gods Submission        

Demand for private health insurance: Is there a quality gap?

Quality of care is qualified as a main determinant of the demand forvoluntary private health insurance (PHI) in National Health Systems(NHS). This paper provides new evidence on the influence of the qualitygap between public and private health insurance and other demanddeterminants in the demand for PHI in Catalonia. The demand for PHI ismodelled as a demand for health care quality. Unlike previous studies, the database employed allows for the development of a link between thetheoretical and the empirical model dealing with unobserved heterogeneityand endogeneity issues. Results suggest that a rise in PHI qualityenhances an equivalent influence in the demand for PHI as an equalreduction of NHS quality. Income and price elasticity estimates areconsistent with the observed feature that PHI appears to be a luxurygood and individuals tend to be relatively insensible to tax relief'sand monetary co-payments in insurance contracts.

Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.