Price regulation in Australia: How consistent has it been?

We assemble a database consisting of 52 regulatory decisions made by seven different regulators across five different industries. We examine how the proportion of firms' revenue requirements that were disallowed by the regulator vary by regulator, industry and time. Despite the differences in the implementation of price regulation across industries and across jurisdictions in Australia, outcomes are surprisingly consistent. For example, we show that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the regulators outcomes in South Australia, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria are similar despite the different regulatory approaches undertaken in these jurisdictions.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second-best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost.

Az európai villamosenergia-árak központi szabályozásának hatása a fogyasztói árakra (The impacts of the price regulation on the level of retail electricity prices in Europe)

Az Európai Unión belül az elmúlt időszakban megerősödött a vita arról, vajon a Közösség versenyképességének javításához milyen módon és mértékben járulhat hozzá az ipari és lakossági fogyasztók számára kedvező áron elérhető villamos energia. Az uniós testületek elsődlegesen a verseny feltételeinek további javításában látják a versenyképesség javításának fő eszközét, ám egyesek az aktívabb központi szabályozás mellett érvelnek. A jelenleg alkalmazott európai szabályozási gyakorlat áttekintése, a szabályozási modellek és a piaci árak alakulásának vizsgálata hozzásegíthet, hogy következtetéseket vonjunk le a tagállami gyakorlatok tekintetében, vajon sikeresebb-e a központi ármegállapításon alapuló szabályozói mechanizmus, mint a liberalizált piacmodell. ______ There is a strengthening debate within the European Union in recent years about the impact of the affordable industrial and household electricity prices on the general competitiveness of European economies. While the European Institutions argues for the further liberalization of the energy retail sector, there are others who believe in centralization and price control to achieve lower energy prices. Current paper reviews the regulatory models of the European countries and examines the connection between the regulatory regime and consumer price trends. The analysis can help to answer, whether the bureaucratic central regulation or the liberalized market model seems more successful in supporting the competitiveness goals. Although the current regulatory practice is heterogeneous within the EU member states, there is a clear trend to decrease the role of regulated tariffs in the end-user prices. Our study did not find a general causal relationship between the regulatory regime and the level of consumer electricity prices in a country concerned. However, the quantitative analysis of the industrial and household energy prices by various segments detected significant differences between the regulated and free-market countries. The first group of member states tends to decrease the prices in the low-consuming household segments through cross-financing technics, including increased network tariffs and/or taxes for the high-consuming segments and for industrial consumers. One of the major challenges of the regulatory authorities is to find the proper way of sharing these burdens proportionally with minimizing the market-distorting effects of the cross-subsidization between the different stakeholder groups.

Price linkages in pharmaceutical markets

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Economic analysis in health care regulation : three essays

ABSTRACT - It is the purpose of the present thesis to emphasize, through a series of examples, the need and value of appropriate pre-analysis of the impact of health care regulation. Specifically, the thesis presents three papers on the theme of regulation in different aspects of health care provision and financing. The first two consist of economic analyses of the impact of health care regulation and the third comprises the creation of an instrument for supporting economic analysis of health care regulation, namely in the field of evaluation of health care programs. The first paper develops a model of health plan competition and pricing in order to understand the dynamics of health plan entry and exit in the presence of switching costs and alternative health premium payment systems. We build an explicit model of death spirals, in which profitmaximizing competing health plans find it optimal to adopt a pattern of increasing relative prices culminating in health plan exit. We find the steady-state numerical solution for the price sequence and the plan’s optimal length of life through simulation and do some comparative statics. This allows us to show that using risk adjusted premiums and imposing price floors are effective at reducing death spirals and switching costs, while having employees pay a fixed share of the premium enhances death spirals and increases switching costs. Price regulation of pharmaceuticals is one of the cost control measures adopted by the Portuguese government, as in many European countries. When such regulation decreases the products’ real price over time, it may create an incentive for product turnover. Using panel data for the period of 1997 through 2003 on drug packages sold in Portuguese pharmacies, the second paper addresses the question of whether price control policies create an incentive for product withdrawal. Our work builds the product survival literature by accounting for unobservable product characteristics and heterogeneity among consumers when constructing quality, price control and competition indexes. These indexes are then used as covariates in a Cox proportional hazard model. We find that, indeed, price control measures increase the probability of exit, and that such effect is not verified in OTC market where no such price regulation measures exist. We also find quality to have a significant positive impact on product survival. In the third paper, we develop a microsimulation discrete events model (MSDEM) for costeffectiveness analysis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus treatment, simulating individual paths from antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation to death. Four driving forces determine the course of events: CD4+ cell count, viral load resistance and adherence. A novel feature of the model with respect to the previous MSDEMs is that distributions of time to event depend on individuals’ characteristics and past history. Time to event was modeled using parametric survival analysis. Events modeled include: viral suppression, regimen switch due virological failure, regimen switch due to other reasons, resistance development, hospitalization, AIDS events, and death. Disease progression is structured according to therapy lines and the model is parameterized with cohort Portuguese observational data. An application of the model is presented comparing the cost-effectiveness ART initiation with two nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTI) plus one non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor(NNRTI) to two NRTI plus boosted protease inhibitor (PI/r) in HIV- 1 infected individuals. We find 2NRTI+NNRTI to be a dominant strategy. Results predicted by the model reproduce those of the data used for parameterization and are in line with those published in the literature.

Price linkages in pharmaceutical markets

This paper studies the existing price linkage between generics and branded pharmaceuticals, in which the generic price must be a fraction of the latter. Using a vertical differentiation model, we look at the market equilibrium, the effects on the incentives for the brand producer to develop new products, and the possibility of predation by the brand producer over the generic firm. We find that the price linkage increases prices compared to no indexation and it may increase the incentives for the brand producer to expand its set of products. When prices are freely set, the branded firm may also want to expand a new product with a higher quality, but will prefer to remove the original one from the market. Predation may equally occur in both schemes but the price linkage may give fewer incentives for the branded firm to predate while compensating losses with a new drug.

Prices of medicines: a case-study on the impact of the rate-of-return regulation in the United Kingdom

This work carries out an empirical evaluation of the impact of the main mechanism for regulating the prices of medicines in the UK on a variety ofpharmaceutical price indices. The empirical evidence shows that the overall impact of the rate of return cap appears to have been slight or even null, and in any case that the impact would differ across therapeutic areas. These empiricalfindings suggest that the price regulation has managed to encourage UK-based firms¿ diversification in many therapeutic areas

Prices of medicines: a case-study on the impact of the rate-of-return regulation in the United Kingdom

This work carries out an empirical evaluation of the impact of the main mechanism for regulating the prices of medicines in the UK on a variety ofpharmaceutical price indices. The empirical evidence shows that the overall impact of the rate of return cap appears to have been slight or even null, and in any case that the impact would differ across therapeutic areas. These empiricalfindings suggest that the price regulation has managed to encourage UK-based firms¿ diversification in many therapeutic areas

The empirical study of the price mechanism in the Chinese housing market

In China, the history of the establishment of the private housing market is pretty short. Actually in less then two decades, the market has grown from almost the scratch to playing an important role in the economy. A great achievement! But many problems also exist. They need to be properly addressed and solved. Price problem---simply put, housing price is too high--- is one of them, and this paper is focused on it. Three basic questions are posed, i.e. (1) how to judge the housing affordability? (2) why the housing price is so high? (3) how to solve the housing price problem. The paper pays particular attention to answering the second question. Except the numerous news reports and surveys show that most of the ordinary city dwellers complained about the high housing price, the mathematical means, the four ratios, are applied to judge the housing affordability in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The results are very clear that the price problem is severe. So why? Something is wrong with the price mechanism. This research shows that mainly these five factors contribute to the price problem: the housing reform, the housing development model, the unbalanced housing market, the housing project financing and the poor governmental management. Finally the paper puts forward five suggestions to solve the housing price problem in first-hand private Chinese housing market. They include: the establishment of real estate information system, the creation of specific price management department, the government price regulation, the property tax and the legalization of "cushion money".

Field administration of price stabilization /

"June 1953."

Price control standards /

"June 1953."

Briefing materials on the direct control programs : price, wage, salary, rent /

"January 1953."

Quality stabilization act. : Report to accompany H.R. 3669, a bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission act, to promote quality and price stabilization, to define and restrain certain unfair methods of distribution and to confirm, define and equalize the rights of producers and resellers in the distribution of goods identified by distinguishing brands, names, or trademarks, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.