Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

In this paper we investigate the trade-off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second-best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost.

Az európai villamosenergia-árak központi szabályozásának hatása a fogyasztói árakra (The impacts of the price regulation on the level of retail electricity prices in Europe)

Az Európai Unión belül az elmúlt időszakban megerősödött a vita arról, vajon a Közösség versenyképességének javításához milyen módon és mértékben járulhat hozzá az ipari és lakossági fogyasztók számára kedvező áron elérhető villamos energia. Az uniós testületek elsődlegesen a verseny feltételeinek további javításában látják a versenyképesség javításának fő eszközét, ám egyesek az aktívabb központi szabályozás mellett érvelnek. A jelenleg alkalmazott európai szabályozási gyakorlat áttekintése, a szabályozási modellek és a piaci árak alakulásának vizsgálata hozzásegíthet, hogy következtetéseket vonjunk le a tagállami gyakorlatok tekintetében, vajon sikeresebb-e a központi ármegállapításon alapuló szabályozói mechanizmus, mint a liberalizált piacmodell. ______ There is a strengthening debate within the European Union in recent years about the impact of the affordable industrial and household electricity prices on the general competitiveness of European economies. While the European Institutions argues for the further liberalization of the energy retail sector, there are others who believe in centralization and price control to achieve lower energy prices. Current paper reviews the regulatory models of the European countries and examines the connection between the regulatory regime and consumer price trends. The analysis can help to answer, whether the bureaucratic central regulation or the liberalized market model seems more successful in supporting the competitiveness goals. Although the current regulatory practice is heterogeneous within the EU member states, there is a clear trend to decrease the role of regulated tariffs in the end-user prices. Our study did not find a general causal relationship between the regulatory regime and the level of consumer electricity prices in a country concerned. However, the quantitative analysis of the industrial and household energy prices by various segments detected significant differences between the regulated and free-market countries. The first group of member states tends to decrease the prices in the low-consuming household segments through cross-financing technics, including increased network tariffs and/or taxes for the high-consuming segments and for industrial consumers. One of the major challenges of the regulatory authorities is to find the proper way of sharing these burdens proportionally with minimizing the market-distorting effects of the cross-subsidization between the different stakeholder groups.

The empirical study of the price mechanism in the Chinese housing market

In China, the history of the establishment of the private housing market is pretty short. Actually in less then two decades, the market has grown from almost the scratch to playing an important role in the economy. A great achievement! But many problems also exist. They need to be properly addressed and solved. Price problem---simply put, housing price is too high--- is one of them, and this paper is focused on it. Three basic questions are posed, i.e. (1) how to judge the housing affordability? (2) why the housing price is so high? (3) how to solve the housing price problem. The paper pays particular attention to answering the second question. Except the numerous news reports and surveys show that most of the ordinary city dwellers complained about the high housing price, the mathematical means, the four ratios, are applied to judge the housing affordability in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The results are very clear that the price problem is severe. So why? Something is wrong with the price mechanism. This research shows that mainly these five factors contribute to the price problem: the housing reform, the housing development model, the unbalanced housing market, the housing project financing and the poor governmental management. Finally the paper puts forward five suggestions to solve the housing price problem in first-hand private Chinese housing market. They include: the establishment of real estate information system, the creation of specific price management department, the government price regulation, the property tax and the legalization of "cushion money".

Field administration of price stabilization /

"June 1953."

Price control standards /

"June 1953."

Briefing materials on the direct control programs : price, wage, salary, rent /

"January 1953."

Quality stabilization act. : Report to accompany H.R. 3669, a bill to amend the Federal Trade Commission act, to promote quality and price stabilization, to define and restrain certain unfair methods of distribution and to confirm, define and equalize the rights of producers and resellers in the distribution of goods identified by distinguishing brands, names, or trademarks, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.

Price-support program. Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, Eighty-fourth Congress, first-[second] session.

Mode of access: Internet.

Agricultural price and income policy.

First published in 1945 under title: Agricultural price control.

Price programs of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1949 /

Includes index.

Understanding natural gas price decontrol.

Item 1005-C

Emergency price control act.

Mode of access: Internet.

Agricultural price policy.

Bibliographical footnotes.