Joan Robinson Was Almost Right: Output under Third-Degree Price Discrimination

In this paper, we show that in order for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output, the demands of the strong markets should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave than the demands of the weak markets. By making the distinction between adjusted concavity of the inverse demand and adjusted concavity of the direct demand, we are able to state necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for third-degree price discrimination to increase total output.

Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature

Published as an article in: American Economic Review, 2010, vol. 100, issue 4, pages 1601-15.

Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand

This paper presents new results on the welfare e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity di¤erence between markets are high enough,then price discrimination not only can increase social welfare but also consumer surplus.

Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly

We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the firms focus more on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games.

Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

Dynamic price discrimination with customer recognition

This paper studies a general two-period model of product line pricing with customer recognition. Specifically, we consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, the monopolist can condition the price-quality offers on the observed purchasing behavior in the first period. In this setup, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers in two dimensions: by quality as well as by purchase history. We fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when there are two types of consumers. When the type space is a continuum, we show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partitional perfect Bayesian equilibria.

Is price dispersion always an indication of price discrimination?

It has been established for a long time that there is significant dispersion in prices charged for seemingly homogeneous goods. This may happen in competitive markets because the world is not frictionless, and certainly in other markets where price discrimination is carried out by firms with oligopolistic power. This paper is the first survey of the economic literature on price dispersion that addresses the following three key issues: i) its characteristics as a result of optimizing search behavior; ii) its relevance as a reflection of price discrimination and its consequences for social welfare and policy intervention; and iii) the empirical evidence of price dispersion. By contributing to a better understanding of price dispersion, this survey may help in the design and implementation of competition and anti-trust policies

Price discrimination in the airline market: the effect of market concentration /

"October 1996."

Price discrimination, the Robinson-Patman Act, and related matters : hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, Eighty-fourth Congress, first session, pursuant to H. Res. 114, a resolution creating A Select Committee to Conduct a Study and Investigation of the Problems of Small Business. October 31-November 17, 1955.

Mode of access: Internet.

Price discrimination. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the judiciary, United States Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session, on S. 4171, a bill making it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to discriminate in price or terms of sale between purchasers of commodities of like grade, quality, and quantity, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.

A list of references on the Robinson-Patman price discrimination atc,

Mode of access: Internet.

Price discrimination and marketing management /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-123) and index.