Behavior-based price discrimination in a multi-dimensional preferences market

NIPE WP 04/ 2016

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

Is price dispersion always an indication of price discrimination?

It has been established for a long time that there is significant dispersion in prices charged for seemingly homogeneous goods. This may happen in competitive markets because the world is not frictionless, and certainly in other markets where price discrimination is carried out by firms with oligopolistic power. This paper is the first survey of the economic literature on price dispersion that addresses the following three key issues: i) its characteristics as a result of optimizing search behavior; ii) its relevance as a reflection of price discrimination and its consequences for social welfare and policy intervention; and iii) the empirical evidence of price dispersion. By contributing to a better understanding of price dispersion, this survey may help in the design and implementation of competition and anti-trust policies

Price discrimination in the airline market: the effect of market concentration /

"October 1996."

Price discrimination, the Robinson-Patman Act, and related matters : hearings before the Select Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives, Eighty-fourth Congress, first session, pursuant to H. Res. 114, a resolution creating A Select Committee to Conduct a Study and Investigation of the Problems of Small Business. October 31-November 17, 1955.

Mode of access: Internet.

Price discrimination. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the judiciary, United States Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session, on S. 4171, a bill making it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to discriminate in price or terms of sale between purchasers of commodities of like grade, quality, and quantity, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.

A list of references on the Robinson-Patman price discrimination atc,

Mode of access: Internet.

Price discrimination and marketing management /

Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-123) and index.

Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups.

Price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopoly

In this article we examine the eects of third degree price discrimination in asymmetric Cournot oligopolies. We show that the average price is not affected by the extent of price discrimination. We nd that the asymmetry between firms is reflected only by the output produced for the lowest-valuation consumers and firms produce equal quantities to the other consumer groups.

First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) 23/June 2012

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no- discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.

Resale price maintenance : economic theories and empirical evidence /

Mode of access: Internet.