Preferential trade agreements and antidumping actions against members and nonmembers

In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country's decisions concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the relationship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff reductions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the member's AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the member. If the governments' weight on the domestic firm's profit is neither high nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries.

Preferential trade agreements in the Caribbean: issues and approaches

Includes bibliography

The competitiveness of agrifoods in Central American and Caribbean countries in the context of trade liberalization

Includes bibliography

Trade Liberalization, Heterogeneous Firms and Industrial Dynamics

This master thesis studies how trade liberalization affects the firm-level productivity and industrial evolution. To do so, I built a dynamic model that considers firm-level productivity as endogenous to investigate the influence of trade on firm’s productivity and the market structure. In the framework, heterogeneous firms in the same industry operate differently in equilibrium. Specifically, firms are ex ante identical but heterogeneity arises as an equilibrium outcome. Under the setting of monopolistic competition, this type of model yields an industry that is represented not by a steady-state outcome, but by an evolution that rely on the decisions made by individual firms. I prove that trade liberalization has a general positive impact on technological adoption rates and hence increases the firm-level productivity. Besides, this endogenous technology adoption model also captures the stylized facts: exporting firms are larger and more productive than their non-exporting counterparts in the same sector. I assume that the number of firms is endogenous, since, according to the empirical literature, the industrial evolution shows considerably different patterns across countries; some industries experience large scale of firms’ exit in the period of contracting market shares, while some industries display relative stable number of firms or gradually increase quantities. The special word “shakeout” is used to describe the dramatic decrease in the number of firms. In order to explain the causes of shakeout, I construct a model where forward-looking firms decide to enter and exit the market on the basis of their state of technology. In equilibrium, firms choose different dates to adopt innovation which generate a gradual diffusion process. It is exactly this gradual diffusion process that generates the rapid, large-scale exit phenomenon. Specifically, it demonstrates that there is a positive feedback between firm’s exit and adoption, the reduction in the number of firms increases the incentives for remaining firms to adopt innovation. Therefore, in the setting of complete information, this model not only generates a shakeout but also captures the stability of an industry. However, the solely national view of industrial evolution neglects the importance of international trade in determining the shape of market structure. In particular, I show that the higher trade barriers lead to more fragile markets, encouraging the over-entry in the initial stage of industry life cycle and raising the probability of a shakeout. Therefore, more liberalized trade generates more stable market structure from both national and international viewpoints. The main references are Ederington and McCalman(2008,2009).

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Domestic Mergers.

It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.

Trade liberalization and income inequality : a theoretical analysis

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The impact of trade liberalization on import demand

In this paper, we empirically analyze the effects of trade reforms on import demand and derive their implications on economic development in Turkey, a country that underwent sudden and substantial trade liberalization in the mid-1980s. The tool for this analysis is the estimation of disaggregated import demand elasticities. The adoption of a more liberal trade regime as well as radical attempts to foster economic development makes the Turkish experience particularly interesting for analysis. Almost all of our elasticities are estimated to be significant, unlike those of most previous studies in the literature on other countries. We test for different elasticities over “closed” and “open” economy periods, and find that the effects of the trade reforms of the 1980s were significant for a number of industries that form the backbone of the Turkish economy. We also compare our results with elasticity estimates from past studies for developed countries.

Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: evidence from Brazil

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988- 1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced, more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline specification, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.