Delegation in predicate encryption supporting disjunctive queries

Predicate encryption has an advantage over traditional public-key or identity-based encryption, since predicate encryption systems provide more flexible control over access to encrypted data. We focus on delegation capabilities in predicate systems. More specifically, we investigate delegatable encryption systems supporting disjunctive predicate evaluations. We present formal security definitions of delegatable predicate encryption and provide the first delegatable predicate encryption scheme which supports disjunctive predicate evaluations in the public-key setting. We analyze the security of the proposed system and give a security proof. In addition, we present a delegatable predicate encryption in the symmetric-key setting and discuss the related security issues.

Fully private revocable predicate encryption

We introduce the concept of Revocable Predicate Encryption (RPE), which extends current predicate encryption setting with revocation support: private keys can be used to decrypt an RPE ciphertext only if they match the decryption policy (defined via attributes encoded into the ciphertext and predicates associated with private keys) and were not revoked by the time the ciphertext was created. We formalize the notion of attribute hiding in the presence of revocation and propose an RPE scheme, called AH-RPE, which achieves attribute-hiding under the Decision Linear assumption in the standard model. We then present a stronger privacy notion, termed full hiding, which further cares about privacy of revoked users. We propose another RPE scheme, called FH-RPE, that adopts the Subset Cover Framework and offers full hiding under the Decision Linear assumption in the standard model. The scheme offers very flexible privacy-preserving access control to encrypted data and can be used in sender-local revocation scenarios.

Forward-secure hierarchical predicate encryption

Secrecy of decryption keys is an important pre-requisite for security of any encryption scheme and compromised private keys must be immediately replaced. \emph{Forward Security (FS)}, introduced to Public Key Encryption (PKE) by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz (Eurocrypt 2003), reduces damage from compromised keys by guaranteeing confidentiality of messages that were encrypted prior to the compromise event. The FS property was also shown to be achievable in (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) by Yao, Fazio, Dodis, and Lysyanskaya (ACM CCS 2004). Yet, for emerging encryption techniques, offering flexible access control to encrypted data, by means of functional relationships between ciphertexts and decryption keys, FS protection was not known to exist.\smallskip In this paper we introduce FS to the powerful setting of \emph{Hierarchical Predicate Encryption (HPE)}, proposed by Okamoto and Takashima (Asiacrypt 2009). Anticipated applications of FS-HPE schemes can be found in searchable encryption and in fully private communication. Considering the dependencies amongst the concepts, our FS-HPE scheme implies forward-secure flavors of Predicate Encryption and (Hierarchical) Attribute-Based Encryption.\smallskip Our FS-HPE scheme guarantees forward security for plaintexts and for attributes that are hidden in HPE ciphertexts. It further allows delegation of decrypting abilities at any point in time, independent of FS time evolution. It realizes zero-inner-product predicates and is proven adaptively secure under standard assumptions. As the ``cross-product" approach taken in FS-HIBE is not directly applicable to the HPE setting, our construction resorts to techniques that are specific to existing HPE schemes and extends them with what can be seen as a reminiscent of binary tree encryption from FS-PKE.

Predicate encryption with various properties

Predicate encryption (PE) is a new primitive which supports exible control over access to encrypted data. In PE schemes, users' decryption keys are associated with predicates f and ciphertexts encode attributes a that are specified during the encryption procedure. A user can successfully decrypt if and only if f(a) = 1. In this thesis, we will investigate several properties that are crucial to PE. We focus on expressiveness of PE, Revocable PE and Hierarchical PE (HPE) with forward security. For all proposed systems, we provide a security model and analysis using the widely accepted computational complexity approach. Our first contribution is to explore the expressiveness of PE. Existing PE supports a wide class of predicates such as conjunctions of equality, comparison and subset queries, disjunctions of equality queries, and more generally, arbitrary combinations of conjunctive and disjunctive equality queries. We advance PE to evaluate more expressive predicates, e.g., disjunctive comparison or disjunctive subset queries. Such expressiveness is achieved at the cost of computational and space overhead. To improve the performance, we appropriately revise the PE to reduce the computational and space cost. Furthermore, we propose a heuristic method to reduce disjunctions in the predicates. Our schemes are proved in the standard model. We then introduce the concept of Revocable Predicate Encryption (RPE), which extends the previous PE setting with revocation support: private keys can be used to decrypt an RPE ciphertext only if they match the decryption policy (defined via attributes encoded into the ciphertext and predicates associated with private keys) and were not revoked by the time the ciphertext was created. We propose two RPE schemes. Our first scheme, termed Attribute- Hiding RPE (AH-RPE), offers attribute-hiding, which is the standard PE property. Our second scheme, termed Full-Hiding RPE (FH-RPE), offers even stronger privacy guarantees, i.e., apart from possessing the Attribute-Hiding property, the scheme also ensures that no information about revoked users is leaked from a given ciphertext. The proposed schemes are also proved to be secure under well established assumptions in the standard model. Secrecy of decryption keys is an important pre-requisite for security of (H)PE and compromised private keys must be immediately replaced. The notion of Forward Security (FS) reduces damage from compromised keys by guaranteeing confidentiality of messages that were encrypted prior to the compromise event. We present the first Forward-Secure Hierarchical Predicate Encryption (FS-HPE) that is proved secure in the standard model. Our FS-HPE scheme offers some desirable properties: time-independent delegation of predicates (to support dynamic behavior for delegation of decrypting rights to new users), local update for users' private keys (i.e., no master authority needs to be contacted), forward security, and the scheme's encryption process does not require knowledge of predicates at any level including when those predicates join the hierarchy.

Predicate encryption for multi-inner-products

Predicate encryption is a new primitive that supports flexible control over access to encrypted data. We study predicate encryption systems, evaluating a wide class of predicates. Our systems are more expressive than the existing attribute-hiding systems in the sense that the proposed constructions support not only all existing predicate evaluations but also arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions of comparison and subset queries. Toward our goal, we propose encryption schemes supporting multi-inner-product predicate and provide formal security analysis. We show how to apply the proposed schemes to achieve all those predicate evaluations.

Predicate-based key exchange

We provide the first description of and security model for authenticated key exchange protocols with predicate-based authentication. In addition to the standard goal of session key security, our security model also provides for credential privacy: a participating party learns nothing more about the other party's credentials than whether they satisfy the given predicate. Our model also encompasses attribute-based key exchange since it is a special case of predicate-based key exchange.---------- We demonstrate how to realize a secure predicate-based key exchange protocol by combining any secure predicate-based signature scheme with the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, providing an efficient and simple solution.

A Multiplicative Homomorphic Sealed-Bid Auction-Based on Goldwasser-Micali Encryption

Instead of the costly encryption algorithms traditionally employed in auction schemes, efficient Goldwasser-Micali encryption is used to design a new sealed-bid auction. Multiplicative homomorphism instead of the traditional additive homomorphism is exploited to achieve security and high efficiency in the auction. The new scheme is the currently known most efficient non-interactive sealed-bid auction with bid privacy.

Analysis of authenticated encryption stream ciphers

Authenticated Encryption (AE) is the cryptographic process of providing simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection to messages. AE is potentially more efficient than applying a two-step process of providing confidentiality for a message by encrypting the message and in a separate pass, providing integrity protection by generating a Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag. This paper presents results on the analysis of three AE stream ciphers submitted to the recently completed eSTREAM competition. We classify the ciphers based on the methods the ciphers use to provide authenticated encryption and discuss possible methods for mounting attacks on these ciphers.

If it's encrypted it's secure! The viability of US state-based encryption exemptions

US state-based data breach notification laws have unveiled serious corporate and government failures regarding the security of personal information. These laws require organisations to notify persons who may be affected by an unauthorized acquisition of their personal information. Safe harbours to notification exist if personal information is encrypted. Three types of safe harbour have been identified in the literature: exemptions, rebuttable presumptions and factors. The underlying assumption of exemptions is that encrypted personal information is secure and therefore unauthorized access does not pose a risk. However, the viability of this assumption is questionable when examined against data breaches involving encrypted information and the demanding practical requirements of effective encryption management. Recent recommendations by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) would amend the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to implement a data breach scheme that includes a different type of safe harbour, factor based analysis. The authors examine the potential capability of the ALRC’s proposed encryption safe harbour in relation to the US experience at the state legislature level.

Encryption safe harbours and data breach notification laws

Data breach notification laws require organisations to notify affected persons or regulatory authorities when an unauthorised acquisition of personal data occurs. Most laws provide a safe harbour to this obligation if acquired data has been encrypted. There are three types of safe harbour: an exemption; a rebuttable presumption and factor-based analysis. We demonstrate, using three condition-based scenarios, that the broad formulation of most encryption safe harbours is based on the flawed assumption that encryption is the silver bullet for personal information protection. We then contend that reliance upon an encryption safe harbour should be dependent upon a rigorous and competent risk-based review that is required on a case-by-case basis. Finally, we recommend the use of both an encryption safe harbour and a notification trigger as our preferred choice for a data breach notification regulatory framework.