Normative Practical Reasoning via Argumentation and Dialogue

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Abductive reasoning, information, and mechanical systems

We investigate, from a philosophical perspective, the relation between abductive reasoning and information in the context of biological systems. Emphasis is given to the organizational role played by abductive reasoning in practical activities of embodied embedded agency that involve meaningful information. From this perspective, meaningful information is provisionally characterized as a selforganizing process of pattern generation that constrains coherent action. We argue that this process can be considered as a part of evolutionarily developed learning abilities of organisms in order to help with their survival. We investigate the case of inorganic mechanical systems (like robots), which deal only with stable forms of habits, rather than with evolving learning abilities. Some difficulties are considered concerning the hypothesis that mechanical systems may operate with meaningful information, present in abductive reasoning. Finally, an example of hypotheses creation in the domain of medical sciences is presented in order to illustrate the complexity of abduction in practical reasoning concerning human activities. © 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Sobre ciencia práctica y prudentia : aproximaciones desde las ideas de John Finnis

Resumen: En el presente trabajo, el autor ensaya una presentación de las contribuciones de John Finnis a los temas de la ciencia práctica y la prudentia. Respecto del primero, destaca el carácter analógico del concepto de ciencia y las particularidades de su aplicación al campo del saber práctico. Con referencia a la segunda, apunta su relevancia en el esquema clásico del pensamiento práctico, en especial en referencia a la determinación de los objetos de las virtudes y al papel de los absolutos morales en el razonamiento práctico-moral.

Thémis desnudada: a questão da justiça em Hans Kelsen

Embora Hans Kelsen tenha desenvolvido suas ideias sobre a justiça em diversos artigos e capítulos de livros, o jusfilósofo nunca edificou uma obra mais profunda, monográfica ou sistemática sobre a questão do justo. Suas considerações, o mais das vezes proferidas incidentalmente quando da análise e crítica das teorias do direito natural, se encontram, a bem dizer, dispersas por diversas produções. A leitura integral e conjunta de seus estudos, entretanto, permite a identificação da mesma e coerente concepção de filosofia moral que perpassa todos os seus escritos, concepção esta que sugere a relatividade, subjetividade e irracionalidade da questão do justo. Sem o propósito de ser uma biografia intelectual ou uma psicanálise do conhecimento das conclusões kelsenianas sobre o problema da justiça, o objetivo da presente dissertação, além da tentativa de realizar uma exposição sistemática da própria teoria da justiça de Kelsen  dispersa por uma multiplicidade de trabalhos, nem todos disponíveis ou publicados em língua portuguesa , consiste na análise dos pressupostos e justificativas teórico-filosóficos que, utilizados pelo jusfilósofo como embasamento de suas inferências sobre o tema, o conduzem a afirmar a incognoscibilidade de qualquer conceito absoluto, objetivo e universal de justiça, ou a viabilidade de uma razão prática. A meta maior desta dissertação, portanto, é o estabelecimento e elucidação das premissas extraídas por Kelsen do pensamento teórico-filosófico de Max Weber, Immanuel Kant (além dos neokantismos de Marburgo e Baden), Wittgenstein, e dos neopositivistas do Círculo de Viena, para rejeitar lógico-gnosiologicamente as concepções absolutistas do justo, bem como a possibilidade de discutir ou definir racionalmente a justiça e as normas morais dela decorrentes. A partir de elementos colhidos dessas diferentes correntes intelectuais, Kelsen desacredita, com base na distinção entre enunciados sobre fatos (racionais e verificáveis) e proposições relativas a valores (irracionais e não verificáveis), a capacidade humana de cognição dos valores em geral e, mais ainda, a existência e cognoscibilidade de valores absolutos  em sua ótica, requisitos imprescindíveis para a exequibilidade de qualquer sistema objetivo de moralidade ou para especulações racionais sobre a justiça.

Dazed and Confused: Accidental Mixtures of Goods and the Theory of Acquisition of Title

This paper explores the law of accidental mixtures of goods. It traces the development of the English rules on mixture from the seminal nineteenth century case of Spence v Union Marine Insurance Co to the present day, and compares their responses to those given by the Roman law, which always has been claimed as an influence on our jurisprudence in this area. It is argued that the different answers given by English and Roman law to essentially the same problems of title result from the differing bases of these legal systems. Roman a priori theory is contrasted with the more practical reasoning of the common law, and while both sets of rules are judged to be coherent on their own terms, it is suggested that the difference between them is reflective of a more general philosophical disagreement about the proper functioning of a legal system, and the relative importance of theoretical and pragmatic considerations.

Welfare Effort and Poverty from the Monetary and Capabilities Approach: A Cross-Country Analysis in Latin American and the Caribbean (1990-2010)

There is abundant empirical evidence on the negative relationship between welfare effort and poverty. However, poverty indicators traditionally used have been representative of the monetary approach, excluding its multidimensional reality from the analysis. Using three regression techniques for the period 1990-2010 and controlling for demographic and cyclical factors, this paper examines the relationship between social spending per capita —as the indicator of welfare effort— and poverty in up to 21 countries of the region. The proportion of the population with an income below its national basic basket of goods and services (PM1) and the proportion of population with an income below 50% of the median income per capita (PM2) were the two poverty indicators considered from the monetarist approach to measure poverty. From the capability approach the proportion of the population with food inadequacy (PC1) and the proportion of the population without access to improved water sources or sanitation facilities (PC2) were used. The fi ndings confi rm that social spending is actually useful to explain changes in poverty (PM1, PC1 and PC2), as there is a high negative and signifi cant correlation between the variables before and after controlling for demographic and cyclical factors. In two regression techniques, social spending per capita did not show a negative relationship with the PM2. Countries with greater welfare effort for the period 1990-2010 were not necessarily those with the lowest level of poverty. Ultimately social spending per capita was more useful to explain changes in poverty from the capability approach.

El razonamiento moral como elemento constitutivo de la competencia ética: dilemas reales e hipotéticos en profesores de educación secundaria en México

El objetivo del presente texto es la indagación del razonamiento moral en los profesores de secundaria como un elemento de la competencia ética. Se realizó con dilemas morales hipotéticos (analizados y probados previamente para su validación y cuya fiabilidad se obtuvo a través del alfa de Cronbach) y con dilemas reales. Se aplicó a 264 profesores, miembros de la comunidad académica de la Escuela Normal Superior de Michoacán, México. Se analizó a través del programa estadístico Aquad 6. Entre los descubrimientos se encuentra una presencia mayoritaria de conflictos entre las normas éticas interpersonales con las normas de conformidad social y con las normas institucionales particulares. También que la justicia y la protección contra daños a los alumnos son valores presentes en los dilemas reales y una prevalencia en el razonamiento convencional de los profesores

Aims of education and well-being as absence of disorder

This thesis offers an original account of what personal well-being can be. Any account of education, it is believed, has to do with and aims at personal well-being. I approach this view on well-being not in a positive but in a negative way. I put forward some items that in certain circumstances can be taken by and called sources or forms of disorder. In the absence of such forms or sources of disorder, I assume that a certain order, prudential or moral, takes place and that constitutes the well-being of the person. The concept of ‘absence of disorder’ is introduced and argued as an educationally appropriate view of personal well-being which is the central educational aim. Therefore, ‘absence of disorder’ is positioned as the central aim of education. This concept is illuminated, for practical reasoning, by a list of seven possible forms of disorder: Comparison, Corruption, Dependency, Division, Fear, Self-disintegration and Violence. As a view of personal well-being, ‘absence of disorder’ is initially rooted in informed desire satisfaction, via the introduction of the concept of entropy. Prudentially, the agent’s informed desire is satisfied by living a life with low build up of entropy or disorder. But, in a second move such a base is also provided by the Levinasinian concept of ‘disinterest’ as a root for ‘what is to be a human’. Such ‘disinterest’ is related to the concepts of love and of ‘action for its own sake’. It is at this final approach that an attempt is made towards the approximation of the ethical and the prudential aspects of social practices. Even if only to some extent successful, the argument is directed to the following conclusion: an education aiming at ‘absence of disorder’ may promote prudential well-being and give us some confidence in simultaneously favouring moral education.

Transgender Freedom and the Law: A Liberal-Poststructural Discussion on McNally

In R v McNally, gender deception is found capable of leading to the vitiation of consent to sexual intercourse and, in so doing, places restriction on the freedom of transgendered individuals in favour of cisgendered freedom. This paper seeks to challenge the standing of this decision by adopting a combined methodological approach between Deleuzian post-structuralism and Gewirthian legal idealism. In so doing, we attempt to show that the combination offers a novel and productive approach to contentious decisions, such as that in McNally. Our approach brings together post-structuralist corporeality which conceives of the body as material and productive, and Gewirth’s ‘agent’ to conceptualise the legal body as an entity which can, and should, shape judicial reasoning. It does this by employing the criterion of categorically necessary freedom on institutionalised practical reasoning. These ‘bodies of agents’ can be conceived as the underpinning and justificatory basis for the authority of the law subject to the morally rational Principle of Generic Consistency. This egalitarian condition precedent requires individualisation and the ability to accept self-differentiation in order to return to a status, which can be validly described as “law”. Ultimately, we argue that this theoretical combination responds to a call to problematise the connection made between gender discourse and judicial reasoning, whilst offering the opportunity to further our conceptions of law and broaden the theoretical armoury with which to challenge judicial reasoning in McNally. That is, a ‘good faith’ attempt to further and guarantee transgender freedoms.

The psychology of exclusivity

L’amitié et l’amour romantique sont, de par leur nature, des relations exclusives. Cet article suggère que l’on peut mieux comprendre la nature de l’exclusivité dont il est question en comprenant l’erreur au coeur de la vision du raisonnement pratique que je nomme « le point de vue englobant » . Selon le PVE, pour que le raisonnement pratique soit rationnel, il doit s’agir d’un processus ayant pour but de choisir la meilleure alternative possible à partir d’une perspective qui est aussi détachée et objective que possible. Quoique cette vision cherche à être neutre à l’égard des porteurs de valeurs, elle incorpore en fait un biais contre les porteurs de valeurs qui ne peuvent être appréciés qu’à partir d’une perspective qui n’est pas détachée - qui ne peuvent être appréciés, par exemple, que par les agents qui sont engagés à long terme envers les valeurs en question. Dans le contexte des relations personnelles, de tels engagements tendent à donner naissance à la sorte d’exclusivité qui caractérise l’amitié et l’amour romantique ; ils empêchent l’agent d’être impartial entre les besoins, les intérêts, etc. de la personne qui lui est chère, d’une part, et ceux des autres, d’autre part. Je suggère que dans de tels contextes les besoins et les revendications des autres personnes peuvent être réduites au silence, de la même manière que, comme le suggère John McDowell, les tentations de l’immoralité sont, pour l’agent vertueux, réduites au silence.