Improving practical reasoning and argumentation

This thesis justifies the need for and develops a new integrated model of practical reasoning and argumentation. After framing the work in terms of what is reasonable rather than what is rational (chapter 1), I apply the model for practical argumentation analysis and evaluation provided by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) to a paradigm case of unreasonable individual practical argumentation provided by mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik (chapter 2). The application shows that by following the model, Breivik is relatively easily able to conclude that his reasoning to mass murder is reasonable – which is understood to be an unacceptable result. Causes for the model to allow such a conclusion are identified as conceptual confusions ingrained in the model, a tension in how values function within the model, and a lack of creativity from Breivik. Distinguishing between dialectical and dialogical, reasoning and argumentation, for individual and multiple participants, chapter 3 addresses these conceptual confusions and helps lay the foundation for the design of a new integrated model for practical reasoning and argumentation (chapter 4). After laying out the theoretical aspects of the new model, it is then used to re-test Breivik’s reasoning in light of a developed discussion regarding the motivation for the new place and role of moral considerations (chapter 5). The application of the new model shows ways that Breivik could have been able to conclude that his practical argumentation was unreasonable and is thus argued to have improved upon the Fairclough and Fairclough model. It is acknowledged, however, that since the model cannot guarantee a reasonable conclusion, improving the critical creative capacity of the individual using it is also of paramount importance (chapter 6). The thesis concludes by discussing the contemporary importance of improving practical reasoning and by pointing to areas for further research (chapter 7).

Normative Practical Reasoning via Argumentation and Dialogue

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Abductive reasoning, information, and mechanical systems

We investigate, from a philosophical perspective, the relation between abductive reasoning and information in the context of biological systems. Emphasis is given to the organizational role played by abductive reasoning in practical activities of embodied embedded agency that involve meaningful information. From this perspective, meaningful information is provisionally characterized as a selforganizing process of pattern generation that constrains coherent action. We argue that this process can be considered as a part of evolutionarily developed learning abilities of organisms in order to help with their survival. We investigate the case of inorganic mechanical systems (like robots), which deal only with stable forms of habits, rather than with evolving learning abilities. Some difficulties are considered concerning the hypothesis that mechanical systems may operate with meaningful information, present in abductive reasoning. Finally, an example of hypotheses creation in the domain of medical sciences is presented in order to illustrate the complexity of abduction in practical reasoning concerning human activities. © 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Transduction and BRICS

Abstract BRICS has philosophical significance. It creates new pressure on cross-cultural skill. This is analysed here as requiring transduction: a variety of defeasible practical reasoning. This replaces a simplistic model of the relation between knowledge and action with a more realistic and contemporary model. The transduction format has utility in cross-cultural training.

The psychology of exclusivity

L’amitié et l’amour romantique sont, de par leur nature, des relations exclusives. Cet article suggère que l’on peut mieux comprendre la nature de l’exclusivité dont il est question en comprenant l’erreur au coeur de la vision du raisonnement pratique que je nomme « le point de vue englobant » . Selon le PVE, pour que le raisonnement pratique soit rationnel, il doit s’agir d’un processus ayant pour but de choisir la meilleure alternative possible à partir d’une perspective qui est aussi détachée et objective que possible. Quoique cette vision cherche à être neutre à l’égard des porteurs de valeurs, elle incorpore en fait un biais contre les porteurs de valeurs qui ne peuvent être appréciés qu’à partir d’une perspective qui n’est pas détachée - qui ne peuvent être appréciés, par exemple, que par les agents qui sont engagés à long terme envers les valeurs en question. Dans le contexte des relations personnelles, de tels engagements tendent à donner naissance à la sorte d’exclusivité qui caractérise l’amitié et l’amour romantique ; ils empêchent l’agent d’être impartial entre les besoins, les intérêts, etc. de la personne qui lui est chère, d’une part, et ceux des autres, d’autre part. Je suggère que dans de tels contextes les besoins et les revendications des autres personnes peuvent être réduites au silence, de la même manière que, comme le suggère John McDowell, les tentations de l’immoralité sont, pour l’agent vertueux, réduites au silence.

Convergences et divergences dans les conceptions de la morale de Ronald Dworkin et Alasdair MacIntyre

Ce mémoire porte sur l’articulation de la morale en droit. Il soulève la question de l’objectivité de la morale dans la théorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. Celui-ci doit pouvoir établir les critères de justification de la morale pour asseoir son autorité en droit. Il conteste la validité de la règle de reconnaissance de Hart qui exclue la morale comme source et comme justification inhérente au droit. Dans son dernier livre, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), Dworkin présente sa thèse de l’unité de valeur entre le droit, la morale personnelle et la morale politique. Pour réussir à intégrer la morale au droit, il doit en défendre l’objectivité. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique et de la vérité propre à la morale. Sa conception de la rationalité pratique est rapprochée de celle d’Alasdair MacIntyre. Celui-ci rejette la prétention issue des Lumières d’une rationalité pratique universelle et neutre. Il développe une conception de la rationalité pratique fondée sur le concept de tradition d’investigation. Il fait l’histoire des principales traditions d’investigation depuis l’antiquité jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Il considère la tradition aristotélicienne supérieure, celle-ci réussissant mieux à donner objectivité et intelligibilité à la morale. Des points de convergence ou de divergence sont identifiés dans les conceptions de la morale de Dworkin et de MacIntyre. Ce rapprochement porte sur leurs positions respectives face aux principaux fondements théoriques en philosophie morale, leurs conceptions de la rationalité pratique et leurs définitions des notions de droit et de justice.

Norm-based behaviour modification in BDI agents

While there has been much work on developing frameworks and models of norms and normative systems, consideration of the impact of norms on the practical reasoning of agents has attracted less attention. The problem is that traditional agent architectures and their associated languages provide no mechanism to adapt an agent at runtime to norms constraining their behaviour. This is important because if BDI-type agents are to operate in open environments, they need to adapt to changes in the norms that regulate such environments. In response, in this paper we provide a technique to extend BDI agent languages, by enabling them to enact behaviour modification at runtime in response to newly accepted norms. Our solution consists of creating new plans to comply with obligations and suppressing the execution of existing plans that violate prohibitions. We demonstrate the viability of our approach through an implementation of our solution in the AgentSpeak(L) language.

The Rechtslehre doctrine and Kant's philosophy of history

The text is divided in two phases. In the first phase, consisting of three parts, the main concepts of Kant's Doctrine of Right are considered in a comprehensive approach related to: the issue of the relations between natural right and positive right, problem closely connected to that of the relations between natural state and civil state, private right and public right; to the doctrine of property and its connection with political right. on treating the right in its several types, we intend to appoint the practical reasoning as a background of the Doctrine. In the second phase, concerning its last section, the consideration on the presence of the practical reasoning into the right is placed before some specificities of Kant's phylosophy of history, with the intent of establishing the possible relation between Rechtslehre and that philosophy.

A Rechtslehre e a filosofia da história

The text is divided in two phases. In the first phase, consisting of three parts, the main concepts of Kant’s Doctrine of Right are considered in a comprehensive approach related to: the issue of the relations between natural right and positive right, problem closely connected to that of the relations between natural state and civil state, private right and public right; to the doctrine of property and its connection with political right. On treating the right in its several types, we intend to appoint the practical reasoning as a background of the Doctrine. In the second phase, concerning its last section, the consideration on the presence of the practical reasoning into the right is placed before some speci!cities of Kant’s phylosophy of history, with the intent of establishing the possible relation between Rechtslehre and that philosophy.