960 resultados para Practical Knowledge
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Objectives To explore how general practitioners have accessed and evaluated evidence from trials on the use of statin lipid lowering drugs and incorporated this evidence into their practice. To draw out the practical implications of this study for strategies to integrate clinical evidence into general medical practice.
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Issued in 1889 under title "The little giant cyclopedia", and in 1893 under title "The marvel cyclopedia". Also issued under titles "The nutshell cyclopedia" and "Armstrong's treasury of ready reference.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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OBJECTIVE: To assess the theoretical and practical knowledge of the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) by trained Air-rescue physicians in Switzerland. METHODS: Prospective anonymous observational study with a specially designed questionnaire. General knowledge of the GCS and its use in a clinical case were assessed. RESULTS: From 130 questionnaires send out, 103 were returned (response rate of 79.2%) and analyzed. Theoretical knowledge of the GCS was consistent for registrars, fellows, consultants and private practitioners active in physician-staffed helicopters. The clinical case was wrongly scored by 38 participants (36.9%). Wrong evaluation of the motor component occurred in 28 questionnaires (27.2%), and 19 errors were made for the verbal score (18.5%). Errors were made most frequently by registrars (47.5%, p = 0.09), followed by fellows (31.6%, p = 0.67) and private practitioners (18.4%, p = 1.00). Consultants made significantly less errors than the rest of the participating physicians (0%, p < 0.05). No statistically significant differences were shown between anesthetists, general practitioners, internal medicine trainees or others. CONCLUSION: Although the theoretical knowledge of the GCS by out-of-hospital physicians is correct, significant errors were made in scoring a clinical case. Less experienced physicians had a higher rate of errors. Further emphasis on teaching the GCS is mandatory.
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In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.
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Este documento es un artículo inédito que ha sido aceptado para su publicación. Como un servicio a sus autores y lectores, Alternativas. Cuadernos de trabajo social proporciona online esta edición preliminar. El manuscrito puede sufrir alteraciones tras la edición y corrección de pruebas, antes de su publicación definitiva. Los posibles cambios no afectarán en ningún caso a la información contenida en esta hoja, ni a lo esencial del contenido del artículo.
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The assertion about the peculiarly intricate and complex character of social phenomena has, in much of social discourse, a virtually uncontested tradition. A significant part of the premise about the complexity of social phenomena is the conviction that it complicates, perhaps even inhibits the development and application of social scientific knowledge. Our paper explores the origins, the basis and the consequences of this assertion and asks in particular whether the classic complexity assertion still deserves to be invoked in analyses that ask about the production and the utilization of social scientific knowledge in modern society. We refer to one of the most prominent and politically influential social scientific theories, John Maynard Keynes' economic theory as an illustration. We conclude that, the practical value of social scientific knowledge is not necessarily dependent on a faithful, in the sense of complete, representation of (complex) social reality. Practical knowledge is context sensitive if not project bound. Social scientific knowledge that wants to optimize its practicality has to attend and attach itself to elements of practical social situations that can be altered or are actionable by relevant actors. This chapter represents an effort to re-examine the relation between social reality, social scientific knowledge and its practical application. There is a widely accepted view about the potential social utility of social scientific knowledge that invokes the peculiar complexity of social reality as an impediment to good theoretical comprehension and hence to its applicability.
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Knowledge is of crucial, and growing importance in social, political and economic relations in modern society. The range and variety of available knowledge dramatically enlarges the available options of social action. This five volume collection brings together a broad array of contributions from a variety of disciplines. Featuring essays from philosophers who have investigated the foundations of knowledge, and addressing different forms of knowledge in society such as common sense and practical knowledge, this collection also discusses the role of knowledge in economic process and gives attention to the role of expert knowledge in political decision making. Including a collection of articles from the sociology of knowledge and science, the set also provides a new introduction by the editors, making it a unique and invaluable research resource for both student and scholar.
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Knowledge is of crucial, and growing importance in social, political and economic relations in modern society. The range and variety of available knowledge dramatically enlarges the available options of social action. This five volume collection brings together a broad array of contributions from a variety of disciplines. Featuring essays from philosophers who have investigated the foundations of knowledge, and addressing different forms of knowledge in society such as common sense and practical knowledge, this collection also discusses the role of knowledge in economic process and gives attention to the role of expert knowledge in political decision making. Including a collection of articles from the sociology of knowledge and science, the set also provides a new introduction by the editors, making it a unique and invaluable research resource for both student and scholar.
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Knowledge is of crucial, and growing importance in social, political and economic relations in modern society. The range and variety of available knowledge dramatically enlarges the available options of social action. This five volume collection brings together a broad array of contributions from a variety of disciplines. Featuring essays from philosophers who have investigated the foundations of knowledge, and addressing different forms of knowledge in society such as common sense and practical knowledge, this collection also discusses the role of knowledge in economic process and gives attention to the role of expert knowledge in political decision making. Including a collection of articles from the sociology of knowledge and science, the set also provides a new introduction by the editors, making it a unique and invaluable research resource for both student and scholar.
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In this paper we investigate the relation between knowledge and political action, focusing on knowledge claims stemming from science that at the same time have relevance in a policy context. In so doing, we will revisit some well-known and some lesser known approaches, such as C.P. Snow's thesis of the two cultures and Mannheim's conceptualization of theory and practice. We arrive at a distinction between knowledge for practice and practical knowledge, which we briefly apply to the case of climate change science and policy. We state as our thesis that policy is ever more reliant on knowledge, but science can deliver ever less certainty. Political decisions and programs have to recognize this fact, either implicitly or explicitly. This creates a paradox that is normally resolved through the political decision and not the dissemination of "truth" in the sense of uncontested knowledge. We use the case of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as an example. © 2012 Copyright ICCR Foundation.
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física
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O objetivo deste artigo é analisar as concepções sobre o inconsciente ligadas ao cotidiano da prática terapêutica de rede, como contribuição à clínica em saúde mental. A pesquisa participante foi realizada em um Centro de Atenção Psicossocial (CAPS) na cidade de São Paulo. Os resultados mostraram as concepções mais frequentes: o inconsciente como inconsciência, o inconsciente como desconhecimento e o inconsciente como método de escuta do sujeito e das relações na instituição. Demonstram uma flexibilidade teórica que pode permitir articulações complexas nas diversas intervenções no cotidiano da equipe referentes às subjetividades e saberes sobre o inconsciente, psicanalíticos ou não. Conclui-se que a elucidação desse saber prático sobre o inconsciente contribui para o aprofundamento dessa temática no campo da reforma psiquiátrica.
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OBJETIVO: Determinar a prevalência, distribuição etária, sazonalidade, características clínicas da doença Lyme-símile em menores de 15 anos. MÉTODOS: De julho/1998 a dezembro/2000 foi conduzido um estudo transversal em 333 pacientes, com exantema e febre. Foram coletadas amostras pareadas de sangue para a identificação de patógenos. Somente em 193 amostras, negativas aos outros patógenos (Parvovirus B19, Herpesvírus 6 humano, Sarampo, Rubéola, Dengue, Escarlatina e Enterovírus), foram realizadas a pesquisa da borreliose pelos métodos de Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay e Western-blotting. Outras variáveis clínicas, socioeconômicas, demográficas e climáticas foram estudadas. RESULTADOS: A prevalência da doença foi de 6,2%(12/193). Das variáveis estudadas, houve predomínio em <6anos(83,2%); sexo feminino (66,7%); procedência da cidade de Franco da Rocha (58,3%); com sazonalidade no outono-verão. O intervalo de atendimento foi de quatro dias. Sinais e sintomas com significância estatística: prurido, ausência da fissura labial e bom estado clínico. Outros dados presentes foram: irritabilidade (80%); febre (?38ºC) (58,3%) com duração de um a três dias. O exantema foi do tipo máculo-papular (33,3%), urticariforme (25%) e escarlatiniforme (16,7%); predominando em tronco (60%). Não houve apresentação clínica característica para diagnóstico da doença de Lyme-símile nestes pacientes. A sensibilidade e especificidade para o diagnóstico clínico contraposta com o diagnóstico laboratorial foi zero. O acompanhamento de 10 casos durante dois anos não evidenciou complicações cardiológicas ou neurológicas. Este é o primeiro estudo desta doença em crianças brasileiras. CONCLUSÃO: A prevalência da doença Lyme-símile foi baixa, não tendo sido lembrada no diagnóstico inicial dos exantemas, mas seu conhecimento é necessário, necessitando maior atenção médica.