Human capital and growth under political uncertainty

In this paper we show how political uncertainty may impede economic growth by reducing public investment in the formation of human capital, and how this negative effect of political uncertainty can be offset by a government contract. We present a model of growth with accumulation of human capital and government investment in education. We show that in a country with an unstable political system the government is reluctant to invest in human capital. Low government spending on education negatively affects productivity and slows growth. Furthermore, a politically unstable economy may be trapped in a stagnant equilibrium. We also demonstrate the role of a government retirement contract. Public investment in education and economic growth are higher when the future retirement compensation of the government depends on the future national income, in comparison with investment under zero or fixed retirement compensation.

Degree of vertical integration and its buffering effects on political uncertainty

The focus of this study is on the governance decisions in a concurrent channels context, in the case of uncertainty. The study examines how a firm chooses to deploy its sales force in times of uncertainty, and the subsequent performance outcome of those deployment choices. The theoretical framework is based on multiple theories of governance, including transaction cost analysis (TCA), agency theory, and institutional economics. Three uncertainty variables are investigated in this study. The first two are demand and competitive uncertainty which are considered to be industry-level market uncertainty forms. The third uncertainty, political uncertainty, is chosen as it is an important dimension of institutional environments, capturing non-economic circumstances such as regulations and political systemic issues. The study employs longitudinal secondary data from a Thai hotel chain, comprising monthly observations from January 2007 – December 2012. This hotel chain has its operations in 4 countries, Thailand, the Philippines, United Arab Emirates – Dubai, and Egypt, all of which experienced substantial demand, competitive, and political uncertainty during the study period. This makes them ideal contexts for this study. Two econometric models, both deploying Newey-West estimations, are employed to test 13 hypotheses. The first model considers the relationship between uncertainty and governance. The second model is a version of Newey-West, using an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator and a Two-Stage Least Squares model (2SLS), to test the direct effect of uncertainty on performance and the moderating effect of governance on the relationship between uncertainty and performance. The observed relationship between uncertainty and governance observed follows a core prediction of TCA; that vertical integration is the preferred choice of governance when uncertainty rises. As for the subsequent performance outcomes, the results corroborate that uncertainty has a negative effect on performance. Importantly, the findings show that becoming more vertically integrated cannot help moderate the effect of demand and competitive uncertainty, but can significantly moderate the effect of political uncertainty. These findings have significant theoretical and practical implications, and extend our knowledge of the impact on uncertainty significantly, as well as bringing an institutional perspective to TCA. Further, they offer managers novel insight into the nature of different types of uncertainty, their impact on performance, and how channel decisions can mitigate these impacts.

Foreign Direct Investment and Political Uncertainty

Recent developments in the general equilibrium theory of multinationals emphasize the importance of multilateral considerations. Yet, existing explanations and corresponding estimations of FDI patterns have largely limited political and institutional investment impediments to a bilateral framework. Through the application of spatial econometric techniques, I demonstrate that the presence of both domestic and regional political uncertainty generate real options effects that lead to the delay or redirection of foreign direct investment. The magnitude and direction of these effects is conditional upon the host country regime type and the predominant multinational integration strategies in the region. Comparing these results with FDI of U.S. origin, I find evidence for divergent investment behavior by U.S. multinationals during regime changes in partner countries. Additionally, I find no evidence that multinationals from developing countries are more likely to complete cross-border deals in environments characterized by greater political risk or political uncertainty.

Political Risk, Economic Integration, and the Foreign Direct Investment Decision

In this paper we analyse the impact of policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment strategies. We also consider the impact of economic integration upon FDI decisions. The paper follows the real options approach, which allows investigating the value to a firm of waiting to invest and/or disinvest, when payoffs are stochastic due to political uncertainty and investments are partially reversible. Across the board we find that political uncertainty can be very detrimental to FDI decisions while economic integration leads to an increasing benefit of investing abroad.

Inflation, political instability and stockmarket volatility in interwar Germany

What determined the volatility of asset prices in Germany between thewars? This paper argues that the influence of political factors has beenoverstated. The majority of events increasing political uncertainty hadlittle or no effect on the value of German assets and the volatility ofreturns on them. Instead, it was inflation (and the fear of it) that islargely responsible for most of the variability in asset returns.

Country risk, national cultural differences between partners and survival of international joint ventures in Brazil

This article aims to identify the main and interaction effects of two country-level variables, namely national distance and country risk, on the survival of international joint ventures in emerging markets. Research hypotheses predicting the negative impact of national distance and country risk on survival of international joint ventures are formulated in this article. These research hypotheses are examined in a sample of 234 international joint ventures formed in Brazil between 1973 and 2004. These international joint ventures were subjected to an event history analysis over a period of time ranging from 1973 to 2006. The empirical results show that large national cultural differences between local and foreign partners increase the instability of international joint ventures, whereas the survival of these alliances does not seem to be affected either by the economic and political uncertainty of Brazil. Furthermore, the national distance between local and foreign partners has effects on survival that are variable according to the life cycle of international joint ventures. (C) 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Television and cultural studies: Unfinished business

This introductory article argues that the current state of debate on television within cultural studies is marked by considerable areas of theoretical and political uncertainty. The spread of deregulatory and privatizing public policies in relation to television, and the disarticulation of television from the idea of the national community and from the role of the citizen, have posed new problems for theorizing the relation between television and its audiences. In this article I survey a number of key areas of debate: the relation between television, the nation and the state; television and the citizen/consumer, television content and performance, and the likely future(s) of television.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

This article studies the diffusion of the main institutional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only a few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that three classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.

The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors

This article seeks to explain the pattern of delegation to independent regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Two types of arguments are advanced to explain variations in the formal independence of regulators. Firstly, the need for governments to increase their credible commitment capacity may lead them to delegate regulation to an agency that is partly beyond their direct control. Secondly, delegation may be a response to the political uncertainty problem, which arises when governments are afraid of being replaced by another coalition with different preferences, which could decide to change existing policy choices. In addition, veto players may constitute a functional equivalent of delegation, since they influence policy stability and therefore tend to mitigate both the credibility and the political uncertainty problems. These arguments are consistent with the results of the empirical analysis of the formal independence of regulators in seventeen countries and seven sectors.

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

Paix soutenable : rapports de force et affaiblissement des extrémistes en Angola, en Colombie, au Salvador et au Mozambique de 1989 à 1999

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Los muertos del Floreanismo (Estudios)

El artículo analiza el crimen político durante las primeras décadas de vida de la República del Ecuador. Específicamente centra su estudio en el período dominado por la figura de Juan José Flores, primer presidente del Ecuador. La inestabilidad política, la precariedad de las alianzas entre las élites regionales, la crisis económica generada por las guerras de independencia, las conspiraciones y la violencia que caracterizaron al período de surgimiento de las repúblicas andinas hicieron del crimen político un “vicio de nacimiento”. El asesinato del general Antonio José de Sucre, la muerte de los miembros de la sociedad El Quiteño Libre, el homicidio de Juan Otamendi, entre otros, hicieron patente esta característica.

Capital flows to Latin America: first quarter 2003

Includes bibliography