Alliance Politics in Hybrid Regimes : Political Stability and Instability since World War II

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides.

Bilateral Transport Cost, Infrastructure, Common Bilateral Ties and Political Stability.

Los costos de transporte son una de las más importantes fuentes de barreras al comercio. Inspirados por este aspecto, utilizamos un modelo empírico ad-hoc con el fin de examinar los posibles determinantes de los costos de transporte. Utilizando una base de datos de costos de transporte bilaterales para el año 1990, replicamos el trabajo de Limao y Venables (2001) y encontramos que el efecto de su ´índice de infraestructura sobre los costos de transporte no es robusto. Siguiendo a Micco (2004) y Micco y Serebrinzky (2005) calculamos dos ´índices alternativos de infraestructura. Utilizando estos ´índices encontramos que aparte de la distancia, la infraestructura, la estabilidad política, las relaciones bilaterales comunes y los acuerdos de cielos abiertos son otros importantes canales mediante los cuales los costos de transporte pueden reducirse.

The Political Economy of Swift's Satires and other Prose Works

Jonathan Swift wrote perceptively about the emerging commercial society
in Britain in the early eighteenth century. His particular focus was on the
financial revolution and its implications for economic and political stability
as well as for shifts of power between the landed and commercial
classes. Following his return to Ireland Swift’s focus shifted to the developmental
problems of his native country. In several pamphlets he advocated
consumption of domestic products, challenged existing political
structures and made trenchant criticisms of absenteeism and other dysfunctional
aspects of the land tenure system. Swift’s politico-economic
concerns are fully reflected in his best known work, Gulliver’s Travels but
his most pointed criticism of the emerging commercial system is contained
in A Modest Proposal. Written in the form of an economic pamphlet, A
Modest Proposal is ostensibly designed to address the problem of poverty
in Ireland. In addition to its implicit criticism of economic policy in Ireland,
the pamphlet challenges the separation of economics and morality as
evidenced in the writings of William Petty and Bernard Mandeville. Swift
parodies Petty’s political arithmetic but it is suggested here that he also
had in his sights the consequentialist reasoning present in the work of
both authors but explicitly so in Mandeville.
Keywords: financial revolution, public debt, paper credit, rationality, political
arithmetic, consequentialism, Petty (William), Mandeville (Bernard)

How can economic and political liberalisation improve financial development in African countries?

The objective of this paper is to study the interactions between Economic liberalisation, Political liberalisation and Financial development in African countries. More specifically, we seek to establish the impact of Economic, Political and institutional openness on financial deepening. The empirical approach will be two-step procedure, first using a difference in difference method to show the various aspect of financial liberalisation on economic and political freedom while the second step will be using panel data techniques from period 1990 to 2005. The estimation results can be summarised as the following, first, Economic and financial liberalisation did account significantly for the financial development performance. While political stability show a positive overall effect on financial development, the association with Political freedom is consistent only after controlling the endogeneity of Political freedom on financial development. This result indicates that the transformation of the political and economic environment has improved the performance of the financial sector.

Essays in political economy

Cette thése relie trois articles sur l'économie politique. Ces articles analysent à la fois théoriquement et empiriquement si, et dans quelle mesure, trois phénomènes politiques différents (les partis politiques, les guerres civiles et les menaces externes), et leur interaction, influent sur les résultats économiques. Le premier chapitre étudie l'impact de la présence au pouvoir des politiciens de nouveaux partis politiques sur la taille du gouvernement. Le chapitre se concentre sur les municipalités colombiennes, où les nouveaux partis politiques ont été nombreux et fructueux au cours des dernières années. Les estimations par régressions sur discontinuité montrent que les dépenses publiques et les recettes fiscales sont significativement plus élevées dans les municipalités gouvernées par un maire d'un nouveau parti politique. En utilisant des informations sur la politique locale et des caractéristiques des nouveaux partis, je soutiens que ce résultat peut être expliqué par le fait qu'il y a moins d'information sur les politiciens de nouveaux partis que les politiciens des partis traditionnels. Le deuxième chapitre développe une nouvelle explication de l'impact des guerres civiles et des conflits interétatiques sur le state-building qui repose sur l'idée que les protagonistes de ces deux types de conflits peuvent avoir un lien (ethnique ou idéologique). Un premier résultat montre que la force de ce lien détermine si les conflits contre des adversaires internes (i.e. guerres civiles) ou des ennemis externes (i.e. conflits interétatiques) sont complémentaires ou se substituent, conduisant à plus ou moins d'investissement en capacité fiscale. La théorie prédit également un rôle non trivial de la stabilité politique dans la relation entre les deux types de conflits et la capacité fiscale: un deuxième résultat montre que, bien que la stabilité politique se traduit par moins de capacité fiscale, plus de stabilité n'implique pas plus de state-building. Leur équivalence dépend du niveau de cohésion des institutions. Un nouveau mécanisme par lequel plus de stabilité politique peut impliquer moins de state-building est proposé. En outre, il est démontré que des corrélations dans les données cross-country sont compatibles avec la théorie. Le troisième chapitre examine la relation entre la probabilité d'occurrence d'un conflit intérieur violent et le risque qu'un tel conflit "s'externalise" (c'est à dire se propage dans un autre pays en devenant un conflit interétatique). Je considère une situation dans laquelle un conflit interne entre un gouvernement et un groupe rebelle peut s'externaliser. Je montre que le risque d'externalisation augmente la probabilité d'un accord de paix, mais seulement si le gouvernement est suffisamment puissant par rapport aux rebelles, et si le risque d'externalisation est suffisamment élevé. Je montre comment ce modèle aide à comprendre les récents pourparlers de paix entre le gouvernement colombien et le groupe le plus puissant des rebelles dans le pays, les FARC.

A mixed methods inquiry into the political economy of agriculture and rural areas in Lebanon

The present work, then, is concerned with the forgotten elements of the Lebanese economy, agriculture and rural development. It investigates the main problematic which arose from these forgotten components, in particular the structure of the agricultural sector, production technology, income distribution, poverty, food security, territorial development and local livelihood strategies. It will do so using quantitative Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling and a qualitative phenomenological case study analysis, both embedded in a critical review of the historical development of the political economy of Lebanon, and a structural analysis of its economy. The research shows that under-development in Lebanese rural areas is not due to lack of resources, but rather is the consequence of political choices. It further suggests that agriculture – in both its mainstream conventional and its innovative locally initiated forms of production – still represents important potential for inducing economic growth and development. In order to do so, Lebanon has to take full advantage of its human and territorial capital, by developing a rural development strategy based on two parallel sets of actions: one directed toward the support of local rural development initiatives, and the other directed toward intensive form of production. In addition to its economic returns, such a strategy would promote social and political stability.

The Socioeconomic Background of the Divergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian Political Systems

The aim of this paper is to analyze the political, social and economic background of the divergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian transitions. We focus on Belarus in order to find explanation for questions such as why could Lukashenko remain the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed in 2004. On the theoretical framework of elite-sociology, we seek to determine whether the internal factors (as macroeconomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system and the structure of the political elite) play a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of the Orange Revolution.

"Rentier States" or the Relationship between Regime Stability and Exercising Power in Post-Soviet Central Asia

The paper intends to give an insight into the relations of the economic and political systems of the Central Asian republics using the theoretical framework of the "rentier economy" and "rentier state" approach. The main findings of the paper are that two (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) of the five states examined are commodity export dependent “full-scale” rentier states. The two political systems are of a stable neo-patrimonial regime character, while the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, poor in natural resources but dependent on external rents, may be described as "semi-rentier" states or "rentier economies". They are politically more instable, but have an altogether authoritarian, oligarchical “clan-based” character. Uzbekistan with its closed economy, showing tendencies of economic autarchy, is also a potentially politically unstable clan-based regime. Thus, in the Central Asian context, the rentier state or rentier economy character affects the political stability of the actual regimes rather than having a direct impact on whether power is exercised in an autocratic or democratic way.

Essays on the determinants of private investment: The effects of relative price uncertainty and political instability

The objective of this study was to provide empirical evidence on the effects of relative price uncertainty and political instability on private investment. My effort is expressed in a single-equation model using macroeconomic and socio-political data from eight Latin American countries for the period 1970–1996. Relative price uncertainty is measured by the implied volatility of the exchange rate and political instability is measured by using indicators of social unrest and political violence. ^ I found that, after controlling for other variables, relative price uncertainty and political instability are negatively associated with private investment. Macroeconomic and political stability are key ingredients for the achievement of a strong investment response. This highlights the need to develop the state and build a civil society in which citizens can participate in decision-making and express consent without generating social turmoil. At the same time the government needs to implement structural policies along with relative price adjustments to eliminate excess volatility in price movements in order to provide a stable environment for investment. ^

Essays in economic growth, political economy and institutions

This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic development and growth.^ The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses aggregate output to a suboptimal level.^ The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of law are the important governance indicators.^ The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from regional differences in economic institutions.^

Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland

Ethnically divided societies that might be described as ‘balanced bicommunal’ (where there are two communities, each of which comes close to representing half of the population) pose a particular challenge to conventional principles of collective decision-making, and commonly threaten political stability. This article analyses the experience of two such societies – Northern Ireland and Fiji – with a view to exploring whether there are common processes in the route by which political stability has been pursued. We assess the manner in which a distinctive relationship with Great Britain and its political culture has interacted with local conditions to produce a highly competitive, bipolar party system. This leads to consideration of the devices that have been adopted in an effort to bridge the gap between the communities: the Fiji constitution as amended in 1997, and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement of 1998. We focus, in particular, on the use of unusual (preferential voting) formulas for the election of parliamentarians and of an inclusive principle in the selection of ministers, and consider the contribution of these institutional devices to the attainment of political stability. We find that, in both cases, the intervention of forces from outside the political system had a decisive impact, though in very different ways. In addition to being underpinned by solid institutional design, for political settlements to work effectively, some minimal level of trust between rival elites is required.

Australia's mining interests within Nigeria and Libya : policies, corruption and conflict

Crude petroleum remains the single most imported commodity into Australia and is sourced from a number of countries around the world (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 2011a). While interest in crude petroleum is widespread, in recent years Australia's focus has been drawn to the continent of Africa, where increased political stability, economic recovery and an improved investment climate has made one of the largest oil reserves in the world increasingly more attractive. Despite improvement across the continent, there remain a number of risks which have the potential to significantly damage Australia's economic interests in the petroleum sector,including government policies and legislation, corruption and conflict. The longest exporters of crude petroleum products to Australia – Nigeria and Libya – have been subject to these factors in recent years and, accordingly, are the focus of this paper. Once identified, the impact of political instability, conflict, government corruption and other risk factors to Australia's mining interests within these countries is examined, and efforts to manage such risks are discussed.

Clasicismo e Ilustración: modelos sin nostalgia

Javier Alonso Aldama, Cirilo García Román e Idoia Mamolar Sánchez (eds)