Kontraszelekció és erkölcsi kockázat a politikában. Vázlat az információs aszimmetria közgazdaságtani fogalmainak politikatudományi alkalmazhatóságáról (Negative selection and moral risk in politics. An outline of the usefulness to political science of the economic concept of information asymmetry)

Az írás a kontraszelekció és az erkölcsi kockázat információ-gazdaságtani fogalmának politikatudományi alkalmazhatósága mellett érvel. Azt kívánja bemutatni, hogy a politikai piac szereplői közti információs aszimmetria mechanizmusainak éppúgy lehetnek súlyos negatív hatásai a demokratikus politikai rendszer működésére nézve, mint ahogy a gazdasági szereplők közti információs aszimmetria - Nobel-díjas közgazdászok érvei szerint - alááshatja a piaci verseny hatékonyságát. Az írás új megvilágításba helyezi a - már Platón óta ismert - politikai kontraszelekció jelenségét, továbbá részletesen foglalkozik az erkölcsi kockázat és a megbízó-megbízott relációk megjelenésével a politikában. Érinti tovább azoknak a mechanizmusoknak - a jelzésnek és a szűrésnek - a megjelenését a politikában, melyeket a közgazdászok az információs aszimmetria csökkentésére ajánlanak. / === / The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors – according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists – has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms – signals and filters – that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.

Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.

Is there space for senior civil servants hybrid management models across political- administrative systems?

Comunicação apresentada na 17.ª conferência anual da NISPACee, realizada de 14 a 16 de Maio de 2009.

Migrant networks and political participation in Mozambique

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Are parties domocratizing themselves? the evolution of leardership selection in Spain (1977-2008)

The aim of this paper is to verify, for the Spanish case, whether between 1977 and 2008 has increased the internal democracy of the major political parties (PSOE, AP / PP, PCE / IU, PNV and CDC). To do this, we will focus on their leadership selection processes, one of the key elements associated with intra-party democracy. The paper is going to introduce data on four different dimensions of leadership selection: the certification process, the voting procedure, the inclusiveness of the selectorate and, finally, the degree of competitiveness. The results will show that have been few changes in the leadership selection processes of the Spanish political parties since 1977. However, the results of the Spanish case will also be used to suggest some preliminary links between the four dimensions.

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.

Career Officers and Political Appointees in American Diplomacy: Contending for Diplomatic Positions through Boundary Work

American Political and Economic Series

Paradise postponed? The Department of National Heritage and political hegemony

Established following the Conservative Party's election victory in April 1992, the Department of National Heritage has been heralded as an important stage in the growing recognition of the significance of the leisure industry to Britain. By combining, for the first time, responsibility for sport, tourism, the arts, libraries, heritage, broadcasting and film, and by providing them with Cabinet representation, a unique opportunity has, seemingly, been provided to develop and promote the interests of leisure in Britain. This paper takes the view that although this initiative has been broadly welcomed, there are important inconsistencies which require attention. On the one hand the selection of the portfolio appears somewhat eclectic. On the other hand, it is questionable why such a department should have been developed at all. An inspection of the implicit ideology suggests that rather than the traditional use of the state to promote leisure interests, the introduction of the department signifies a shift to the use of leisure to promote the Government's interests. Thus the new Department of National Heritage is to be used as a central feature in the legitimation of the government's political programme. Rather than emphasising its traditional quasi-welfare role, the new place for leisure and heritage is firmly in the market economy. Whilst a leisured society may be the epitome of post-industrialism, therefore, the citizen rights claim for access to leisure activities can only be secured by engaging with the market. This legitimised construction of post- modern citizenship is at the centre of a new political order where choice has been replaced by means and where the classless paradigm championed by the Prime Minister will be a classlessness of constructed omission.

Charles Darwin's liberalism in 'Natural Selection as affecting civilised nations'

This article reassesses 'Natural Selection as affecting Civilised Nations': a thirteen-page section in the first volume of The Descent of Man (1871) often assumed to be problematic for those who wish to emphasize Darwin's liberal credentials. For hismost virulent critics the section connects Darwin to eugenics and the Nazi Holocaust. Even his admirers tend to view it as symptomatic of Darwin succumbing to a more conservative politics. This article demonstrates, through a delineation of the intellectual context and a close reading of key passages, that in fact 'Natural Selection as affecting Civilised Nations' confirmed, rather than abandoned, Darwin's liberalism.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Selection and influence effects in defending a victim of bullying: The moderating effects of school context

In this paper we examined whether defenders of victims of school bullying befriended similar peers, and whether the similarity is due to selection or influence processes or both. We examined whether these processes result in different degrees of similarity between peers depending on teachers’ self-efficacy and the school climate. We analyzed longitudinal data of 478 Swiss school students employing actor-based stochastic models. Our analyses showed that similarity in defending behavior among friends was due to selection rather than influence. The extent to which adolescents selected peers showing similar defending behavior was related to contextual factors. In fact, lower self-efficacy of teachers and positive school climate were associated with increased selection effects in terms of defending behavior.

The Personal Foundations of Political Tolerance towards Immigrants

In this paper, we expand previous research on the psychological foundations of attitudes towards immigrants by evaluating the role of the Big Five personality traits with regard to the formation of political tolerance. Following the literature, we elaborate tolerance as a sequential concept of rejection and acceptance to uncover differentiating effects of personality on both immigrant-specific prejudices as well as on the assignment of the right to vote as a pivotal political privilege to this group. Using a representative sample of the Swiss population, with its distinctive history related to the immigration issue, our two-step Heckman selection models reveal that extroverts and people who score low in agreeableness exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants. At the same time, only openness to experience is significantly connected to the likeliness of granting immigrants the right to vote.