Joining the online video conversation? Discourse and practices of European political institutions and politicians on YouTube

To mimic the online practices of citizens has been declared an imperative to improve communication and extend participation. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of how European discourses praising online video as a communication tool have been translated into actual practices by politicians, governments and organisations. By contrasting official documents with YouTube activity, it is argued that new opportunities for European political communication are far from being fully embraced, much akin to the early years of websites. The main choice has been to use YouTube channels fundamentally for distribution and archiving, thus neglecting its social media features. The disabling of comments by many heads of state and prime ministers - and, in 2010, the European Commission - indicates such an attitude. The few attempts made to foster citizen engagement, in particular during elections, have had limited success, given low participation numbers and lack of argument exchange.

Political institutions and the development of telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.

Political institutions and the development of telecomunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries’ political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.

Violence and Political Institutions in the Basque Country

A credible analysis or proposal to solve the problem of the treatment of violence in divided societies has to based in a good understanding of the micro-foundations of the political mobilization in these societies. Much of the engineering models seem to have been based on rather strong simplifications of the electoral behaviour of the citizens. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the underlying political competition in divided societies with a neo-downsian model of party competition that is based on the interpretation of Tsebelis (1991) of the consociationalism.

Accountability and corruption : a study into political institutions as referees between principals and agents

Representativ demokrati innebär att medborgare istället för att själv göra beslut i frågor som angår dem, ofta delegerar dylikt beslutsfattande till representanter. Det här betyder att viktiga beslut görs av personer som medborgarna i allmänhet inte känner speciellt väl, och i vars ageranden medborgarna endast har lite insyn. Vanliga medborgare och deras representanter har därtill ofta mycket olika intressen, d.v.s. har olika syn på vad som är viktigt. Representanterna har följaktligen både möjligheter och incitament att missbruka den makt som anförtrotts dem, bl.a. genom korrupt verksamhet. Denna avhandling analyserar mekanismer genom vilka korruption bland representanter kan förebyggas, och (då korrupta handlingar redan ägt rum) upptäckas. Avhandlingen granskar mekanismer som a) ger medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare mer information om representanternas målsättningar och ageranden, b) som tvingar representanterna att rättfärdiga sina ageranden gentemot medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare, och c) som gör det möjligt för medborgare och andra ansvarsutkrävare att straffa representanter som agerat korrupt. Avhandlingen hävdar att tillämpandet av dylika mekanismer minskar lockelsen för och möjligheterna att engagera sig i korrupta handlingar. Avhandlingen studerar de mekanismer för ansvarsutkrävande som skapas genom politiskt institutionsbyggande. Bl.a. analyseras i vilken grad olika valsystem och typer av maktfördelning gör det möjligt att hålla representanter till svars, och därmed förhindra och upptäcka korruption. Sambandet mellan institutionsbyggande, möjligheter till ansvarsutkrävande och förekomst av korruption studeras på såväl makro- som mikronivå. Studien på makronivå inkluderar ett flertal länder och analyserar sambandet med hjälp av statistisk analys. Studien på mikronivå däremot består av två fallstudier (Österrike och Botswana) och utgör en djupdykning i dessa länders politiska institutioner, möjligheter till ansvarsutkrävande inom ramen för institutionerna, och följder i form av korruption.

Translation practices in political institutions: a comparison of national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations

This paper explores the settings and practices of translation at three types of political institutions, i.e. national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations. The three institutions are the translation service of the German Foreign Office, the translation department of the European Central Bank, and translation provision by the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International. The three case studies describe the specific translation practices in place at these institutions and illustrate some characteristic translation strategies. In this way, we reflect on how different translation practices can impact on translation agency and how these practices in turn are influenced by the type of institution and its organisational structure. The article also aims to explore to which extent the characteristics of collectivity, anonymity and standardisation, and of institutional translation as self-translation are applicable to the institutions under discussion.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.