Changes in the political elite, economy and society of Belarus: Appearances and reality. OSW Study 30/2008

In late 2006 and early 2007, relations between Russia and Belarus were hit by the most serious crisis in many years. In a setting of heightened tension, the Belarusian authorities decided to gradually modify their economic policy and thoroughly restructure the ruling class. The new situation created new, much more difficult challenges for the Belarusian opposition. The processes initiated by the authorities were not intended to bring about either the democratisation of public and political life or full economic liberalisation; their only purpose was to enable the regime to tackle new challenges and survive in the changing international context. Nevertheless, modernisation has been initiated in Belarus' authoritarian system of power, which until now was considered to be completely incapable of reform. This puts the country's main political and economic partners, including the European Union, in a new situation.

Legitimacy in question : elite-mass relations, constitutional reform and Canadian democracy /

During the 1980s and 1990s, Canadian political authority orientations underwent a significant transformation. Canadians are no longer deferential towards their political elites. Instead, they are autonomous, challenging, and increasingly participatory, and this continuing trend has brought the procedural legitimacy of the Canadian political process into question. The following study of elite-mass relations within Canadian democracy attempts to provide insight into the meaning of this change and how it should be addressed. An attitudinalbehavioural analysis ofthe electorate presents evidence that popular cynicism and alienation is rooted more deeply in a dissatisfaction with political institutions and traditions than with politicians. A structural analysis of the elected political elite reveals the failure of consociational traditions to provide effective representation as well as the minimal impact which the aforementioned orientation shift has had upon this elite. An event-decisional analysis, or case study, ofelite-mass relations in the arena of constitutional politics augments these complementary profiles and illustrates how the transformed electorate has significantly restricted the elected political elite's role in constitutional reform. The study concludes that the lack ofresponsiveness, representativeness, and inclusiveness ofCanada's elected political elite, political institutions, and political traditions has substantially eroded the procedural legitimacy of Canadian democracy during the 1980s and 1990s. Remedying these three deficiencies in the political system, which are the objects of increasing public demand, may restore legitimacy, but the likelihood that such reforms will be adopted is presently uncertain in the face of formidable difficulties and obstacles.

Politics in extraordinary times : a study of the reaction of political parties and elites to terrorism

Cette thèse porte sur le comportement des élites politiques durant les périodes de crise nationale et plus particulièrement sur leurs réactions aux attentats terroristes. Elle démontre que les crises terroristes sont tout comme les conflits militaires ou diplomatiques propices aux unions nationales et notamment aux ralliements des partis d’opposition auprès du gouvernement. L’analyse statistique d’actes terroristes s’étant produits dans cinq états démocratiques (Allemagne, Espagne, États-Unis d’Amérique, France et Royaume-Uni) entre 1990 et 2006 révèle que l’ampleur d’un attentat en termes de pertes humaines ainsi que la répétition de ces attentats influencent dans une large mesure la réaction des élites politiques. Ainsi plus l’ampleur d’un attentat est élevée, plus la probabilité d’un ralliement est grande. En revanche, la multiplication des attentats augmente la possibilité de dissension entre l’opposition et le gouvernement. Par ailleurs, l’opposition est plus susceptible de se rallier au gouvernement lorsque l’attentat est perpétré par des terroristes provenant de l’étranger. L’analyse quantitative indique également que l’existence d’un accord formel de coopération dans la lutte antiterroriste entre le gouvernement et l’opposition favorise l’union des élites. Enfin, les données analysées suggèrent que la proportion des ralliements dans les cinq pays est plus importante depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001. Une analyse qualitative portant exclusivement sur la France et couvrant la période 1980-2006 confirme la validité des variables identifiées dans la partie quantitative, mais suggère que les élites réagissent au nombre total de victimes (morts mais aussi blessés) et que la répétition des actes terroristes a moins d’impact lors des vagues d’attentats. Par ailleurs, les analyses de cas confirment que les élites politiques françaises sont plus susceptibles de se rallier quand un attentat vise un haut-fonctionnaire de l’État. Il apparaît également que les rivalités et rancœurs politiques propre à la France (notamment suite à l’arrivée de la gauche au pouvoir en 1981) ont parfois empêché le ralliement des élites. Enfin, cette analyse qualitative révèle que si l’extrême gauche française soutient généralement le gouvernement, qu’il soit de gauche ou de droite, en période de crise terroriste, l’extrême droite en revanche saisit quasi systématiquement l’opportunité offerte par l’acte terroriste pour critiquer le gouvernement ainsi que les partis de l’establishment. La thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier chapitre suggère que le comportement des élites politiques en période de crises internationales graves (guerres et conflits diplomatiques) est souvent influencé par la raison d’État et non par l’intérêt électoral qui prédomine lors des périodes plus paisibles. Le second chapitre discute du phénomène terroriste et de la littérature afférente. Le troisième chapitre analyse les causes du phénomène d’union nationale, soumet un cadre pour l’analyse de la réaction des élites aux actes terroristes, et présente une série d’hypothèses. Le quatrième chapitre détaille la méthodologie utilisée au cours de cette recherche. Les chapitres cinq et six présentent respectivement les résultats des analyses quantitatives et qualitatives. Enfin, le chapitre sept conclut cette thèse en résumant la contribution de l’auteur et en suggérant des pistes de recherche.

Integrating a traditional minority into a Nordic society: Elite discourse on the Finnish Roma

Contemporary citizenship studies have been more concerned with the theory and philosophy of citizenship than with empirical studies. The general objective of this contribution is to broaden the understanding of how notions of citizenship are constructed and re-valued in the social world. The study draws on a qualitative analysis of political elite discourse on Romani issues in the Finnish Parliament from 1989-2003. How issues concerning the Roma are debated elucidates the dilemmas of universal rights and duties within the Nordic welfare model, and the possibilities for cultural diversity within this framework. While the Finnish parliamentary debate accentuated tolerance and the acceptance of difference as strengthening factors for Finnish social citizenship, it was not before the new millennium that the political discourse changed to increasingly stress notions of discrimination and structural inequalities in relation to the incapability to provide for a full an inclusive citizenship as regards the Romani minority.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Corruption and the Electoral Support of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This article examines corruption as a potential determinant of their electoral support. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: on the one hand, the historically derived corruption level reduces the electoral support for new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase in perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral support for new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2013 confirms these two counteracting effects.

Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

The Socioeconomic Background of the Divergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian Political Systems

The aim of this paper is to analyze the political, social and economic background of the divergence of Belarusian and Ukrainian transitions. We focus on Belarus in order to find explanation for questions such as why could Lukashenko remain the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the position of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed in 2004. On the theoretical framework of elite-sociology, we seek to determine whether the internal factors (as macroeconomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of the political system and the structure of the political elite) play a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of the Orange Revolution.

Political polarization and its consequences on democratic accountability

This paper first explores the polarizationthesis, according to which between 1990-2010 political polarization increased to a large extent in the Hungarian political elite and among citizens, although it did not undermine the stability of the political system. Second, it gives an endogenousexplanation for this phenomenon. Third, through theoretical discussion and empirical examples taken from Hungarian politics it is revealed that although growing polarization has not generated regime instability, it reduces, or might reduce, the efficiency of the operation of democracy. Five mechanisms of the effects of ideological polarization which weaken democratic accountability are explored.

O espaço ‘Opinião’ do jornal Público: perfil e agenda dos comentadores no início de 2014

Relatório de estágio apresentado à Escola Superior de Comunicação Social como parte dos requisitos para obtenção de grau de mestre em Jornalismo.

Políticas, mediação e acesso à informação europeia: análise comparativa no âmbito da ciência da informação

Apresentam-se as primeiras etapas da política de informação das instituições europeia desde os anos cinquenta do século XX até ao primeiro semestre de 2007. Enfatiza-se o alargamento progressivo do público-alvo, inicialmente restrito a grupos de elite diversos, que, a partir dos anos setenta, começa a procurar abranger a opinião-pública de todos os Estados-Membros. Sublinha-se também a afirmação gradual de um discurso assente na política de comunicação em detrimento da política de informação. Os Centros de Documentação Europeia, rede de informação tutelada pela Comissão Europeia, são objecto de um estudo mais detalhado. Analisam-se as motivações para o acesso à informação europeia, as facilidades e os obstáculos existentes para esse acesso, os meios e as fontes preferenciais bem como os aspectos mais valorizados neste âmbito.

The MPs of the First Portuguese Republic: A prosopographic study

This paper summarises the results of the first systematic, detailed prosopographic study of the MPs – the deputados of the Lower Chamber - of the First Portuguese Republic (1910-1926). Data are presented both by legislature and for the overall period. Two kinds of background variables are explored: sociodemographic (birthplace, age, education and profession) and political (previous experience in other elite positions). Regime change in 1910 resulted in the replacement of the former political elite by homines novi. Most MPs of the Republican regime were born in small towns and communities, had carried out higher educational studies (with prevalence for law training), were mainly drawn from the professions (practising lawyers and doctors) and the Army, and were elected for the first-time at relatively young ages. Parliamentary turnover was high (two-thirds of the representatives held just one mandate) and a large proportion of MPs had a consistent connection (birth, family ties, occupation) to the constituencies to which they had been elected.

Humor and the framing of the public sphere and public opinion in Portugal (1797-1834)

In his Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment (1784), Kant puts forward his belief that the vocation to think freely, which humankind is endowed with, is bound to make sure that “the public use of reason” will at last act “even on the fundamental principles of government and the state [will] find it agreeable to treat man – who is now more than a machine – in accord with his dignity”. The critical reference to La Mettrie (1747), by opposing the machine to human dignity, will echo, in the dawn of the 20th century, in Bergson’s attempt to explain humor. Besides being exclusive to humans, humor is also a social phenomenon. Freud (1905) assures that pleasure originated by humor is collective, it results from a “social process”: jokes need an audience, a “third party”, in order to work and have fun. Assuming humor as a social and cultural phenomenon, this paper intends to sustain that it played a role in the framing of the public sphere and of public opinion in Portugal during the transition from Absolute Monarchy to Liberalism. The search for the conditions which made possible the critical exercise of sociability is at the root of the creation of the public sphere in the sense developed by Habermas (1962), whose perspective, however, has been questioned by those who point 2 out the alleged idealism of the concept – as opposed, for example, to Bakhtin (1970), whose work stresses diversity and pluralism. This notwithstanding, the concept of public sphere is crucial to the building of public opinion, which is, in turn, indissoluble from the principle of publicity, as demonstrated by Bobbio (1985). This paper discusses the historical evolution of the concept of public opinion from Ancient Greece doxa, through Machiavelli’s “humors” (1532), the origin of the expression in Montaigne (1580) and the contributions of Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690), Swift (1729), Rousseau (1762) or Hume (1777), up to the reflection of Lippman (1922) and Bourdieu’s critique (1984). It maintains that humor, as it appears in Portuguese printed periodicals from 1797 (when Almocreve de Petas was published for the first time) to the end of the civil war (1834) – especially in those edited by José Daniel Rodrigues da Costa but also in O Piolho Viajante, by António Manuel Policarpo da Silva, or in the ones written by José Agostinho de Macedo, as well as in a political “elite minded” periodical such as Correio Braziliense –, contributed to the framing of the public sphere and of public opinion in Portugal.