The political economy of corruption in Brazil

This article is the first part of a research on corruption in Brazil and it is theoretical. Despite this, it provides an economic interpretation of corruption using Brazil as a case study. The main objective of this research is to apply some microeconomic tools to understand the "big corruption". However, I am going to show that corruption is not simply a kind of crime. Rather, it is an ordinary economic activity that arises in some institutional environments. Firstly, some corruption cases in Brazil will be described. This article is aimed at showing that democracy itself does not ensure control over corruption. Secondly, I am going to do a very brief survey of institutional changes and controls over corruption in some Western Societies in which I am going to argue that corruption, its control and its illegality depend on institutional evolution by streamlining the constitutional and institutional framework. Thirdly, I am going to explain how some economic models could be adopted for a better understanding of corruption. Finally, I will present a multiple-self model applied to the public agent (politician and bureaucrat) constrained by institutions and pay-off systems.

“The political economy of the Church”

A igreja de Goa é uma filha da expansão portuguesa. Nasceu e cresceu no âmbito do Padroado português do Oriente. Essa ligação beneficiou e prejudicou a sua missão espiritual. Desde 1961 a igreja de Goa enfrenta os desafios da democracia. Apesar da demonstração de progresso visível, há muito caminho para percorrer, particularmente no que diz respeito à administração dos bens temporais da igreja e com maior participação leiga nessa área.

An Archival Case Study: Revisiting The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie

This paper forms part of a wider project to show the significance of archival material on distinguished economists, in this case Lauchlin Currie (1902-93), who studied and taught at Harvard before entering government service at the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Board as the intellectual leader of Roosevelt’s New Deal, 1934-39, as FDR’s White House economic adviser in peace and war, 1939-45, and as a post-war development economist. It discusses the uses made of the written and oral material available when the author was writing his intellectual biography of Currie (Duke University Press 1990) while Currie was still alive, and the significance of the material that has come to light after Currie’s death.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Beyond the Transatlantic Divide: The Multiple Authorities of Standards in the Global Political Economy of Services

This paper explores the plurality of institutional environments in which standards for the service sector are expected to support the rise of a global knowledge-based economy. Despite the careful wording of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a whole range of international bodies still have the capacity to define technical specifications affecting how services are expected to be traded on worldwide basis. The analysis relies on global political economy approaches to extend to the area of service standards the assumption that the process of globalization is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression of both of them including new patterns and agents of structural change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. It analyses on a cross-institutional basis patterns of authority in the institutional setting of service standards in the context of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), the European Union, and the United States. In contrast to conventional views opposing the American system to the ISO/European framework, the paper questions the robustness of this opposition by showing that institutional developments of service standards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises across those systems and between two opposing models of standardisation.

The political economy of childcare in OECD countries : Explaining cross-national variation in spending and coverage rates

If childcare policy has become topical in most OECD countries over the last ten years or so, actual developments display huge cross-national variations. Countries like Sweden and Denmark spend around 2 per cent of GDP on this service, and provide affordable childcare places to most children below school age. At the other extreme, in Southern Europe, only around 10 per cent of this age group has access to formal daycare. Against this background, this article aims to account for cross-national variations in childcare services. It distinguishes two dependent variables: the coverage rate and the proportion of GDP spent subsidising childcare services. Using a mix of cross-sectional and pooled times-series methods, it tests a series of hypotheses concerning the determinants of the development of this policy. Its main conclusion for the coverage rate is that key factors are public spending and wage dispersion (both positive). For spending, key factors are the proportion of women in parliaments (positive) and spending on age-related policies (negative).