Treasury bond returns and U.S. political cycles

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

State–society cycles and political pacts in a national–dependent society: Brazil

The history of independent Brazil may be divided into three major state–society cycles, and, after 1930, five political pacts or class coalitions can be identified. These pacts were nationalist; only in the 1990s did the Brazilian elites surrender to the neoliberal hegemony. Yet, since the mid-2000s they have been rediscovering the idea of the nation. The main claim of the essay is that Brazilian elites and Brazilian society are “national–dependent”, that is, they are ambivalent and contradictory, requiring an oxymoron to define them. They are dependent because they often see themselves as “European” and the mass of the people as inferior. But Brazil is big enough, and there are enough common interests around its domestic market, to make the Brazilian nation less ambivalent. Today Brazil is seeking a synthesis between the last two political cycles – between social justice and economic development in the framework of democracy.

Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level

This article tests the hypothesis of opportunistic and partisan cycle models using a new large data set of Brazilian municipalities over the 1989-2005 period. The results show an increase in total and current expenditures and a decrease in municipal investments, local tax revenues, and budget surplus in election years. They also show that partisan ideology exerts a relative influence on the performance of the local public accounts. These results confirm that both opportunistic and partisan cycles have occurred in the management of the budgets of Brazilian municipalities after the end of the military government.

Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: in depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures

NIPE - WP 02/2016

The electoral dynamics of human development

This paper analyses the impact of elections on the dynamics of human development in a panel of 82 countries over the period 1980-2013. The incidence of partisan and political support effects is also taken into account. A GMM estimator is employed in the empirical analysis and the results point out to the presence of an electoral cycle in the growth rate of human development. Majority governments also influence it, but no clear evidence is found regarding partisan effects. The electoral cycles have proved to be stronger in non-OECD countries, in countries with less frequent elections, with lower levels of income and human development, in presidential and non-plurality systems and in proportional representation regimes. They have also become more intense in this millennium.

La titulatura faraònica dels emperadors romans: un cas particular de la imitatio Alexandri

Estudi realitzat a partir d’una estada a la University of Oxford, Gran Bretanya, entre 2010 i 2012. Durant l’estada postdoctoral a la University of Oxford s’han efectuat dos estudis relacionats amb l’onomàstica dels faraons d’Egipte i que constitueixen una continuació de l’anàlisi de la titulatura d’Alexandre el Gran realitzada prèviament per l’investigador en la seva recerca doctoral. El primer estudi examina la titulatura faraònica dels emperadors romans en comparació amb la d’Alexandre i, en especial, la significació ideològica i política dels paral•lelismes onomàstics existents entre elles, els quals han estat analitzats en el marc de la imitatio-aemulatio-comparatio Alexandri. Per al cas d’August, s’ha arribat a la conclusió que l’adopció de determinats apel•latius egipcis utilitzats anteriorment per Alexandre pot ser interpretada com un exemple local o estrictament egipci d’imitatio Alexandri, mentre que, en relació amb la resta d’emperadors, atès que les seves titulatures faraòniques es basen o imiten la del primer emperador, aquestes represes han de ser vistes més aviat com un exemple d’imitatio (o comparatio) Augusti. El segon estudi versa sobre la titulatura faraònica egípcia i la tradició annalística. A partir d’una anàlisi comparativa dels protocols onomàstics dels fundadores de cadascuna de les dinasties, s’ha intentat determinar si determinats noms o epítets s’empren de forma recurrent i d’una manera deliberada per tal de senyalar canvis dinàstics, és a dir, noves realitats polítiques. En concret, s’ha pretès establir fins a quin punt determinats recursos onomàstics tenen el seu reflex en la divisió en dinasties de Manetó i, alhora, determinar en quina mesura l’estudi de l’onomàstica faraònica pot contribuir al coneixement de com els egipcis conceptualitzaren i organitzaren el seu propi passat.

Politiikan syklit ja ääriliikkeet Hampurissa

Abstract: Political cycles and extremist movements in Hamburg

Ciclos político-económico-electorales y su incidencia en los niveles de pobreza en el marco de la competencia por el poder

El interés de la presente monografía es analizar los efectos de los ciclos político-económico-electorales (CPEE) sobre los niveles de pobreza en Colombia para el periodo del 2002 al 2010. Se analiza el manejo de la política fiscal por parte del gobierno con el fin de caracterizar el ciclo político entre oportunista o partidista. De esta forma, se pretende corroborar que en Colombia los CPEE generan efectos en la economía. No obstante, estos efectos pueden ser más o menos duraderos en función de la sostenibilidad del discurso ganador en la contienda electoral. Como resultado de este trabajo se determinó que la discontinuidad en el manejo de la política fiscal presenta un ciclo político-económico-electoral oportunista que contribuye negativamente los niveles de pobreza. Para desarrollar lo anterior, se realiza un análisis el cual se aborda desde el Enfoque de la Elección Racional.

Os três ciclos da sociedade e do estado

The history of independent Brazil may be divided in three major political cycles, and, since 1930, we can distinguish five political pacts or class coalitions. Since 1930 these pacts have been nationalist. Only in the 1990s the Brazilian elites surrendered to the neoliberal hegemony. Yet, since the mid 2000s, they are recovering their idea of nation. In fact, the main claim of the essay is that Brazilian elites and the Brazilian society are “national-dependent”, i.e., they are ambiguous and contradictory, requiring an oxymoron to define them. The elite is dependent because it often sees itself as “European” and its people as inferior. But Brazil is big enough and around its domestic market there are enough common interests to make the Brazilian nation less ambiguous. Today, it searches for a synthesis between the two last political cycles – between social justice and economic development in the framework of democracy.

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

Rapport de recherche

Special interests and political business cycles

In this paper we bridge the gap between special interest politics and political business cycle literature. We build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange rates.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.

Development cycles, political regimes and international migration: Argentina in the 20th century

Includes bibliography

Application of wavelets to the study of political history

\The idea that social processes develop in a cyclical manner is somewhat like a `Lorelei'. Researchers are lured to it because of its theoretical promise, only to become entangled in (if not wrecked by) messy problems of empirical inference. The reasoning leading to hypotheses of some kind of cycle is often elegant enough, yet the data from repeated observations rarely display the supposed cyclical pattern. (...) In addition, various `schools' seem to exist which frequently arrive at di erent conclusions on the basis of the same data." (van der Eijk and Weber 1987:271). Much of the empirical controversies around these issues arise because of three distinct problems: the coexistence of cycles of di erent periodicities, the possibility of transient cycles and the existence of cycles without xed periodicity. In some cases, there are no reasons to expect any of these phenomena to be relevant. Seasonality caused by Christmas is one such example (Wen 2002). In such cases, researchers mostly rely on spectral analysis and Auto-Regressive Moving-Average (ARMA) models to estimate the periodicity of cycles.1 However, and this is particularly true in social sciences, sometimes there are good theoretical reasons to expect irregular cycles. In such cases, \the identi cation of periodic movement in something like the vote is a daunting task all by itself. When a pendulum swings with an irregular beat (frequency), and the extent of the swing (amplitude) is not constant, mathematical functions like sine-waves are of no use."(Lebo and Norpoth 2007:73) In the past, this di culty has led to two di erent approaches. On the one hand, some researchers dismissed these methods altogether, relying on informal alternatives that do not meet rigorous standards of statistical inference. Goldstein (1985 and 1988), studying the severity of Great power wars is one such example. On the other hand, there are authors who transfer the assumptions of spectral analysis (and ARMA models) into fundamental assumptions about the nature of social phenomena. This type of argument was produced by Beck (1991) who, in a reply to Goldstein (1988), claimed that only \ xed period models are meaningful models of cyclic phenomena".We argue that wavelet analysis|a mathematical framework developed in the mid-1980s (Grossman and Morlet 1984; Goupillaud et al. 1984) | is a very viable alternative to study cycles in political time-series. It has the advantage of staying close to the frequency domain approach of spectral analysis while addressing its main limitations. Its principal contribution comes from estimating the spectral characteristics of a time-series as a function of time, thus revealing how its di erent periodic components may change over time. The rest of article proceeds as follows. In the section \Time-frequency Analysis", we study in some detail the continuous wavelet transform and compare its time-frequency properties with the more standard tool for that purpose, the windowed Fourier transform. In the section \The British Political Pendulum", we apply wavelet analysis to essentially the same data analyzed by Lebo and Norpoth (2007) and Merrill, Grofman and Brunell (2011) and try to provide a more nuanced answer to the same question discussed by these authors: do British electoral politics exhibit cycles? Finally, in the last section, we present a concise list of future directions.