Applied philosophy of language

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data.

Experimental philosophy of language

Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed.

Concise Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Language, ed. P.V. Lamarque, Pergamon 1997, ISBN: 978-0080429915 and, Readings in the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. Ludlow, The MIT Press, 1997, ISBN: 978-0262621144 [Book review]

Abstract not available

The structure and design philosophy of OL/2, an array language,

Includes bibliographies.

A sequel to the Common school grammar; containing, in addition to other materials and illustrations, notes and critical remarks on the philosophy of the English language; and explaining some of its most difficult idiomatic phrases. Designed for the use of the first class in common schools.

Mode of access: Internet.

A manual of the philosophy of voice and speech, especially in relation to the English language and the art of public speaking /

Mode of access: Internet.

The destinal question of language

How can we think the destinal place of language in the essentially historical condition of our existence if such historicity cannot be understood on the basis of the labor of negativity alone? The attempt is made here to think language in a more originary manner, as non-negative finitude, that affirms what is outside dialectical-speculative closure, what is to come. The notion of 'destinal' itself is thus transformed. No longer being merely a categorical grasp of "entities presently given", language is an originary exposure to the event of arrival in its lightning flash. Destiny appears as that of the messianic arrival of the 'not yet' which is not a telos that the immanent movement of historical reason reaches by an irresistible force of the negative. This essay reads Schelling, Heidegger and Kierkegaard to think language as a "place" of exposure to the non-teleological destiny that may erupt even today, here and now, without any given conditionality.

Linguistic experiments and ordinary language philosophy

J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his `donkey stories', that `mistake' and `accident' apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as `intentionally' and `deliberately'). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.