Applied philosophy of language

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data.

Experimental philosophy of language

Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names and natural kind terms. The reliability of expert judgments vs. the judgments of ordinary speakers, the role that ambiguity plays in influencing responses to experiments, and the reliability of meta-linguistic judgments are also assessed.

Concise Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Language, ed. P.V. Lamarque, Pergamon 1997, ISBN: 978-0080429915 and, Readings in the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. Ludlow, The MIT Press, 1997, ISBN: 978-0262621144 [Book review]

Abstract not available

Imagination and diversity in the philosophy of Hobbes

This dissertation is a study of some aspects of theoretical philosophy of the early modern thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). The focal point of the work is Hobbes s conception of imagination, which is discussed from both a systematic and a historical point of view, as well as in the light of contemporary scholarship. I argue that though there are significant similarities between the view of Hobbes and that of his predecessors, he gives a novel theory of imagination, which clarifies not only early modern discussions on human nature, knowledge, science, and literary criticism, but above all his own versatile philosophy. The prologue of the dissertation introduces methodological principles and gives critical remarks on the standard view of Hobbes. In Chapter II, I discuss the prominent theories of imagination before Hobbes and link them to his account. I argue that though Hobbes adopted the Aristotelian framework, his view is not reduced to it, as he borrows from various sources, for instance, from the Stoics and from Renaissance thought. Chapters III and IV form the psychological part of the work. In the Chapter III I argue that imagination, not sense, is central in the basic cognitive operations of the mind and that imagination has a decisive role in Hobbes s theory of motivation. The Chapter IV concentrates on various questions of Hobbes s philosophy of language. The chapter ends with a defence of a less naturalistic reading of Hobbes s theory of human nature. Chapters V and VI form the epistemological part of the work. I suggest, contrary to what has been recently claimed, that though Hobbes s ideas of good literary style do have a point of contact with his philosophy (e.g. the psychology of creative process), his ideas in the field are independent of his project of demonstrative political science. Instead I argue that the novelty of his major political work, Leviathan (1651), is based on a new theory of knowledge which he continued to develop in the post-Leviathan works. Chapter VII seeks to connect the more theoretical conclusions of Chapters V and VI to Hobbes's idea(l) of science as well as to his philosophical practice. On the basis of Hobbes s own writings as well as some historical examinations, I argue that method is not an apt way to conceptualise Hobbes s philosophical practice. Contemporary readings of Hobbes s theory of science are critically discussed and the chapter ends with an analysis of Hobbes s actual argumentation. In addition to the concluding remarks, the epilogue suggest three things: first, imagination is central when trying to understand Hobbes s versatile philosophy; second, that it is misleading to depict Hobbes as a simple materialist, mechanist, and empiricist; and, third, that in terms of imagination his influence on early modern thought has not been fully appreciated.

The structure and design philosophy of OL/2, an array language,

Includes bibliographies.

A sequel to the Common school grammar; containing, in addition to other materials and illustrations, notes and critical remarks on the philosophy of the English language; and explaining some of its most difficult idiomatic phrases. Designed for the use of the first class in common schools.

Mode of access: Internet.

A manual of the philosophy of voice and speech, especially in relation to the English language and the art of public speaking /

Mode of access: Internet.

The ADHD debate and the philosophy of truth

There is ongoing and wide-ranging dispute over the proliferation of childhood behaviour disorders. In particular, the veracity of the category Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), has been the subject of considerable scepticism. With no end to the debate in sight, it will be argued here that the problem might effectively be approached, not by addressing the specific features of ADHD itself, but rather by a philosophical analysis of one of the terms around which this entire problem revolves: that is, the notion of truth. If we state: “It is true that ADHD is a real disorder”, what exactly do we mean? Do we mean that it is an objective fact of nature? Do we mean that it fits seamlessly with other sets of ideas and explanations? Or do we simply mean that it works as an idea in a practical sense? This paper will examine the relationship between some of the dominant models of truth, and the assertions made by those in the field of ADHD. Specifically, the paper will contrast the claim that ADHD is a real disorder, with the claim that ADHD is a product of social governance. The intention is, first, to place some significant qualifications upon the validity of the truth-claims made by ADHD advocates, and second, to re-emphasise the potential and promise of philosophical investigation in providing productive new ways of thinking about some obstinate and seemingly intractable educational problems.

Mathematics, nature and cryptography: Insights from philosophy of information

One influential image that is popular among scientists is the view that mathematics is the language of nature. The present article discusses another possible way to approach the relation between mathematics and nature, which is by using the idea of information and the conceptual vocabulary of cryptography. This approach allows us to understand the possibility that secrets of nature need not be written in mathematics and yet mathematics is necessary as a cryptographic key to unlock these secrets. Various advantages of such a view are described in this article.

Deconstructing 'Mono'-Lingualism: considerations of value for 'English' 'language' education in a global setting.

Traditionally, language speakers are categorised as mono-lingual, bilingual, or multilingual. It is traditionally assumed in English language education that the ‘lingual’ is something that can be ‘fixed’ in form, written down to be learnt, and taught. Accordingly, the ‘mono’-lingual will have a ‘fixed’ linguistic form. Such a ‘form’ differs according to a number of criteria or influences including region or ‘type’ of English (for example, World Englishes) but is nevertheless assumed to be a ‘form’. ‘Mono-lingualism’ is defined and believed, traditionally, to be ‘speaking one language’; wherever that language is; or whatever that language may be. In this chapter, grounded in an individual subjective philosophy of language, we question this traditional definition. Viewing language from the philosophical perspectives such as those of Bakhtin and Voloshinov, we argue that the prominence of ‘context’ and ‘consciousness’ in language means that to ‘fix’ the form of a language goes against the very spirit of how it is formed and used. We thus challenge the categorisation of ‘mono’-lingualism; proposing that such a categorisation is actually a category error, or a case ‘in which a property is ascribed to a thing that could not possibly have that property’ (Restivo, 2013, p. 175), in this case the property of ‘mono’. Using this proposition as a starting point, we suggest that more time be devoted to language in its context and as per its genuine use as a vehicle for consciousness. We theorise this can be done through a ‘literacy’ based approach which fronts the context of language use rather than the language itself. We outline how we envision this working for teachers, students and materials developers of English Language Education materials in a global setting. To do this we consider Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence as an exemplar to promote conscious language use in context.

Linguistic experiments and ordinary language philosophy

J.L. Austin is regarded as having an especially acute ear for fine distinctions of meaning overlooked by other philosophers. Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gathering evidence in support of these fine distinctions in meaning, an approach that has become a standard technique for investigating meaning in both philosophy and linguistics. In this paper, we subject Austin's methods to formal experimental investigation. His methods produce mixed results: We find support for his most famous distinction, drawn on the basis of his `donkey stories', that `mistake' and `accident' apply to different cases, but not for some of his other attempts to distinguish the meaning of philosophically significant terms (such as `intentionally' and `deliberately'). We critically examine the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discuss the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.