The impact of pharmaceutical policy measures: a structural-break approach

Pharmaceutical spending in many other countries has had a steep increase in the last decade. The Portuguese Government has adopted several measures to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure growth, ranging from increased co-payments to price decreases determined administratively. Promotion of generic consumption has also ranked high in political priorities. We assess the overall impact of the several policy measures on total pharmaceutical spending, using monthly data over the period January 1995 – August 2008. Endogenous structural breaks (time-series) methods were employed. Our findings suggest that policy measures aimed at controlling pharmaceutical expenditure have been, in general, unsuccessful. Two breaks were identified. Both coincide with administratively determined price decreases. Measures aimed at increasing competition in the market had no visible effect on the dynamics of Government spending in pharmaceutical products. In particular, the introduction of reference pricing had only a transitory effect of less than one year, with historical growth resuming quickly. The consequence of it is a transfer of financial burden from the Government to the patients, with no apparent effect on the dynamics of pharmaceutical spending. This strongly suggests that pharmaceutical companies have been able to adjust to policy measures, in order to sustain their sales. It remains a challenge for the future to identify firms’ strategies that supported continued growth of sales, despite the several policy measures adop

Regulatory ambivalence and the limitations of pharmaceutical policy in Spain

Broadly speaking, pharmaceutical policy in Spain has been unable to control either the price or thevolume of drugs prescribed. Limited attempts have been made to bring together the regulation of thepharmaceutical market and policies, in pursuit of the desired goals of efficiency and quality. Thispaper assesses the regulation of the Spanish pharmaceutical market over the last two decades byexamining regulation and policy and the available empirical evidence on their appreciable effects,and presents recommendations for policy design. Our findings suggest that policies aiming to improveefficiency and quality have not managed to contain costs, while cost-effectiveness is still overlooked.We argue that future policies should encourage broader participation in the decision-making processesand promote a higher degree of competition, especially from generic drugs.

Report of the National Conference on Orphan Drugs : the path to promise : May 18-19, 1988, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. / [sponsored jointly by] the National Institutes of Health and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.

Mode of access: Internet.

Pharmaceutical innovation--promises and problems [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, April 27, 1981.

"No. 145."

Pharmaceutical assistance program : calendar year ... annual report.

Mode of access: Internet.

Le néo-sujet du droit criminel. Effets secondaires des psychotropes sur l’anthropologie pénale

Cette thèse a fait l'objet d'une publication: Le nouveau sujet du droit criminel : effets secondaires de la psychiatrie sur la responsabilité pénale / Christian Saint-Germain. — Montréal : Liber, [2014]. — 358 pages ; 23 cm. ISBN 9782895784654.

Orphan drugs and paediatric medicinal products

While the safety and availability of medicinal products for the majority of adult patients has steadily improved in recent decades, for children and people suffering from rare diseases (orphan diseases) there is a lack of approved medicinal products for these patient populations. Since the research and development of medicinal products is associated with high costs, the costs for paediatric medicinal products and medicines for rare diseases (orphan drugs) may barely be covered under normal market conditions due to the small patient populations. In order to prevent the continued exclusion of children and persons suffering from rare diseases from medical progress and to eliminate the deficits in the research and development of medicinal products for these patient groups, the European Union created, along the lines of the U.S. model, a system of incentives and constraints. Since 2000, under Regulation (EC) No. 141/2000 (Orphan Drug Regulation) there has been an incentive system to encourage the research and development of orphan drugs. With the goal of improving the health of children in Europe, Regulation (EC) No. 1901/2006 (Paediatric Regulation) combines economic incentives with the requirement to conduct paediatric studies. This article explains and comments on the specific regulatory framework for orphan drugs and paediatric medicinal products in the European Union.

From test tube to patient : new drug development in the United States.

Mode of access: Internet.

Drug lag [microform] : hearing before the Subcommittee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, and Environment of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, September 16, 1981.

"No. 149."

Annual report /

Title from cover.

Drug manual for pharmacies.

"June 1964"--Page [i].

Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceuticalmarkets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model canexplain the observation that countries with stronger regulations havesmaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences inobserved regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higherproportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closelyrelated model can account for the observed increase in prices by patentowners after entry of generic producers.