School Principals' Attitudes Towards Performance Based Compensation

The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals regarding a performance based compensation system. This study identifies the attitudes towards specific factors that should be considered in the implementation of a system of performance based compensation. The data have been analyzed to determine if a principal's demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with performance based compensation and the factors for implementation. In addition, this study unveils areas of concern that principals have conveyed regarding the implementation of a performance based compensation system. Data was obtained from 444 public school principals representing 444 schools and 178 districts in the state of Colorado. Measures used in the treatment of the data include descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA. The major findings of this study were: 1. 82.4% of respondents believe that teachers, principals and administrators should be included in performance based compensation (PBC). 2. The top two indicators that respondents believed should be included in a PBC system are student achievement (88.5%) and teacher evaluations (77.6%) 3. The 3 largest obstacles to PBC that respondents identified are: a. The capacity to link student achievement to teacher evaluations (82.9%) b. Teacher Union Resistance (67.1%) c. Cost (55.9%) 4. Principals in urban, rural and suburban geographic groups disagree about the effects of performance based compensation. 5. The top 5 overall concerns regarding Performance Based Compensation were: a. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all teachers/equity between teachers b. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn, consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality of evaluation tool). c. Not in favor of PBC due to philosophical views or concerns about lack of research. d. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources. e. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between teachers. Based upon these findings, the researcher concluded that there is not a strong general acceptance of performance based compensation systems. However, urban principals in Colorado tend to view PBC somewhat more favorably than do principals in suburban or rural areas. Most importantly, systems to link student achievement to teacher evaluation must be collaboratively created to ensure PBC systems are equitable, consistent and fair.

Corporate performance and the pay gap

Increasing disparity between executive compensation and that of the average worker (the pay gap) has generated a fierce debate about its causes and effects. This paper studies the determinants and performance effects of the pay gap through the prism of Tournament Incentives and the Equity Fairness Theory. Results show that the size of the pay gap is caused primarily by the size of the firm and by the standards of its industry and also by the unionization rate and whether the Chairman is also the CEO. The paper Concludes by showins that the pay gap has a positive effect on firm performance in the United States Keywords:

Effect of a national primary care pay for performance scheme on emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions: controlled longitudinal study.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the impact of a national primary care pay for performance scheme, the Quality and Outcomes Framework in England, on emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs). DESIGN: Controlled longitudinal study. SETTING: English National Health Service between 1998/99 and 2010/11. PARTICIPANTS: Populations registered with each of 6975 family practices in England. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Year specific differences between trend adjusted emergency hospital admission rates for incentivised ACSCs before and after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme and two comparators: non-incentivised ACSCs and non-ACSCs. RESULTS: Incentivised ACSC admissions showed a relative reduction of 2.7% (95% confidence interval 1.6% to 3.8%) in the first year of the Quality and Outcomes Framework compared with ACSCs that were not incentivised. This increased to a relative reduction of 8.0% (6.9% to 9.1%) in 2010/11. Compared with conditions that are not regarded as being influenced by the quality of ambulatory care (non-ACSCs), incentivised ACSCs also showed a relative reduction in rates of emergency admissions of 2.8% (2.0% to 3.6%) in the first year increasing to 10.9% (10.1% to 11.7%) by 2010/11. CONCLUSIONS: The introduction of a major national pay for performance scheme for primary care in England was associated with a decrease in emergency admissions for incentivised conditions compared with conditions that were not incentivised. Contemporaneous health service changes seem unlikely to have caused the sharp change in the trajectory of incentivised ACSC admissions immediately after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. The decrease seems larger than would be expected from the changes in the process measures that were incentivised, suggesting that the pay for performance scheme may have had impacts on quality of care beyond the directly incentivised activities.

Executive pay and performance: did bankers’ bonuses cause the crisis?

This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing particularly on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to focus on short-term results.

Paying for long-term performance: restructuring bankers’ pay for risk regulation

The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010. Our paper contributes to both literature and practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently reduce the probability of future bank failures.

Pay for performance does not always increase performance

Pay for performance can have a positive or a negative influence on actual performance. The aim of this study was to give an explanation for this contradiction.We demonstrated that the variability of the payment can act as a stressor. According to the transactional model of stress, the influence on performance depends on the subjective interpretation of the variability as challenge or threat. Therefore we manipulated the degree of variability. The data showed decreasing performance for participants who preferred less-variable payments. They performed better under a less-variable rather than more-variable payment. The participants who preferred more-variable payment schemes showed the opposite pattern. These participants showed a higher performance under a more-variable rather than less-variable payment scheme.

Significant progress in pay-for-performance, 1980-1982.

"August 1983."

Merit pay and proposed pay-for-performance regulations : hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session.

"S. 958, the Merit Pay Reform Act of 1983, and amendments to expand its coverage with regard to regulations proposed by the Office of Personnel Management; May 26, June 9, and July 14, 1983"--Pt. 2.

Linking performance-related pay to a Business School's mission and objectives

This paper first analyses the Performance Related Pay (PRP) schemes developed from 1992/3 to 2002/3 in a large Business School in England and then the School’s mission and strategic objectives in that period. The PRP schemes changed to include more specific performance indicators and these were increasingly linked to the objectives. The School’s resources allocated to PRP increased from £44,000 in 1992/93 to £355,000 in 2002/3 and from 1.08% in 1995/96 to 2.37% of the School’s income in 2002/3. As well as examining the changing strategic objectives and PRP schemes, the paper charts the development of the School’s reputation and resources and the role which staff motivation via PRP played at different stages. The paper concludes that the PRP scheme was at its most effective when it was clearly linked with the School’s strategic objectives, but that the relationship between objectives and motivation may be more complex than apparent from this study. Although the PRP scheme under consideration also applies to academic related staff, this paper concentrates on the effect on academic staff.

Executive pay, tournaments and corporate performance in UK firms

Recent initiatives for modernising local government have ignored the potential contribution of parish and town councils. This article critically examines English parish and town councils in the context of the current debate about the need for government to be more responsive to community needs. It considers measures to enhance the capacity of these grassroots councils by recalibrating the responsibilities and resources between tiers of local government. It concludes by setting out possible reforms to facilitate the contribution of these local councils to the modernising agenda as both representatives of the community and potential providers of local services.