The Role of Parliaments in European foreign policy

This book addresses the debate on the democratic deficit of European foreign and defence policies. This debate revolves around two dimensions. The first one has to do with the accountability of CFSP institutions. Is the current degree of parliamentary oversight of these policies the most appropriate? Has the disengagement of national parliaments regarding European foreign policy been counterbalanced by giving sufficient powers to the European Parliament? And, regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), are national parliaments effectively controlling it? The second dimension of the debate is related to the wider question of whether the European Parliament is capable of legitimising EU policy outcomes. In the absence of a Europe-wide demos and of a true party system, what interests do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent when dealing with foreign policy issues? Are there transnational cleavages in foreign policy or are they mainly national? Furthermore, is the European Parliament developing a transnational, autonomous stance on foreign policy issues, different from that of the Council or the Commission? The present volume is the result of the 2nd Meeting of the FORNET Working Group on “Evolution and Accountability of CFSP Institutions” organised by the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (Research line of the Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus), which took place in Barcelona, the 4 and 5 March 2005.

The scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity by autonomous regional parliaments with particular reference to the participation of the Parliament of Catalonia in the early warning system

The purpose of this article is to offer a practical approach to the new European dimension for regional parliaments signified by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The parliamentary scrutiny of subsidiarity by way of the early warning system has assigned a new mission to legislative assemblies with the aim of reinforcing the intervention of regions in the drafting of policies by Union institutions. In the Spanish case, the institutionalisation of this mechanism came about with Act nº 24/2009, which attributes to the Joint Committee for the European Union, in the name of the Cortes Generales [the Spanish Parliament], the function of receiving the proposals for legislative acts by the EU and transferring them to the regional parliaments in order for the latter to issue, in a brief period of four weeks, a report on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The majority of regional parliaments have also carried out normative reforms to regulate the procedure of participation in the early warning system.

Why budget accountability fails? The elusive links between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of the budget

ABSTRACTParliaments and audit agencies have critical and complementary roles in the oversight of the budget and the enforcement of government accountability. Yet, the nexus between parliaments and audit agencies is one of the weakest links in the accountability chain, generating an accountability gap in the budget process. This articles analyses the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies in the oversight of government finances during the latter stages of the budget process. Using proxies to evaluate the quality of those linkages, such as the follow-up to audit findings and the discharge of government, it shows important dysfunctions in the interactions between parliaments and audit agencies due to a combination of technical capacity constraints and political economy disincentives. It suggests that the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances in public budgeting critically hinges on the agility of the linkages between accountability institutions. As such, the failure of budget accountability is due to systemic dysfunctions in the systems of accountability, rather than the failure of an individual accountability institution acting in isolation. In addition, the effectiveness of the horizontal accountability architecture depends on the political economy incentives shaping the budget process, which are generated by the interactions between the choice of institutional design and budget rules, with the degree of political competition and electoral rules.

National Parliaments and their Role in European Integration: The EU’s Democratic Deficit in Times of Economic Hardship and Political Insecurity. Bruges Political Research Paper 28/2013

The article describes and assesses the role of national parliaments in EU legislation considering the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. This is closely connected with the understanding and (political) application of the principle of subsidiarity. After an analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the relevant legal regulations in the post-Lisbon age, alternative ways for participation of national legislators on the European level are being scrutinized and proposed. The issue of democratic legitimization is also interconnected with the current political reforms being discussed in order to overcome the Euro Crisis. Finally, the authors argue that it does not make sense to include national parliaments in the existing legislative triangle of the EU, but instead to promote the creation of a new kind of supervisory body.