Incentivos governamentais em PPP: uma análise por opções reais

Em novembro de 2005, o Governo do Estado lançou edital de licitação para serviços de transporte de passageiros da Linha 4 do Metrô de São Paulo. Neste trabalho, utilizamos a metodologia de opções reais para modelar o impacto dos incentivos governamentais existentes no contrato de concessão sobre o valor do projeto, determinar o grau de redução de risco obtido e o seu custo para o Estado. Os resultados indicam que estes incentivos são eficazes em reduzir o risco do projeto e aumentam o seu resultado em 36%, a um custo para o Estado de 5% do valor total do projeto. Adicionalmente, analisamos também a relação custo/benefício para o Estado de modelos alternativos de mitigação de risco e mostramos que, sem aumentar o custo para o Governo, a eficácia desse mecanismo pode ser incrementada aumentando-se o peso da parcela de garantia de demanda em relação à parcela de contraprestação.

As PPP e os processos tradicionais de contratação pura: vantagens e desvantagens

Mestrado em Engenharia Civil – ramo Tecnologia e Gestão das Construções

As condições de financiamento das PPP em Portugal

Mestrado em Finanças

Analyse diagrammatique des désintégrations de type B vers PPP sans quarks charmés

Ce mémoire présente l’application de la méthode de décomposition en termes de diagrammes aux désintégrations de mésons B vers trois mésons de type pseudos- calaire ne comportant pas de quarks charmés. La décomposition diagrammatique des désintégrations de types B → Kππ, B → KKK ̄, B → KK ̄π et B → πππ est effectuée de façon systématique. Il est démontré que lorsque l’on néglige les dia- grammes d’échanges et d’annihilations, dont les contributions sont estimées être petites, de nouvelles relations apparaissent entre les amplitudes. Ces relations sont de nouveaux tests du modèle standard qui ne peuvent être obtenus que par la méthode diagrammatique. Lorsque les données nécessaires sont disponibles, nous vérifions ces relations et obtenons un bon accord avec les données expérimentales. Nous démontrons également qu’il est possible d’utiliser le secteur B → Kππ pour mesurer la phase faible γ avec une incertitude théorique que nous estimons être de l’ordre de 5%. Les autres secteurs de désintégrations ne permettent d’extraire des phases faibles que si l’on invoque des approximations de précisions inconnues.

PPP, UIP and Fisher parity: speculation or rational expectations? Evidence for four Latin American countries

This work aims to test the equilibrium relations of two international macroeconomics models for Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. The first model is the rational expectation hypothesis (REH) where three key relations will be tested: Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) and the Fisher Parity condition. The second model follows the line of though of Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) where two equilibrium relations will be tested. According to IKE, even under the assumption that agents are rational, the presence of speculative behavior in financial markets helps explain the long swings often observed in the behavior of exchange rates. The results support the view that the predictions of the IKE model hold for Colombia, while those of the REH hold for both Brazil and Mexico. Mixed findings are obtained for Chile.

Knowledge transfer processes in PFI/PPP: critical success factors

Successful knowledge transfer is an important process which requires continuous improvement in today’s knowledge-intensive economy. However, improving knowledge transfer processes represents a challenge for construction practitioners due to the complexity of knowledge acquisition, codification and sharing. Although knowledge transfer is context based, understanding the critical success factors can lead to improvements in the transfer process. This paper seeks to identify and evaluate the most significant critical factors for improving knowledge transfer processes in Public Private Partnerships/Private Finance Initiatives (PPP/PFI) projects. Drawing upon a questionnaire survey of 52 construction firms located in the UK, data is analysed using Severity Index (SI) and Coefficient of Variation (COV), to examine and identify these factors in PPP/PFI schemes. The findings suggest that a supportive leadership, participation/commitment from the relevant parties, and good communication between the relevant parties are crucial to improving knowledge transfer processes in PFI schemes. Practitioners, managers and researchers can use the findings to efficiently design performance measures for analysing and improving knowledge transfer processes.

A new perspective on the PPP hypothesis

This paper the stastistical properties of the real exchange rates of G-5 countries for the Bretton-Woods peiod, and draw implications on the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis. In contrast to most previous studies that consider only unit root and stationary process to describe the real exchange tae, this paper also considers two in-between processes, the locally persistent process ans the fractionally integrated process, to complement past studies. Seeking to be consistent with tha ample evidence of near unit in the real exchange rate movements very well. This finding implies that: 1) the real exchange movement is more persistent than the stationary case but less persistent than the unit root case; 2) the real exchange rate is non-stationary but the PPP reversion occurs and the PPP holds in the long run; 3) the real exchange rate does not exhibit the secular dependence of the fractional integration; 4) the real exchange rate evolves over time in a way that there is persistence over a range of time, but the effect of shocks will eventually disappear over time horizon longer than order O (nd), that is, at finite time horizon; 5) shocks dissipation is fasters than predicted by the fractional integracion, and the total sum of the effects of a unit innovation is finite, implying that a full PPP reversion occurs at finite horizons. These results may explain why pasrt empirical estudies could not provide a clear- conclusion on the real exchange rate processes and the PPP hypothesis.

PPP no estado de São Paulo: estruturas e impacto no orçamento

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo a contextualização histórica das Parcerias Público-Privadas (PPPs) no Governo do Estado de São Paulo. Partindo de uma descrição do marco legal federal, sua estrutura e os órgãos por ele criados, o artigo reflete sobre o impacto desse mecanismo no Governo do Estado de São Paulo. A análise Lei estadual nº 11.688, de 19/04/04, que instituiu o Programa de Parcerias Público-Privadas em São Paulo e o posterior Decreto n º 48.867, de 10/08/04, tiveram o importante papel de regulamentar as PPPs em São Paulo. Porém, foi somente em novembro de 2006 que a primeira PPP paulista foi assinada, sendo o primeiro contrato de concessão, dessa modalidade, assinado no país. Após quase uma década, apenas três contratos estão em operação em São Paulo e esse fato desperta a necessidade de uma reflexão. As estruturas de promoção e acompanhamento dos contratos embora consolidadas, podem expor necessidade de majoração. Já a estruturas que discutem eventuais pleitos de mudanças contratuais, o que pode representar severas perdas financeiras ao Estado, demonstram certas fragilidades. Um contrato de PPP impõe ao contratante um importante compromisso financeiro de longo prazo. Após a consolidação do controle fiscal pelos governos brasileiros, impulsionados pela Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal, um eventual cenário financeiro negativo futuro pode ser o motivador para que se evite a contratação de um PPP. Também é sabido que os gargalos de infraestrutura impõem aos Governos soluções inovadoras, para que não se restrinjam as possibilidades de desenvolvimento econômico. Em um cenário complexo, de difícil regulação, as PPPs podem ser soluções e ameaças, dependendo da forma que são concebidas e são cuidadas as suas execuções.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.