Safeguarding rural Australia : addressing masculinity and violence in rural settings. Data report No. 4 - Risky behaviour - misuse of alcohol, illicit drugs, firearms use and abuse, other risky behaviour

This report focuses on our examination of extant data which have been sourced with respect to personally and socially risky behaviour associated with males living in regional and remote Australia . The AIHW (2008: PHE 97:89) defines personally risky behaviour, on the one hand, as working, swimming, boating, driving or operating hazardous machinery while intoxicated with alcohol or an illicit drug. Socially risky behaviour, on the other hand, is defined as creating a public disturbance, damaging property, stealing or verbally or physically abusing someone while intoxicated with alcohol or an illicit drug. Additional commentary resulting from exploration, examination and analyses of secondary data is published online in complementary reports in this series.

Testing the single-peakedness of other-regarding preferences

We test an implication that is common to all prominent theories of outcome-based other-regarding preferences: the ordinal preference ranking of an agent over a finite number of alternatives lying on any straight line in the space of material payoffs to oneself and some other agent must be single-peaked or single-plateaued. An incentive compatible mechanism is used to elicit strict preference rankings of subjects over a finite set of alternatives in decision tasks based on dictator and trust games. Violations of single-peakedness range from a low of 19% to a high of 46% across the six main treatments. Other-regarding subjects violate single-peakedness significantly more often than self-regarding subjects. The presence of equal-split in the set of alternatives increases the number of violations. We argue that the violations cannot be explained by appealing to the relative ease of reporting certain rankings or as errors from the theoretical benchmark.

Other-Regarding Preferences in General Equilibrium

We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be- have as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Sec- ond Welfare Theorem holds as long as an increase in resources can be distributed such that all agents are better off. Nevertheless, the First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consump- tion possibilities in the economy, we provide a condition under which agents have no incentive to make direct transfers, and show that this condition implies that competitive equilibria are efficient given prices.

Image-encounters with the techno-mediated other: Regarding post-election Iran on Youtube

In June 2009 large-scale public demonstrations on the streets of Tehran followed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s controversial claiming of victory in the Republic’s most recent election. As the scale of the unrest rapidly escalated, foreign journalists were expelled from the country and unprecedented numbers of Iranian journalists were imprisoned (Sreberny and Khiabany 176). Observers outside of Iran learned of the events as Iranians on the streets embraced image production and distribution as a central component of their protest. Evading the attempts of the regime to control media coverage of the post-election violence, Iranians uploaded rough footage, still images, and blog entries, seeking to make real their experiences for the international community. A stream of citizen-produced footage of mass demonstrations, beatings and deaths was relayed to the world at large via Internet-based social networking channels and mobile phones. This paper takes a series of images from the mediated turmoil in Iran as a prism through which to consider the problem of what it is that such images make real for distant observers.

How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?

We use a human-subjects experiment to investigate how bargaining outcomes are affected by changes in bargainers’ disagreement payoffs. Subjects bargain against changing opponents, with randomly drawn asymmetric disagreement outcomes that vary over plays of the game, and with complete information about disagreement payoffs and the cake size. We find that subjects only respond about half as much as theoretically predicted to changes in their own disagreement payoff and to changes in their opponent’s disagreement payoff. This effect is observed in a standard Nash demand game and a related unstructured bargaining game, in both early and late rounds, and is robust to moderate changes in stake sizes. We show theoretically that standard models of expected utility maximisation are unable to account for this under-responsiveness, even when generalised to allow for risk aversion. We also show that quantal-response equilibrium has, at best, mixed success in characterising our results. However, a simple model of other-regarding preferences can explain our main results.

Lying about the price? Ultimatum bargaining with messages and imperfectly observed offers

We introduce the taxicab game, related to the ultimatum game and Gehrig et al.'s (2007) yes/no game. The proposer makes an offer, and simultaneously sends a cheap talk message indicating (possibly falsely) the amount of the offer. The responder observes the message with certainty and the offer with probability p before accepting or rejecting the offer. We investigate versions with p=. 0 and p=. 0.5 along with the ultimatum game as a baseline. Intuition and a model comprising both standard economic agents and others who dislike inequity, lies and lying provide clear predictions that our experimental results support. As the likelihood increases of offers being seen, the offers themselves increase, messages over-state them less, and responders are more likely to accept (even when the offer is unseen). Also, responders are more likely to accept after truthful messages than after lies or when no message is sent.

Fatigue behaviour of corrugated roofing under cycling wind loading

Low cycle fatigue cracking of light gauge metal roofing was investigated by testing a number of two-span corrugated roofing assemblies with different spans and fastening systems under cyclic uplift wind loading. Fatigue results correlated quite well with the corresponding static results reported earlier, and revealed the dependence of fatigue behaviour on the fastening system used. A comparison was made of one fastening system with the other regarding fatigue performance .

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Desempenho de pontas de pulverização quanto a indução de ar nas gotas

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Foraging behaviour of the epaulette shark Hemiscyllium ocellatum is not affected by elevated CO2

Increased oceanic uptake of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) is a threat to marine organisms and ecosystems. Among the most dramatic consequences predicted to date are behavioural impairments in marine fish which appear to be caused by the interference of elevated CO2 with a key neurotransmitter receptor in the brain. In this study, we tested the effects of elevated CO2 on the foraging and shelter-seeking behaviours of the reef-dwelling epaulette shark, Hemiscyllium ocellatum. Juvenile sharks were exposed for 30 d to control CO2 (400 µatm) and two elevated CO2 treatments (615 and 910 µatm), consistent with medium- and high-end projections for ocean pCO2 by 2100. Contrary to the effects observed in teleosts and in some other sharks, behaviour of the epaulette shark was unaffected by elevated CO2. A potential explanation is the remarkable adaptation of H. ocellatum to low environmental oxygen conditions (hypoxia) and diel fluctuations in CO2 encountered in their shallow reef habitat. This ability translates into behavioural tolerance of near-future ocean acidification, suggesting that behavioural tolerance and subsequent adaptation to projected future CO2 levels might be possible in some other fish, if adaptation can keep pace with the rate of rising CO2 levels.

Discourses on behaviour : a role for restorative justice?

The description and management of difficult behaviour in schools has interested educational practitioners and researchers worldwide, including in the UK. Concerns have been raised about the use and implications of more dominant discourses, namely those of behaviourism and zero tolerance, for understanding student behaviour. This article presents research, conducted in a secondary school in Northern England, exploring restorative justice as an alternative. Transcripts from a series of school staff focus groups and the school behaviour policy were analysed, using critical discourse analysis, in order to address two questions: (1) what are the dominant discourses on behaviour amongst school staff within the school? and (2) what spaces are available for the construction of alternative discourses regarding behaviour and relational action? The analysis confirms the predominance of behaviourist and zero-tolerance discourses and a reliance on individualistic explanations regarding difficult behaviour. However, the presence of a range of discursive resources within the staff focus groups suggests the viable use of an alternative discourse.

Forensic challenges in service oriented architectures

Digital forensics relates to the investigation of a crime or other suspect behaviour using digital evidence. Previous work has dealt with the forensic reconstruction of computer-based activity on single hosts, but with the additional complexity involved with a distributed environment, a Web services-centric approach is required. A framework for this type of forensic examination needs to allow for the reconstruction of transactions spanning multiple hosts, platforms and applications. A tool implementing such an approach could be used by an investigator to identify scenarios of Web services being misused, exploited, or otherwise compromised. This information could be used to redesign Web services in order to mitigate identified risks. This paper explores the requirements of a framework for performing effective forensic examinations in a Web services environment. This framework will be necessary in order to develop forensic tools and techniques for use in service oriented architectures.