The role of risk assessment in supporting a positive organisational safety culture

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A comparison of safety climate and safety outcomes between construction and resource functions in a large case study organisation

The research described in this paper forms part of an in-depth investigation of safety culture in one of Australia’s largest construction companies. The research builds on a previous qualitative study with organisational safety leaders and further investigates how safety culture is perceived and experienced by organisational members, as well as how this relates to their safety behaviour and related outcomes at work. Participants were 2273 employees of the case study organisation, with 689 from the Construction function and 1584 from the Resources function. The results of several analyses revealed some interesting organisational variance on key measures. Specifically, the Construction function scored significantly higher on all key measures: safety climate, safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety participation. The results are discussed in terms of relevance in an applied research context.

Returning to the roots of culture : a review and re-conceptualisation of safety culture

Despite significant research, there is still little agreement over how to define safety culture or of what it is comprised. Due to this lack of agreement, much of the safety culture research has little more than safety management strategies in common. There is, however, a degree of acceptance of the close relationship between safety culture and organisational culture. Organisational culture can be described using traditional views of culture drawn from the anthropology and cultural psychology literature. However, the safety culture literature rarely ventures beyond organisational culture into discussions of these more traditional concepts of culture. There is a need to discuss how these concepts of culture can be applied to safety culture to provide greater understanding of safety culture and additional means by which to approach safety in the workplace. This review explores how three traditional conceptualisations of culture; the normative, anthropological and pragmatist conceptualisations, can and have been be applied to safety culture. Finally the review proposes a synthesised conceptualisation of safety culture which can be used to provide greater depth and practical applicability of safety culture, by increasing our understanding of the interactions between cultural and contextual variables in a given workplace and the effect they have on safety.

A framework for conceptualising traffic safety culture

Traffic safety culture is a relatively new concept which has recently gained attention in the field of traffic safety. There is currently little known regarding the nature of the concept, nor how it should be defined. Preliminary definitions have tended to focus on specific road safety problems and the anticipated effect of a strong traffic safety culture. The literature to date has tended to emphasise how traffic safety culture might be created or shaped. However, without a better understanding of the nature and structure of traffic safety culture, discussions regarding changes to traffic safety culture are restricted. An examination of different conceptualisations and definitions of organisational safety culture provides a preliminary theoretical framework for traffic safety culture. Two high risk driving behaviours within the Australian context are compared to illustrate how key factors within this framework can be used to understand and improve road safety outcomes.

Profiling contextual factors which influence safety in heavy vehicle industries

A significant proportion of worker fatalities within Australia result from truck-related incidents. Truck drivers face a number of health and safety concerns. Safety culture, viewed here as the beliefs, attitudes and values shared by an organisation’s workers, which interact with their surrounding context to influence behaviour, may provide a valuable lens for exploring safety-related behaviours in heavy vehicle operations. To date no major research has examined safety culture within heavy vehicle industries. As safety culture provides a means to interpret experiences and generate behaviour, safety culture research should be conducted with an awareness of the context surrounding safety. The current research sought to examine previous health and safety research regarding heavy vehicle operations to profile contextual factors which influence health and safety. A review of 104 peer-reviewed papers was conducted. Findings of these papers were then thematically analysed. A number of behaviours and scenarios linked with crashes and non-crash injuries were identified, along with a selection of health outcomes. Contextual factors which were found to influence these outcomes were explored. These factors were found to originate from government departments, transport organisations, customers and the road and work environment. The identified factors may provide points of interaction, whereby culture may influence health and safety outcomes.

Applying the Haddon Matrix in the context of work-related road safety

The Haddon Matrix was developed in the 1960s road safety arena, and has since been used in many public health settings. The literature and two specific case studies are reviewed to describe the background to the Haddon Matrix, identify how it has been critiqued and developed over time and practical applications in the work-related road safety context. Haddon’s original focus on the road, vehicle and driver has been extended and applied to include organisational safety culture, journey management and wider issues in society that affect occupational drivers and the communities in which they work. The paper shows that the Haddon Matrix has been applied in many projects and contexts. Practical work-related road safety applications include providing a comprehensive systems-based safety management framework to inform strategy. It has also been used to structure the review or gap analysis of current programs and processes, identify and develop prevention measures and as a tool for effective post-event investigations.

The influence of culture on safety : culture, organisational culture and safety culture

Transport and Storage Sector - Identified as one of 4 primary targets in the National Occupational Health and Safety Strategy 2002-2012 (NOHSS) The Heavy Vehicle Industry -80% of the freight task -29% of the employees in Transport and Storage 5 years on: -Transport and Storage - 22% reduction -Heavy Vehicle Industry - only an 11% reduction Intervention strategies that aren’t targeted to a specific audience may have differing levels of success due to cultural beliefs and values (McLeroy et al., 1994) Research Goal: - To explore the influence of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry

A Guide to Applying Road Safety within a Workplace : A Bilateral Approach to Organisational Road Safety in Australia and New Zealand

Corporate and organisational fleet and road safety is of strong interest to government and government agencies in Australia and New Zealand. It has been identified that there is great opportunity to engage and assist organisations and corporations in the delivery of road safety and road safety measures to achieve nationally significant road related trauma reductions. This guide has therefore been developed through public sector funding for use by any workplace within Australia and New Zealand. Significant road safety benefits can be achieved by road safety government agencies (Australia and New Zealand) that engage with private and public sectors at their workplaces to address work related road safety issues. It has also been noted that organisational road safety advancement creates effective and sustainable outcomes, safer places of employment, and safer communities. This can be achieved without totally relying upon traditional and often lengthy processes such as further public legislation and/ or community attitudinal and behavioural change programs. Currently, there is little in the way of robust guides or support for those organisations that are wishing to adopt road safety within their places of employment, supply chain and/ or community. Due to this identified gap in available resource and support, it has been recommended that a practical organisational road safety guide be produced; hence the development of this guide. A guide, or supporting documentation, that bridges the gap between government and road safety research knowledge, internationally endorsed road safety methodology, and assists industry as the end user. To achieve this, the guide is designed to be non-specific to any industry sector and usable for small or large organisations, public or private, and engaging for senior executives and the personnel on the ground responsible for its implementation. Therefore, this guide is based on methodology and principles so that it can be applicable in a scalable way to the greatest number of public and private organisations while providing enough detail and ‘how to’ advice to enable organisations to generate their own solutions to road safety issues.

Take me to your employer: the organisational reach of occupational health and safety regulation

[Conclusion] We have explored two dimensions of the Australian OHS statutes which enable statutory OHS duties to reach more than one employer or self-employed person within a corporate group or network. First, most of the OHS statutes contain provisions extending the reach of employer’s duty beyond the employer’s employees. One legislative technique is to deem contractors and their employees to be employees of the principal contractor. Another imposes duties on employers and self-employed persons to persons who are not employees, so that employers and self-employed persons can be responsible for the OHS of firms, and those they engage, lower in the contractual chain. These duties are non-delegable, meaning that the principal contractor cannot seek to delegate OHS duties to firms lower in the contractual chain. Second, new Victorian ‘shadow officer’ provisions can be applied to remove difficulties and doubt as to the liability of partners in a partnership, officers of unincorporated associations, joint venturers, and holding and subsidiary companies within corporate groups. While the provisions can be argued simply to confirm that a partner who fails to take reasonable care in relation to OHS will be guilty of an offence, we demonstrate that there are very real benefits to having ‘shadow officer’ provisions which remove uncertainties about the liability of unincorporated associations, joint ventures and corporate groups. Perhaps most significantly, the Victorian corporate officer provisions have the potential to extend liability to individuals and other entities within organisational structures, where those individuals and entities make or participate in making decisions that affect the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s business, and are responsible for an OHS offence having been committed, due to their failure to take reasonable care. We suggest that similar provisions should be included in all OHS statutes, to overcome at least some of the barriers limiting group responsibility for OHS statutory duties.

Organisational driving safety systems analysis: Fleet safety situational issues and system gaps

The identification of safety hazards and risks and their associated control measures provides the foundation for any safety program and essentially determines the scope, content and complexity of an effective occupational health and safety management system. In the case of work-related road safety (WRRS), there is a gap within current knowledge, research and practice regarding the holistic assessment of WRRS safety systems and practice. In order to mitigate this gap, a multi-level process tool for assessing WRRS safety systems was developed from extensive consultation, practice and informed by theoretical models and frameworks. Data collection for the Organisational Driving Safety Systems Analysis (ODSSA) tool utilised a case study methodology and included multiple information sources: such as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artefacts. Previous trials and application of the ODSSA has indicated that the tool is applicable to a wide range of organisational fleet environments and settings. This paper reports on the research results and effectiveness of the ODSSA tool to assess WRRS systems across a large organisation that recently underwent considerable organisational change, including amalgamation of multiple organisations. The outcomes of this project identified considerable differences in the degree by which the organisation addressed WRRS across their vehicle fleet operations and provided guidelines for improving organisations’ WRRS systems. The ODSSA tool was pivotal in determining WRRS system deficiencies and provided a platform to inform mitigation and improvement strategies.

Safety culture during major organisational change

This research examines the effect of major changes, in the external context, on the safety culture of a UK generating company. It was focused on an organisation which was originally part of the state owned Central Electricity Generating Board and which, by the end of the research period, was a self-contained generating company, operating in a competitive market and a wholly owned subsidiary of a US utility. The research represents an attempt to identify the nature and culture of the original organisation and to identify, analyse and explain the effects of the forces of change in moulding the final organisation. The research framework employed a qualitative methodology to investigate the effects of change, supported by a safety culture questionnaire, based on factors identified in the third report of the ACSNI Human Factors Study Group; Organising for Safety, as being indicators of safety culture. An additional research objective was to assess the usefulness of the ACSNI factors as indicators of safety culture. Findings were that the original organisation was an engineering dominated technocracy with a technocentric safety culture. Values and beliefs were very strongly held and resistant to change and much of the original safety culture survived unchanged into the new organisation. The effects of very long periods of uncertainty about the future were damaging to management/worker relationships but several factors were identified which effectively insulated the organisation from any of the effects of change. The forces of change had introduced a beneficial appreciation of the crucial relationship between safety risk assessment and commercial risk assessment.Although the technical strength of the original safety culture survived, so did the essential weakness of a low level of appreciation of the human behavioural aspects of safety. This led to a limited, functionalist world view of safety culture, which assumed that cultural change was simpler to achieve than was the case and an inability to make progress in certain areas which were essentially behavioural problems.The factors identified by ACSNI provided a useful basis for the site research methodology and for identifying areas of relative strength and weakness in the site safety arrangements.

Organisational change and safety culture: the impact of communication

This research examines and explains the links between safety culture and communication. Safety culture is a concept that in recent years has gained prominence but there has been little applied research conducted to investigate the meaning of the concept in 'real life' settings. This research focused on a Train Operating Company undergoing change in a move towards privatisation. These changes were evident in the management of safety, the organisation of the industry and internally in their management. The Train Operating Company's management took steps to improve their safety culture and communications through the development of a cascade communication structure. The research framework employed a qualitative methodology in order to investigate the effect of the new system on safety culture. Findings of the research were that communications in the organisation failed to be effective for a number of reasons, including both cultural and logistical problems. The cultural problems related to a lack of trust in the organisation by the management and the workforce, the perception of communications as management propaganda, and asyntonic communications between those involved, whilst logistical problems related to the inherent difficulties of communicating over a geographically distributed network. An organisational learning framework was used to explain the results. It is postulated that one of the principal reasons why change, either to the safety culture or to communications, did not occur was because of the organisation's inability to learn. The research has also shown the crucial importance of trust between the members of the organisation, as this was one of the fundamental reasons why the safety culture did not change, and why safety management systems were not fully implemented. This is consistent with the notion of mutual trust in the HSC (1993) definition of safety culture. This research has highlighted its relevance to safety culture and its importance for organisational change.

Accountability, organisational learning and risks to patient safety in England: conflict or compromise?

This article examines the current risk regulation regime, within the English National Health Service (NHS), by investigating the two, sometimes conflicting, approaches to risk embodied within the field of policies towards patient safety. The first approach focuses on promoting accountability and is built on legal principles surrounding negligence and competence. The second approach focuses on promoting learning from previous mistakes and near-misses, and is built on the development of a ‘safety culture’. Previous work has drawn attention to problems associated with risk-based regulation when faced with the dual imperatives of accountability and organisational learning. The article develops this by considering whether the NHS patient safety regime demonstrates the coexistence of two different risk regulation regimes, or merely one regime with contradictory elements. It uses the heuristic device of ‘institutional logics’ to examine the coexistence of and interrelationship between ‘organisational learning’ and ‘accountability’ logics driving risk regulation in health care.

Large scale organisational intervention to improve patient safety in four UK hospitals:mixed method evaluation

Objectives: To conduct an independent evaluation of the first phase of the Health Foundation's Safer Patients Initiative (SPI), and to identify the net additional effect of SPI and any differences in changes in participating and non-participating NHS hospitals. Design: Mixed method evaluation involving five substudies, before and after design. Setting: NHS hospitals in United Kingdom. Participants: Four hospitals (one in each country in the UK) participating in the first phase of the SPI (SPI1); 18 control hospitals. Intervention: The SPI1 was a compound (multicomponent) organisational intervention delivered over 18 months that focused on improving the reliability of specific frontline care processes in designated clinical specialties and promoting organisational and cultural change. Results: Senior staff members were knowledgeable and enthusiastic about SPI1. There was a small (0.08 points on a 5 point scale) but significant (P<0.01) effect in favour of the SPI1 hospitals in one of 11 dimensions of the staff questionnaire (organisational climate). Qualitative evidence showed only modest penetration of SPI1 at medical ward level. Although SPI1 was designed to engage staff from the bottom up, it did not usually feel like this to those working on the wards, and questions about legitimacy of some aspects of SPI1 were raised. Of the five components to identify patients at risk of deterioration - monitoring of vital signs (14 items); routine tests (three items); evidence based standards specific to certain diseases (three items); prescribing errors (multiple items from the British National Formulary); and medical history taking (11 items) - there was little net difference between control and SPI1 hospitals, except in relation to quality of monitoring of acute medical patients, which improved on average over time across all hospitals. Recording of respiratory rate increased to a greater degree in SPI1 than in control hospitals; in the second six hours after admission recording increased from 40% (93) to 69% (165) in control hospitals and from 37% (141) to 78% (296) in SPI1 hospitals (odds ratio for "difference in difference" 2.1, 99% confidence interval 1.0 to 4.3; P=0.008). Use of a formal scoring system for patients with pneumonia also increased over time (from 2% (102) to 23% (111) in control hospitals and from 2% (170) to 9% (189) in SPI1 hospitals), which favoured controls and was not significant (0.3, 0.02 to 3.4; P=0.173). There were no improvements in the proportion of prescription errors and no effects that could be attributed to SPI1 in non-targeted generic areas (such as enhanced safety culture). On some measures, the lack of effect could be because compliance was already high at baseline (such as use of steroids in over 85% of cases where indicated), but even when there was more room for improvement (such as in quality of medical history taking), there was no significant additional net effect of SPI1. There were no changes over time or between control and SPI1 hospitals in errors or rates of adverse events in patients in medical wards. Mortality increased from 11% (27) to 16% (39) among controls and decreased from17%(63) to13%(49) among SPI1 hospitals, but the risk adjusted difference was not significant (0.5, 0.2 to 1.4; P=0.085). Poor care was a contributing factor in four of the 178 deaths identified by review of case notes. The survey of patients showed no significant differences apart from an increase in perception of cleanliness in favour of SPI1 hospitals. Conclusions The introduction of SPI1 was associated with improvements in one of the types of clinical process studied (monitoring of vital signs) and one measure of staff perceptions of organisational climate. There was no additional effect of SPI1 on other targeted issues nor on other measures of generic organisational strengthening.

Organisational and systems factors impacting on patient safety in acute care organisations: lessons from four multi-site research studies

Background Patient safety is concerned with preventable harm in healthcare, a subject that became a focus for study in the UK in the late 1990s. How to improve patient safety, presented both a practical and a research challenge in the early 2000s, leading to the eleven publications presented in this thesis. Research question The overarching research question was: What are the key organisational and systems factors that impact on patient safety, and how can these best be researched? Methods Research was conducted in over 40 acute care organisations in the UK and Europe between 2006 and 2013. The approaches included surveys, interviews, documentary analysis and non-participant observation. Two studies were longitudinal. Results The findings reveal the nature and extent of poor systems reliability and its effect on patient safety; the factors underpinning cases of patient harm; the cultural issues impacting on safety and quality; and the importance of a common language for quality and safety across an organisation. Across the publications, nine key organisational and systems factors emerged as important for patient safety improvement. These include leadership stability; data infrastructure; measurement capability; standardisation of clinical systems; and creating an open and fair collective culture where poor safety is challenged. Conclusions and contribution to knowledge The research presented in the publications has provided a more complete understanding of the organisation and systems factors underpinning safer healthcare. Lessons are drawn to inform methods for future research, including: how to define success in patient safety improvement studies; how to take into account external influences during longitudinal studies; and how to confirm meaning in multi-language research. Finally, recommendations for future research include assessing the support required to maintain a patient safety focus during periods of major change or austerity; the skills needed by healthcare leaders; and the implications of poor data infrastructure.