The Timing of Asset Trade and Optimal Policy in Dynamic Open Economies

Using a standard open economy DSGE model, it is shown that the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions has a potentially important impact on the welfare evaluation of monetary policy at the individual country level. If asset trade in the initial period takes place before the announcement of policy, a national policymaker can choose a policy rule which reduces the work effort of households in the policymaker’s country in the knowledge that consumption is fully insured by optimally chosen international portfolio positions. But if asset trade takes place after the policy announcement, this insurance is absent and households in the policymaker’s country bear the full consumption consequences of the chosen policy rule. The welfare incentives faced by national policymakers are very different between the two cases. Numerical examples confirm that asset market timing has a significant impact on the optimal policy rule.

Államadósság, optimális politika, finanszírozás (State Debt, Optimal Policy, and Financing)

A fejlett ipari országoknak is az államadósság csökkentése vagy akár szinten tartása okozza az egyik legfontosabb gazdaságpolitikai dilemmát. Az euróövezet tagállamai esetében is ez a kritérium tűnik a legkevésbé teljesíthetőnek, de Japán és az Egyesült Államok is leküzdhetetlennek tűnő államadóssággal birkózik. A tanulmány rövid áttekintést ad néhány meghatározó közgazdasági megközelítésről, amelyek az államadósság szintjének hosszú távú alakulása mögött meghúzódó tényezőket, gazdaságpolitikai lépéseket magyarázzák. Végül az elméletek alapján tanulságokat fogalmaz meg a magyar államadósság kezelését illetően az 1990–2010 közötti folyamatok ismeretében. _____ The macroeconomic developments of the last decade have confirmed that one of the most important dilemmas that even developed economies have to face is the reduction or even sustaining of the state debt. In case of the eurozone member states this criterion is the most difficult to be accomplished, furthermore the United States and Japan are among the global powers that have to cope with state debts which seems to be insurmountable. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of some decisive economic approaches (Barro [1979], Lucas and Stokey [1983], Marcet and Scott [2007], Martin [2009] etc.) that explain the factors behind the formation of long-run state debt level and economic policy measures accompanying state debt management. The paper also attempts to draw some lessons for the Hungarian state debt management in view of the 1990-2010 processes.

Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Habits in Consumption

While consumption habits have been utilised as a means of generating a humpshaped output response to monetary policy shocks in sticky-price New Keynesian economies, there is relatively little analysis of the impact of habits (particularly,external habits) on optimal policy. In this paper we consider the implications of external habits for optimal monetary policy, when those habits either exist at the level of the aggregate basket of consumption goods (‘superficial’ habits) or at the level of individual goods (‘deep’ habits: see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)). External habits generate an additional distortion in the economy, which implies that the flex-price equilibrium will no longer be efficient and that policy faces interesting new trade-offs and potential stabilisation biases. Furthermore, the endogenous mark-up behaviour, which emerges when habits are deep, can also significantly affect the optimal policy response to shocks, as well as dramatically affecting the stabilising properties of standard simple rules.

How Optimal is US Monetary Policy?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis assume that policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow policy to be described by various forms of optimal policy - commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment. We find that, even after allowing for Markov switching in shock variances, the inflation target and/or rule parameters, the data preferred description of policy is that the US Fed operates under discretion with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. Parameter estimates are similar to those obtained under simple rules, except that the degree of habits is significantly lower and the prevalence of cost-push shocks greater. Moreover, we find that the greatest welfare gains from the ‘Great Moderation’ arose from the reduction in the variances in shocks hitting the economy, rather than increased inflation aversion. However, much of the high inflation of the 1970s could have been avoided had policy makers been able to commit, even without adopting stronger anti-inflation objectives. More recently the Fed appears to have temporarily relaxed policy following the 1987 stock market crash, and has lost, without regaining, its post-Volcker conservatism following the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000.

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Global Reuse and Optimal Waste Policy

Electronic waste generated from the consumption of durable goods in developed countries is often exported to underdeveloped countries for reuse, recycling and disposal with unfortunate environmental consequences. The lack of efficient disposal policies within developing nations coupled with global free trade agreements make it difficult for consumers to internalize these costs. This paper develops a two-country model, one economically developed and the other underdeveloped, to solve for optimal tax policies necessary to achieve the efficient allocation of economic resources in an economy with a durable good available for global reuse without policy measures in the underdeveloped country. A tax in the developed country on purchases of the new durable good combined with a waste tax set below the domestic external cost of disposal is sufficient for global efficiency. The implication of allowing free global trade in electronic waste is also examined, where optimal policy resembles a global deposit-refund system.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Assessing the impact of adaptive accessibility on the optimal transport policy implementation by using an integrated land-use/transport model for Madrid

Accessibility is an essential concept widely used to evaluate the impact of land-use and transport strategies in transport and urban planning. Accessibility is typically evaluated by using a transport model or a land-use model independently or successively without a feedback loop, thus neglecting the interaction effects between the two systems and the induced competition effects among opportunities due to accessibility improvements. More than a mere methodological curiosity, failure to account for land- use/transport interactions and the competition effect may result in large underestimation of the policy effects. With the recent development of land-use and transport interaction (LUTI) models, there is a growing interest in using these models to adequately measure accessibility and evaluate its impact. The current study joins this research stream by embedding an accessibility measure in a LUTI model with two main aims. The first aim is to account for adaptive accessibility, namely the adjustment of the potential accessibility due to the effect of competition among opportunities (e.g., workplaces) as a result of improved accessibility. LUTI models are particularly suitable for assessing adaptive accessibility because the competition factor is a function of the number of jobs, which is related to land-use attractiveness and the number of workers which is related, among other factors, to the transport demand. The second aim is to identify the optimal implementation scenario of policy measures on the basis of the potential and adaptive accessibility and analyse the results in terms of social welfare and accessibility. The metropolitan area of Madrid is used as a case-study and two transport policy instruments, namely a cordon toll and bus frequency increase, have been chosen for the simulation study in order to present the usefulness of the approach to urban planners and policy makers. The MARS model (Metropolitan Activity Relocation Simulator) calibrated for Madrid was employed as the analysis tool. The impact of accessibility is embedded in the model through a social welfare function that includes not only costs and benefits to both road users and transport operators, but also costs and benefits for the government and society in general (external costs). An optimisation procedure is performed by the MARS model for maximizing the value of objective function in order to find the best (optimal) policy imp lementations intensity (i.e., price, frequency). Last, the two policy strategies are evaluated in terms of their accessibility. Results show that the accessibility with competition factor influences the optimal policy implementation level and also generates different results in terms of social welfare. In addition, mapping the difference between the potential and the adaptive accessibility indicators shows that the main changes occur in areas where there is a strong competition among land-use opportunities.

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Innovation and environmental policy: Clean vs. dirty technical change

We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations. We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages research toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increasing the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one.

Optimal feedback control rules sensitive to controlled endogenous risk-aversion

The objective of this paper is to correct and improve the results obtained by Van der Ploeg (1984a, 1984b) and utilized in the theoretical literature related to feedback stochastic optimal control sensitive to constant exogenous risk-aversion (see, Jacobson, 1973, Karp, 1987 and Whittle, 1981, 1989, 1990, among others) or to the classic context of risk-neutral decision-makers (see, Chow, 1973, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1993). More realistic and attractive, this new approach is placed in the context of a time-varying endogenous risk-aversion which is under the control of the decision-maker. It has strong qualitative implications on the agent's optimal policy during the entire planning horizon.