Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Optimal second best taxation of addictive goods in dynamic general equilibrium: a revenue raising perspective

In this paper we derive conditions under which optimal tax rates for addictive goods exceed tax rates for non-addictive consumption goods within a rational addiction framework where exogenous government spending cannot be financed with lump sum taxes. We reexamine classic results on optimal commodity taxation and find a rich set of new findings. Two dynamic effects exist. First, households anticipating higher future addictive tax rates reduce current addictive consumption, so they will be less addicted when the tax rate increases. Therefore, addictive tax revenue falls prior to the tax increase. Surprisingly, the optimal tax rate on addictive goods is generally decreasing in the strength of tolerance, since strong tolerance strengthens this tax anticipation effect. Second, high current tax rates on addictive goods make households less addicted in the future, affecting all future tax revenues in a way which depends on how elasticities are changing over time. Classic results on uniform commodity taxation emerge as special cases when elasticities are constant and the addiction function is homogeneous of degree one. Finally, we also study features of addictive goods such as complementarity to leisure that, while not directly related to the definition of addiction, are nonetheless properties many addictive goods display.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derivetaxation are valid in this setup. We incorporate pre-committed goods - those whose consumption must be decided before the resolution of uncertainty - and show that tax prescriptions are also analogous to the existing literature. The robustness of tax rules across these setups is explained by the relaxation of incentive compatibility constraints.

Cambios en el régimen de pensiones en Colombia y su efecto en el margen intensivo de la oferta laboral

En Colombia, como en muchos países de América Latina, en los años 80 y 90 se hicieron cambios importantes en los regímenes de pensiones. Este trabajo hace un análisis de uno de esos cambios en Colombia. El cambio consistió en aumentar el tiempo de cotización necesario para reclamar los beneficios pensionales y la inclusión del salario dentro de la fórmula del monto de pensiones. Para este propósito se estudia el impacto sobre la oferta laboral de un cambio exógeno en estas condiciones usando un diseño de regresión discontinua. Se encuentra un efecto positivo sobre las horas promedio trabajadas en la semana.

The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies

Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on this type of investment. In a two period and finite type optimal income taxation problem we derive prescriptions that are robust to the risk characteristics of human capital: savings should be discouraged, human capital investments encouraged and both types of investment driven to an efficient level from an aggregate perspective. These prescriptions are also robust to the assumptions regarding what choices are observed, despite policy instruments being not.

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach to collective households

Esta dissertação apresenta uma abordagem alternativa para o problema de taxação de famílias. Mais especificamente modelamos a decisão familiar com um modelo de barganha de Nash em que os o governo determina de forma ótima as utilidades de discórdia. Demonstramos um Princípio da Revelação para esse modelo de forma a reduzir a classe de mecanismos possíveis, além disso calculamos os ganhos do mecanismo ótimo em relação a outros mecanismos razoáveis por meio de exemplos. Discutimos algumas implicações associadas ao mecanismo ótimo.

Taxation of couples: a mirrleesian approach for non-unitary households

Optimal tax theory in the Mirrlees’ (1971) tradition implicitly relies on the assumption that all agents are single or that couples may be treated as individuals, despite accumulating evidence against this view of household behavior. We consider an economy where agents may either be single or married, in which case choices result from Nash bargaining between spouses. In such an environment, tax schedules must play the double role of: i) defining households’ objective functions through their impact on threat points, and; ii) inducing the desired allocations as optimal choices for households given these objectives. We find that the taxation principle, which asserts that there is no loss in relying on tax schedules is not valid here: there are constrained efficient allocations which cannot be implemented via taxes. More sophisticated mechanisms expand the set of implementable allocations by: i) aligning the households’ and planner’s objectives; ii) manipulating taxable income elasticities, and; iii) freeing the design of singles’ tax schedules from its consequences on households’ objectives.

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).

Optimal Taxation and Indeterminacy in the Uzawa-Lucas Model with Sector-specific Externalities

Documento de trabajo

Optimal tax theory and the taxation of housing in the US and the UK

First, we survey recent research in the application of optimal tax theory to housing. This work suggests that the under-taxation of housing for owner occupation distorts investment so that owner occupiers are encouraged to over-invest in housing. Simulations of the US economy suggest that this is true there. But, the theoretical work excludes consideration of land and the simulations exclude consideration of taxes other than income taxes. These exclusions are important for the US and UK economies. In the US, the property tax is relatively high. We argue that excluding the property tax is wrong, so that, when the property tax is taken into account, owner occupied housing is not undertaxed in the US. In the UK, property taxes are relatively low but the cost of land has been increasing in real terms for forty years as a result of a policy of constraining land for development. The price of land for housing is now higher than elsewhere. Effectively, an implicit tax is paid by first time buyers which has reduced housing investment. When land is taken into account over-investment in housing is not encouraged in the UK either.

Optimal taxation with gradual learning of types

An important feature of life-cycle models is the presence of uncertainty regarding one’s labor income. Yet this issue, long recognized in different areas, has not received enough attention in the optimal taxation literature. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. We write a simple 3 period model where agents gradually learn their productivities. In a framework akin to Mirrlees’ (1971) static one, we derive properties of optimal tax schedules and show that: i) if preferences are (weakly) separable, uniform taxation of goods is optimal, ii) if they are (strongly) separable capital income is to rate than others forms of investiment.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.