A economia da informação : rumo a um programa de pesquisa alternativo

Este trabalho tem por objetivo discutir o surgimento de um programa de pesquisa na Ciência Econômica, no que concerne a análise das assimetrias de informação, as diferenças epistemológicas e as implicações em termos de equilíbrio ótimo de Pareto, em contraponto à abordagem neoclássica standard. Em busca de tal objetivo, foi necessário destacar o método de ambos os paradigmas; todavia, era igualmente necessário discutir a filosofia/epistemologia da ciência envolvida e que serviria de base para uma abordagem relacionada a mudanças paradigmáticas na ciência. No capítulo 1, discutimos a epistemologia da ciência, a partir de três autores: Popper, Kuhn e Lakatos. Definimos o conjunto de hipóteses que podem ser associadas ao método empregado pela Escola Neoclássica, a partir da filosofia da ciência proposta por Lakatos. Em seguida, no capítulo 2, fizemos uma longa exposição do método neoclássico, definindo os axiomas inerentes às preferências bem-comportadas, apresentando algebricamente o equilíbrio geral walrasiano, exemplificando o relaxamento de hipóteses auxiliares do modelo neoclássico a partir de Friedman e, por fim, aplicando o instrumental neoclássico ao relaxamento da hipótese auxiliar de perfeição da informação, a partir do modelo desenvolvido por Grossman & Stiglitz (1976), bem como da expansão matemática desenvolvida pelo presente trabalho. Finalmente, encerramos a presente dissertação com o capítulo 3, no qual, basicamente, expomos as principais contribuições de autores como Stiglitz, Akerlof e Arrow, no que concerne a mercados permeados por informações assimétricas e comportamentos oportunistas. Procuramos mostrar as consequências para o próprio mercado, chegando a resultados em que o mesmo era extinto. Apresentamos a segunda parte do modelo de Grossman & Stiglitz, enfatizando a natureza imperfeita do sistema de preços, sua incapacidade de transmitir todas as informações sobre os bens ao conjunto dos agentes, e, por fim, discutimos tópicos variados ligados à Economia da Informação.

Innovation and environmental policy: Clean vs. dirty technical change

We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmental quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations. We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages research toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increasing the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Assessment of a data-limited, multi-species shark fishery in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and south-east Queensland

The status of five species of commercially exploited sharks within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP) and south-east Queensland was assessed using a data-limited approach. Annual harvest rate, U, estimated empirically from tagging between 2011 and 2013, was compared with an analytically-derived proxy for optimal equilibrium harvest rate, UMSY Lim. Median estimates of U for three principal retained species, Australian blacktip shark, Carcharhinus tilstoni, spot-tail shark, Carcharhinus sorrah, and spinner shark, Carcharhinus brevipinna, were 0.10, 0.06 and 0.07 year-1, respectively. Median U for two retained, non-target species, pigeye shark, Carcharhinus amboinensis and Australian sharpnose shark, Rhizoprionodon taylori, were 0.27 and 0.01 year-1, respectively. For all species except the Australian blacktip the median ratio of U/UMSY Lim was <1. The high vulnerability of this species to fishing combined with life history characteristics meant UMSY Lim was low (0.04-0.07 year-1) and that U/UMSY Lim was likely to be > 1. Harvest of the Australian blacktip shark above UMSY could place this species at a greater risk of localised depletion in parts of the GBRMP. Results of the study indicated that much higher catches, and presumably higher U, during the early 2000s were likely unsustainable. The unexpectedly high level of U on the pigeye shark indicated that output-based management controls may not have been effective in reducing harvest levels on all species, particularly those caught incidentally by other fishing sectors including the recreational sector. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.

Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal?

We model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity premium, sustainability, and service smoothing. We use a dynamic-equilibrium model with tax distortions and government outlays uncertainty, and model maturity as the fraction of debt that needs to be rolled over every period. In the model, the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. We then calibrate our artificial economy and solve for the optimal debt maturity for Brazil as an example of a developing country and the US as an example of a mature economy. We obtain that the calibrated costs from defaulting on long-term debt more than offset costs associated with short-term debt. Therefore, short-term debt implies higher welfare levels.

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students` strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.

Basic dyestuffs removal from textile effluents using feathers: equilibrium, kinetic and column studies

This research work has been focused in the study of gallinaceous feathers, a waste that may be valorised as sorbent, to remove the Dark Blue Astrazon 2RN (DBA) from Dystar. This study was focused on the following aspects: optimization of experimental conditions through factorial design methodology, kinetic studies into a continuous stirred tank adsorber (at pH 7 and 20ºC), equilibrium isotherms (at pH 5, 7 and 9 at 20 and 45ºC) and column studies (at 20ºC, at pH 5, 7 and 9). In order to evaluate the influence of the presence of other components in the sorption of the dyestuff, all experiments were performed both for the dyestuff in aqueous solution and in real textile effluent. The pseudo-first and pseudo-second order kinetic models were fitted to the experimental data, being the latter the best fit for the aqueous solution of dyestuff. For the real effluent both models fit the experimental results and there is no statistical difference between them. The Central Composite Design (CCD) was used to evaluate the effects of temperature (15 - 45ºC) and pH (5 - 9) over the sorption in aqueous solution. The influence of pH was more significant than temperature. The optimal conditions selected were 45ºC and pH 9. Both Langmuir and Freundlich models could fit the equilibrium data. In the concentration range studied, the highest sorbent capacity was obtained for the optimal conditions in aqueous solution, which corresponds to a maximum capacity of 47± 4 mg g-1. The Yoon-Nelson, Thomas and Yan’s models fitted well the column experimental data. The highest breakthrough time for 50% removal, 170 min, was obtained at pH 9 in aqueous solution. The presence of the dyeing agents in the real wastewater decreased the sorption of the dyestuff mostly for pH 9, which is the optimal pH. The effect of pH is less pronounced in the real effluent than in aqueous solution. This work shows that feathers can be used as sorbent in the treatment of textile wastewaters containing DBA.

Optimal design and operation of compact simulated moving bed processes for enantioseparations

Simulated moving bed (SMB) chromatography is attracting more and more attention since it is a powerful technique for complex separation tasks. Nowadays, more than 60% of preparative SMB units are installed in the pharmaceutical and in the food in- dustry [SDI, Preparative and Process Liquid Chromatography: The Future of Process Separations, International Strategic Directions, Los Angeles, USA, 2002. http://www. strategicdirections.com]. Chromatography is the method of choice in these ¯elds, be- cause often pharmaceuticals and ¯ne-chemicals have physico-chemical properties which di®er little from those of the by-products, and they may be thermally instable. In these cases, standard separation techniques as distillation and extraction are not applicable. The noteworthiness of preparative chromatography, particulary SMB process, as a sep- aration and puri¯cation process in the above mentioned industries has been increasing, due to its °exibility, energy e±ciency and higher product purity performance. Consequently, a new SMB paradigm is requested by the large number of potential small- scale applications of the SMB technology, which exploits the °exibility and versatility of the technology. In this new SMB paradigm, a number of possibilities for improving SMB performance through variation of parameters during a switching interval, are pushing the trend toward the use of units with smaller number of columns because less stationary phase is used and the setup is more economical. This is especially important for the phar- maceutical industry, where SMBs are seen as multipurpose units that can be applied to di®erent separations in all stages of the drug-development cycle. In order to reduce the experimental e®ort and accordingly the coast associated with the development of separation processes, simulation models are intensively used. One impor- tant aspect in this context refers to the determination of the adsorption isotherms in SMB chromatography, where separations are usually carried out under strongly nonlinear conditions in order to achieve higher productivities. The accurate determination of the competitive adsorption equilibrium of the enantiomeric species is thus of fundamental importance to allow computer-assisted optimization or process scale-up. Two major SMB operating problems are apparent at production scale: the assessment of product quality and the maintenance of long-term stable and controlled operation. Constraints regarding product purity, dictated by pharmaceutical and food regulatory organizations, have drastically increased the demand for product quality control. The strict imposed regulations are increasing the need for developing optically pure drugs.(...)

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

Pareto-improving optimal capital and labor taxes

We show a standard model where the optimal tax reform is to cut labor taxes and leave capital taxes very high in the short and medium run. Only in the very long run would capital taxes be zero. Our model is a version of Chamley??s, with heterogeneous agents, without lump sum transfers, an upper bound on capital taxes, and a focus on Pareto improving plans. For our calibration labor taxes should be low for the first ten to twenty years, while capital taxes should be at their maximum. This policy ensures that all agents benefit from the tax reform and that capital grows quickly after when the reform begins. Therefore, the long run optimal tax mix is the opposite from the short and medium run tax mix. The initial labor tax cut is financed by deficits that lead to a positive long run level of government debt, reversing the standard prediction that government accumulates savings in models with optimal capital taxes. If labor supply is somewhat elastic benefits from tax reform are high and they can be shifted entirely to capitalists or workers by varying the length of the transition. With inelastic labor supply there is an increasing part of the equilibrium frontier, this means that the scope for benefitting the workers is limited and the total benefits from reforming taxes are much lower.