Valuation of a new entrant in an oligopolistic market, including its option to abandon: A real-life case

The purpose of this paper is to increase current empirical evidence on the relevance of real options for explaining firm investment decisions in oligopolistic markets. We study an actual investment case in the Spanish mobile telephony industry, the entrant in the market of a new operator, Yoigo. We analyze the option to abandon in order to show the relevance of the possibility of selling the company in an oligopolistic market where competitors are not allowed free entrance. The NPV (net present value) of the new entrant is calculated as a starting point. Then, based on the general approach proposed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001), a binomial tree is used to model managerial flexibility in discrete time periods, and value the option to abandon. The strike price of the option is calculated based on incremental EBITDA margins due to selling customers or merging with a competitor.

Microeconomics and the space economy; the effectiveness of an oligopolistic market economy.

Includes bibliography.

Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Empresas promotoras de saúde no sistema de saúde colombiano: dinâmica financeira estrutural.

Esta dissertação analisou as Empresas Promotoras de Salud (EPS), seguradoras de saúde introduzidas no sistema de saúde colombiano através da reforma sanitária instaurada com a Lei n 100/1993, desde uma perspectiva de economia política crítica, através do método de análise documental. A maioria delas são empresas privadas com finalidade lucrativa que conformaram rapidamente um oligopólio que reproduziu problemas dos modelos de Managed Care e Managed Competition já conhecidos internacionalmente. Esta dissertação analisou as relações entre os processos de financeirização do sistema capitalista e o processo de ajuste estrutural na Colômbia, com a reforma sanitária e a dinâmica financeira das EPS. Também foi analisada a introdução de mecanismos próprios do processo de financeirização na gestão financeira das EPS, como: a alavancagem; a reprodução ampliada de capital através da dívida pública; e os investimentos em ativos securitizados. Dado que o sistema de saúde atual se caracteriza por altos níveis de inequidade e injustiça, as consequências da finalidade lucrativa neste, com suas expressões concretas de sofrimento e morte na população, foram preocupações transversais deste trabalho. Os resultados desta dissertação demonstraram a concentração oligopólica do mercado de seguros privados de saúde, cujas empresas se organizaram como um cartel, dificultando o acesso aos serviços de saúde para seus segurados, o que contribuiu para a piora de indicadores de saúde da população. Quando a mobilização social obrigou a aumentar o controle sobre as EPS, estas começaram a sair do mercado declarando-se em falência, ou entrando subitamente em balanços financeiros negativos.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

Modell zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs und der Transparenz auf dem Ratingmarkt unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten der deutschen Bankenstruktur

This paper provides a model for the international market of credit ratings in order to promote transparency of rating methodologies and combat the oligopolistic market structure where Standard & Poor‘s, Moody‘s and Fitch Ratings collectively comprise approximately 85 percent of the market. For the German credit market this paper strongly advises the establishment of at least three centralistic credit rating agencies (CRAs), set up and run independently by the large bank institutions – „Großbanken“, „Sparkassen“ and „Genossenschaftsbanken“. By acting as CRAs, universal banks could not only decrease their costs but would also be able to increase competition and transparency. These new credit rating agencies would be subject to the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) surveillance standards that go far beyond the Basel II standard approach with its external ratings by the dominating three US-american CRAs. Due to the fact that the new Basle Accord has already been implemented in Europe, this model could be applied all over Europe and possibly even worldwide, assuming the US were to adopt the new capital adequacy rules. This would lead to an increase in the number of CRAs and hence to more competition, as the barriers to entry in the rating industry would not apply to these new institutions because of their expertise in the credit market. The fact that the IRB-criteria already have to be disclosed by law would make the methodologies transparent and subject to approval by national regulators such as the „Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht“ (BaFin) in Germany. Hence the requirement to set up a new monitoring committee in Europe would become obsolete.

Efectos espaciales en la formación de precios de oferta en mercados spot de generación eléctrica

El mecanismo de fijación del precio de oferta en el mercado eléctrico colombiano exhibe comportamientos estratégicos inherente a la estructura oligopólica de este mercado, no solo por su alto porcentaje hidrológico, aproximadamente 80%, sino también debido a la localización geográfica de las plantas de generación eléctrica cercanas a la Región Andina. En esta investigación se diseña una matriz de pesos espaciales, que recoge características de la localización geográfica de las plantas de generación eléctrica, la cual se incorpora en un panel espacial de tipo Durbin para identificar dichos comportamientos de la geografía económica, además de las variables fundamentales que explican la formación del precio en este mercado.

Policy Coordination in an Oligopolistic Housing Market

This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between two different levels of government (regulators) in the development of housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of coordination has significant effects on prices and supply of houses, housing developers’ profits, and buyers’ surplus.

The Impact of Emissions Trading on the Price of Electricity in Nord Pool : Market Power and Price Determination in the Nordic Electricity Market

The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and how this will effect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity. The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.

Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Chronic limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and oligopolistic markets: an urgent case for socialized capital

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the serious limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and urge for a shift to socialized capital before further economic deterioration leads to a succession of global conflicts. Design/methodology/approach – This conceptual paper adopts a macro perspective in presenting argument on how global, financial markets integration and capital flow liberalization have led to inadequate market and corporate governance measures. The argument is couched in a selected literature and is preceded by a proposed solution – the requirement for socialized capital. An analysis of the nature of socialized capital is outlined and the questions that require attention identified if a paradigm shift from neo-liberal capitalism is to take place. Findings – The need to urgently shift to a new philosophy of capitalism is overwhelming. Emphasized is that capital needs to adopt a socialised identity and is supported by investment horizons of 30 years or more. It is argued that non-market (e.g. state, NGOs, civil society) intervention is critical in setting appropriate frameworks within which socialized capital can operate. Research limitations/implications – This is a theoretical paper, in which questions are raised which require transparent, public debate. Originality/value – The paper presents the case for a fundamental reconsideration of present day markets, the role of capital and the influence of elites in determining the public good.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).