An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Valuation of a new entrant in an oligopolistic market, including its option to abandon: A real-life case

The purpose of this paper is to increase current empirical evidence on the relevance of real options for explaining firm investment decisions in oligopolistic markets. We study an actual investment case in the Spanish mobile telephony industry, the entrant in the market of a new operator, Yoigo. We analyze the option to abandon in order to show the relevance of the possibility of selling the company in an oligopolistic market where competitors are not allowed free entrance. The NPV (net present value) of the new entrant is calculated as a starting point. Then, based on the general approach proposed by Copeland and Antikarov (2001), a binomial tree is used to model managerial flexibility in discrete time periods, and value the option to abandon. The strike price of the option is calculated based on incremental EBITDA margins due to selling customers or merging with a competitor.

Microeconomics and the space economy; the effectiveness of an oligopolistic market economy.

Includes bibliography.

Stochastic short-term maintenance scheduling of GENCOs in an oligopolistic electricity market

In the proposed model, the independent system operator (ISO) provides the opportunity for maintenance outage rescheduling of generating units before each short-term (ST) time interval. Long-term (LT) scheduling for 1 or 2 years in advance is essential for the ISO and the generation companies (GENCOs) to decide their LT strategies; however, it is not possible to be exactly followed and requires slight adjustments. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used to characterize the decision-making procedure of an individual GENCO for ST intervals considering the effective coordination with LT plans. Random inputs, such as parameters of the demand function of loads, hourly demand during the following ST time interval and the expected generation pattern of the rivals, are included as scenarios in the stochastic mixed integer program defined to model the payoff-maximizing objective of a GENCO. Scenario reduction algorithms are used to deal with the computational burden. Two reliability test systems were chosen to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model for the ST decision-making process for future planned outages from the point of view of a GENCO.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

Modell zur Förderung des Wettbewerbs und der Transparenz auf dem Ratingmarkt unter Berücksichtigung der Besonderheiten der deutschen Bankenstruktur

This paper provides a model for the international market of credit ratings in order to promote transparency of rating methodologies and combat the oligopolistic market structure where Standard & Poor‘s, Moody‘s and Fitch Ratings collectively comprise approximately 85 percent of the market. For the German credit market this paper strongly advises the establishment of at least three centralistic credit rating agencies (CRAs), set up and run independently by the large bank institutions – „Großbanken“, „Sparkassen“ and „Genossenschaftsbanken“. By acting as CRAs, universal banks could not only decrease their costs but would also be able to increase competition and transparency. These new credit rating agencies would be subject to the Basel II internal ratings-based (IRB) surveillance standards that go far beyond the Basel II standard approach with its external ratings by the dominating three US-american CRAs. Due to the fact that the new Basle Accord has already been implemented in Europe, this model could be applied all over Europe and possibly even worldwide, assuming the US were to adopt the new capital adequacy rules. This would lead to an increase in the number of CRAs and hence to more competition, as the barriers to entry in the rating industry would not apply to these new institutions because of their expertise in the credit market. The fact that the IRB-criteria already have to be disclosed by law would make the methodologies transparent and subject to approval by national regulators such as the „Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht“ (BaFin) in Germany. Hence the requirement to set up a new monitoring committee in Europe would become obsolete.

Efectos espaciales en la formación de precios de oferta en mercados spot de generación eléctrica

El mecanismo de fijación del precio de oferta en el mercado eléctrico colombiano exhibe comportamientos estratégicos inherente a la estructura oligopólica de este mercado, no solo por su alto porcentaje hidrológico, aproximadamente 80%, sino también debido a la localización geográfica de las plantas de generación eléctrica cercanas a la Región Andina. En esta investigación se diseña una matriz de pesos espaciales, que recoge características de la localización geográfica de las plantas de generación eléctrica, la cual se incorpora en un panel espacial de tipo Durbin para identificar dichos comportamientos de la geografía económica, además de las variables fundamentales que explican la formación del precio en este mercado.

Chronic limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and oligopolistic markets: an urgent case for socialized capital

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the serious limitations of neo-liberal capitalism and urge for a shift to socialized capital before further economic deterioration leads to a succession of global conflicts. Design/methodology/approach – This conceptual paper adopts a macro perspective in presenting argument on how global, financial markets integration and capital flow liberalization have led to inadequate market and corporate governance measures. The argument is couched in a selected literature and is preceded by a proposed solution – the requirement for socialized capital. An analysis of the nature of socialized capital is outlined and the questions that require attention identified if a paradigm shift from neo-liberal capitalism is to take place. Findings – The need to urgently shift to a new philosophy of capitalism is overwhelming. Emphasized is that capital needs to adopt a socialised identity and is supported by investment horizons of 30 years or more. It is argued that non-market (e.g. state, NGOs, civil society) intervention is critical in setting appropriate frameworks within which socialized capital can operate. Research limitations/implications – This is a theoretical paper, in which questions are raised which require transparent, public debate. Originality/value – The paper presents the case for a fundamental reconsideration of present day markets, the role of capital and the influence of elites in determining the public good.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).

The revenge of the market on the rentiers why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature

Starting from the perspective of heterodox Keynesian-Minskyian-Kindlebergian financial economics, this paper begins by highlighting a number of mechanisms that contributed to the current financial crisis. These include excess liquidity, income polarisation, conflicts between financial and productive capital, lack of intelligent regulation, asymmetric information, principal-agent dilemmas and bounded rationalities. However, the paper then proceeds to argue that perhaps more than ever the ‘macroeconomics’ that led to this crisis only makes analytical sense if examined within the framework of the political settlements and distributional outcomes in which it had operated. Taking the perspective of critical social theories the paper concludes that, ultimately, the current financial crisis is the outcome of something much more systemic, namely an attempt to use neo-liberalism (or, in US terms, neo-conservatism) as a new technology of power to help transform capitalism into a rentiers’ delight. And in particular, into a system without much ‘compulsion’ on big business; i.e., one that imposes only minimal pressures on big agents to engage in competitive struggles in the real economy (while inflicting exactly the opposite fate on workers and small firms). A key component in the effectiveness of this new technology of power was its ability to transform the state into a major facilitator of the ever-increasing rent-seeking practices of oligopolistic capital. The architects of this experiment include some capitalist groups (in particular rentiers from the financial sector as well as capitalists from the ‘mature’ and most polluting industries of the preceding techno-economic paradigm), some political groups, as well as intellectual networks with their allies – including most economists and the ‘new’ left. Although rentiers did succeed in their attempt to get rid of practically all fetters on their greed, in the end the crisis materialised when ‘markets’ took their inevitable revenge on the rentiers by calling their (blatant) bluff.

Excise Tax Overshifting in the Hungarian Beer Market

We conduct this paper on excise tax shifting in the Hungarian beer market. Using a regression model we show that tax overshifting occurs in this market. We present a model with oligopolistic competition to explain how tax overshifting can occur because of the separated vertical structure. Our results suggests that Hungarian beer producers compete in Bertrand fashion and the hypothesis of collusion between beer producers can be rejected.

A Markovian model market-Akerlof`s lemons and the asymmetry of information

In this work we study an agent based model to investigate the role of asymmetric information degrees for market evolution. This model is quite simple and may be treated analytically since the consumers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only the quality of the last good purchased plus her perceptive capacity beta. As a consequence, the system evolves according to a stationary Markov chain. The value of a good offered by the firms increases along with quality according to an exponent alpha, which is a measure of the technology. It incorporates all the technological capacity of the production systems such as education, scientific development and techniques that change the productivity rates. The technological level plays an important role to explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution in this model. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can detect adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum asymmetric information degree before the market collapses. Below this critical point the market evolves during a limited period of time and then dies out completely. When beta is closer to 1 (symmetric information), the market becomes more profitable for high quality goods, although high and low quality markets coexist. The maximum asymmetric information level is a consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process of quality evaluation. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Music and faith: The religious scene in the Brazilian phonographic market

This text discusses the phonographic segment of religious music in Brazil in its two main manifestations, linked respectively to the Catholic and Protestant traditions. The text offers a brief history of both traditions, as well as a description of their main recording companies and artists of greatest prominence. In its final part. the text presents the strategies that bring together recording companies and independent artists, as well as ponders over Brazil`s independent musical production as a whole.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE BRAZILIAN REAL ESTATE MARKET

This article discusses the main aspects of the Brazilian real estate market in order to illustrate if it would be attractive for a typical American real estate investor to buy office-building portfolios in Brazil. The article emphasizes: [i] - the regulatory frontiers, comparing investment securitization, using a typical American REIT structure, with the Brazilian solution, using the Fundo de Investimento Imobiliario - FII; [ii] - the investment quality attributes in the Brazilian market, using an office building prototype, and [iii] - the comparison of [risk vs. yield] generated by an investment in the Brazilian market, using a FII, benchmarked against an existing REIT (OFFICE SUB-SECTOR) in the USA market. We conclude that investing dollars exchanged for Reais [the Brazilian currency] in a FII with a triple A office-building portfolio in the Sao Paulo marketplace will yield an annual income and a premium return above an American REIT investment. The highly aggressive scenario, along with the strong persistent exchange rate detachment to the IGP-M variations, plus instabilities affecting the generation of income, and even if we adopt a 300-point margin for the Brazil-Risk level, demonstrates that an investment opportunity in the Brazilian market, in the segment we have analyzed, outperforms an equivalent investment in the American market.