Conscientious objection and ideological impositions: The Drift of The Mayflower

This article discusses the problematic and evading development of conscientiousobjection in the context of the Colombian constitutional jurisprudence. From a historical allusion to the famous case of the “Mayflower Pilgrims” –which serve as areference to the central problems that faces the objector–, it seeks to define the scopeof conscientious objection as a fundamental right (as a fundamental justice claim)in regard to the “factual” and “legal” possibilities for its exercise, for which there willbe a brief contrast between the most representative cases decided by the ColombianConstitutional Court in such matter. The core of the article is the idea that thereis an ideological prevalence that, unjustifiably, makes it difficult and in some casesdenies the exercise of the right to object in consciousness, particularly when it comes tothe right of life in regard to the abortion case.

Fundamental Right to Freedom of Conscience without Objection? Some Notes for its Recognition as a Fundamental Guarantee

Conscientious objection is defined as the ability to depart from statutory mandates because of intimate convictions based on ethical or religious convictions. A discussion of this issue presents the conflict between the idea of a State concerned with the promotion of individual rights or the protection of general interests and an idea of law based on the maintenance of order and against a view of the law as a means to claim the protection of minimum conditions of the person. From this conflict is drawn the possibility to argue whether conscientious objection should be guaranteed as a fundamental right of freedom of conscience or as a statutory authority legislatively conferred upon persons. This paper sets out a discussion around the two views so as to develop a position that is more consistent with the context of social and constitutional law.

“Dishonourable disobedience” – Why refusal to treat in reproductive healthcare is not conscientious objection

In medicine, the vast majority of conscientious objection (CO) is exercised within the reproductive healthcare field – particularly for abortion and contraception. Current laws and practices in various countries around CO in reproductive healthcare show that it is unworkable and frequently abused, with harmful impacts on women's healthcare and rights. CO in medicine is supposedly analogous to CO in the military, but in fact the two have little in common. This paper argues that CO in reproductive health is not actually Conscientious Objection, but Dishonourable Disobedience (DD) to laws and ethical codes. Healthcare professionals who exercise CO are using their position of trust and authority to impose their personal beliefs on patients, who are completely dependent on them for essential healthcare. Health systems and institutions that prohibit staff from providing abortion or contraception services are being discriminatory by systematically denying healthcare services to a vulnerable population and disregarding conscience rights for abortion providers. CO in reproductive healthcare should be dealt with like any other failure to perform one's professional duty, through enforcement and disciplinary measures. Counteracting institutional CO may require governmental or even international intervention.

The objection to the inspiration of the evangelists and apostles from their manner of quoting texts from the Old Testament. Considered in a lecture delivered September 2, 1823, in the Theological Seminary, Andover. ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Pædobaptism examined; with replies to the arguments and objection of Dr. Williams and Mr. Peter Edwards.

Mode of access: Internet.

The religious objection to tetotalism.

Mode of access: Internet.

Examen de deux traittex nouvellement mis au jour par Me. La Placette : dont le premier a pour tître : réponse à une objection qu'on applique à divers sujets &c. ... et le second eclaircissemens sur quelques difficultez, qui naissent de la consideration de la liberté necessaire pour agir moralement : avec une addition où l'on prouve contre Spinoza, que nous sommes libres.

Mode of access: Internet.

‘Every Coward’s Choice’? Political Objection to Military Service in Apartheid South Africa as Sexual Citizenship

Sexuality was articulated by the apartheid state as a means of disciplining the white population and marginalizing white opponents of apartheid. As such, homophobia was a recurrent feature of political and legal discourse. The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) opposed compulsory conscription for all white men in the apartheid era South African Defence Force (SADF). Its challenge was a potentially radical and profoundly destabilizing one and it articulated a competing definition of citizenship to that offered by the state. The pro‐ and anti‐conscription discourse was inherently gendered and overtly sexualized. The South African government regularly associated men who objected to military service with effeminacy, cowardice and sexual ‘deviance’. The case of Dr Ivan Toms' objection, a gay objector who wished to cite his sexuality as a primary motivation for his objection, reveals the unwillingness of the ECC to engage in sexual politics. Using Shane Phelan's and Zygmunt Bauman's concept of friends, enemies and strangers, this paper investigates the construction of both white gay men and white people who opposed apartheid as ‘strangers’ and suggests that the deployment of homophobia by the state was a stigmatizing discourse aimed at purging the ECC's political message from the public realm. In this context the ECC adopted an assimilatory discursive strategy, whereby they attempted to be ‘respectable whites’, negotiating over shared republican territory. This populist strategy, arguably safer in the short term, avoided issues of sexuality and the fundamental conflation of sexuality and citizenship in apartheid South Africa. The ECC thus circumscribed its radical and deconstructive political potential and did not offer a ‘radical democratic’ message in opposition to apartheid.