Ownership structure and business evaluation practices in family SMEs : evidence from empirical research in Italy

This paper presents early results from a pilot project which aims to investigate the relationship between proprietary structure of small and medium- sized Italian family firms and their owners’ orientation towards a “business evaluation process”. Evidence from many studies point out the importance of family business in a worldwide economic environment: in Italy 93% of the businesses are represented by family firms; 98% of them have less than 50 employees (Italian Association of Family Firms, 2004) so we judged family SMEs as a relevant field of investigation. In this study we assume a broad definition of family business as “a firm whose control (50% of shares or voting rights) is closely held by the members of the same family” (Corbetta,1995). “Business evaluation process” is intended here both as “continuous evaluation process” (which is the expression of a well developed managerial attitude) or as an “immediate valuation” (i.e. in the case of new shareholder’s entrance, share exchange among siblings, etc). We set two hypotheses to be tested in this paper: the first is “quantitative” and aims to verify whether the number of owners (independent variable) in a family firm is positively correlated to the business evaluation process. If a family firm is led by only one subject, it is more likely that personal values, culture and feelings may affect his choices more than “purely economic opportunities”; so there is less concern about monitoring economic performance or about the economic value of the firm. As the shareholders’ number increases, economic aspects in managing the firm grow in importance over the personal values and "value orientation" acquires a central role. The second hypothesis investigates if and to what extent the presence of “non- family members” among the owners affects their orientation to the business evaluation process. The “Cramer’s V” test has been used to test the hypotheses; both were not confirmed from these early results; next steps will lead to make an inferential analysis on a representative sample of the population.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

Outsider board activity, ownership structure and firm value : evidence from Korea

Using a sample of publicly listed firm in Korea from 2002 to 2006, this article examines the impact of board monitoring on firm value and productivity. We use outsider's attendance of board meetings as a proxy for board monitoring. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that outsider's attendance rate increases firm value, suggesting that attending board meeting itself is a strong signal that reflects outsider's intention to monitor insiders. While ownership of controlling shareholders negatively affects firm value, this relationship is not moderated by increased monitoring by outsiders. Our findings provide further evidence that the outside director system is less effective in chaebol-affiliated firms. Results also indicate that the effect of outsider's board monitoring activity on investor's valuation of the firm is greater than on productivity improvement of the firm. Our conclusions are robust for possible endogeneity in the relationship between firm value and board attendance by outside directors.

The effect of ownership structure, country governance, and financial development on the capital structure of unlisted eastern European firms

This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.

Ownership structure, organisational flexibility and store performance in retail chains.

Drawing on agency and flexible capability perspectives, the authors develop a theoretical framework explaining the impact of ownership structure on organisational flexibility and store performance in retail chains. The researchers argue that franchised stores attract more entrepreneurial managers with more flexible capabilities and they have a stronger incentive to align their flexible capabilities with the demands of the business environment. A sample of 105 franchised and company-owned stores of an optical retail chain is used to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, the study found strong support for the hypotheses that 'Franchised stores have a higher structural flexibility than company-owned stores', but only weak support for operational and strategic flexible capabilities. Furthermore, in line with the study's theoretical framework, it has been found that in a highly turbulent business environment, franchised stores perform better than company-owned stores. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for theory development and management of ownership structures in retail chains.

Does ownership structure matter? Three essays in finance

Management

Garland, since 1776- a unique ownership structure

The case is based on Garland, a 240 years old Portuguese family business, now owned by the Dawson family. It focuses on a decision made 50 years ago, aligned with what had been the company’s history, about the ownership rules for family members, which influences the ownership structure of the firm. It addresses the main issues about ownership in family businesses, and tackles the problem of succession planning and fair process. It contains a teaching note to support the utilization of the case in a classroom context, with learning objectives, target audience, a teaching plan, questions and proposed answers, and theory that relates to the case. It is also complemented with an epilogue and an overview of the case.

Ownership structure and risk at Colombian banks

The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.

Ownership structure and corporate performance : Australian evidence

This paper seeks to analyse the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance for fifty firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange during 2002-2003. The study initially tests a two equation model similar to that in the existing literature, but is distinguished from prior literature by subsequently reclassifying leverage. By categorising leverage as an endogenous variable, an examination of the relationship between ownership and performance is undertaken through ordinary least squares and two stage least squares analysis of a three equation econometric model. Interestingly, empirical results illustrate the fact that managerial ownership impacts negatively on firm performance which is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis.

The impact of ownership structure on corporate debt policy : two stage least square simultaneous model approach for post crisis period : evidence from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Ownership concentration as a governance mechanism has received considerable attention among academician, practitioners as well as policy makers because large-block shareholders are increasingly active in their demands that corporations adopt effective governance mechanisms to control managerial decisions, which include corporate debt policy. Earlier study on the agency model of the firm widely recognizes that the managerial ownership and external debt play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts and enhancing firm value. They also found that increase in the external monitors, for example the institutional investors, can actually play a useful role in limiting agency problems in the firm. This paper, using 100 Composite Index companies from Brusa Malaysia between 1998 to 2002 explores the impact of institutional holdings on managerial ownership and debt policy in an integrated framework by using a simultaneous equations estimation procedure (2SLS). The findings show that there is a significant impact of institutional ownership which serves effective control mechanism on managerial ownership and corporate debt policy as hypothesized. Findings of such evidence suggest that institutional holding thus have played an important role in managers' strategic management decision and reduce agency conflict. In addition, corporate debt policy too is governed by managerial ownership and exhibited a negative relation.

Sources of liquidity commonality, asymmetric information and ownership structure in emerging markets : evidence from the Chinese stock market

Xinwei Zheng examines if common factors of liquidity can be determined by ownership structure measured by asymmetric information in an emerging market that has adopted an order-driven trading system. Using China as a case for the study, I select a broad sample of stocks from two separate Chinese stock exchanges to measure and
analyse the relationship. My empirical evidence seems significant and pervasive. These findings about the Chinese stock market provide useful pointers for understanding commonality in emerging economies and shed critical light
on a new dimension of the working of emerging markets.