Analysis of Object-Specific Authorization Protocol (OSAP) using coloured petri nets - Version 1.0

Analyzing security protocols is an ongoing research in the last years. Different types of tools are developed to make the analysis process more precise, fast and easy. These tools consider security protocols as black boxes that can not easily be composed. It is difficult or impossible to do a low-level analysis or combine different tools with each other using these tools. This research uses Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) to analyze OSAP trusted computing protocol. The OSAP protocol is modeled in different levels and it is analyzed using state space method. The produced model can be combined with other trusted computing protocols in future works.

Analysis of Object-Specific Authorization Protocol (OSAP) using coloured Petri nets

The use of Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is be- coming increasingly popular in many security sys- tems. To access objects protected by TPM (such as cryptographic keys), several cryptographic proto- cols, such as the Object Specific Authorization Pro- tocol (OSAP), can be used. Given the sensitivity and the importance of those objects protected by TPM, the security of this protocol is vital. Formal meth- ods allow a precise and complete analysis of crypto- graphic protocols such that their security properties can be asserted with high assurance. Unfortunately, formal verification of these protocols are limited, de- spite the abundance of formal tools that one can use. In this paper, we demonstrate the use of Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) - a type of formal technique, to formally model the OSAP. Using this model, we then verify the authentication property of this protocol us- ing the state space analysis technique. The results of analysis demonstrates that as reported by Chen and Ryan the authentication property of OSAP can be violated.

Formal analysis of security properties in trusted computing protocols

This research introduces a general methodology in order to create a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) model of a security protocol. Then standard or user-defined security properties of the created CPN model are identified. After adding an attacker model to the protocol model, the security property is verified using state space method. This approach is applied to analyse a number of trusted computing protocols. The results show the applicability of proposed method to analyse both standard and user-defined properties.

Analysis of two authorization protocols using Colored Petri Nets

To prevent unauthorized access to protected trusted platform module (TPM) objects, authorization protocols, such as the object-specific authorization protocol (OSAP), have been introduced by the trusted computing group (TCG). By using OSAP, processes trying to gain access to the protected TPM objects need to prove their knowledge of relevant authorization data before access to the objects can be granted. Chen and Ryan’s 2009 analysis has demonstrated OSAP’s authentication vulnerability in sessions with shared authorization data. They also proposed the Session Key Authorization Protocol (SKAP) with fewer stages as an alternative to OSAP. Chen and Ryan’s analysis of SKAP using ProVerif proves the authentication property. The purpose of this paper was to examine the usefulness of Colored Petri Nets (CPN) and CPN Tools for security analysis. Using OSAP and SKAP as case studies, we construct intruder and authentication property models in CPN. CPN Tools is used to verify the authentication property using a Dolev–Yao-based model. Verification of the authentication property in both models using the state space tool produces results consistent with those of Chen and Ryan.

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