Social Housing under Oligopoly

In this paper it is shown that the setting up of a social housing system may decrease the total number of houses built in the market, induce a price of non-social houses greater than the price of houses without that system and increase the profits of housing developers even in situations where they have to sell social houses at a price below production cost. The analysis considers a situation with imperfect competition in the housing market and with a social housing system where housing developers must provide some social houses when they obtain a permit to build non-social houses.

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).

Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly

We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the firms focus more on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games.

Bertrand oligopoly when rivals' costs are unknown

We study a Bertrand oligopoly model with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where the uncertainty is given by a uniform distribution. We compute the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this game, the ex-ante expected profit and the ex-post profit of each firm. We see that, even though only one firm produces in equilibrium, all firms have a positive ex-ante expected profit.

On the Profitability of Production Constraints in a Dynamic Natural Resource Oligopoly

Static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in Cournot equilibrium were to be constrained to contract its production marginally, its profits would fall. on the other hand, if all the firms were simultaneously constrained to reduce their productino, thus moving the industry towards monopoly output, each firm's profit would rise. We show that these very intuitive results may not hold in a dynamic oligopoly.

Some effects of asymmetries in a common pool natural resource oligopoly

Nous envisageons le cas d'une ressource naturelle renouvelable exploitée en commun par des firmes qui se concurrencent à la fois dans le marché du produit et dans l'exploitation de la ressource. Nous montrons que l'introduction de la moindre différence de coûts entre les firmes peut avoir un effet drastique sur la nature de l' équilibre, à comparer avec le cas de coûts identiques. Pour ce faire, nous prenons comme point de référence un équilibre de Nash markovien parfait qui existe dans le cas de firmes identiques et qui a la propriété que les firmes jouent une stratégie linéaire jusqu'à une borne supérieure endogène du stock et la stratégie correspondant à l' équilibre de Cournot statique au-delà de cette borne. Après avoir montré qu'un équilibre de cette nature n'est pas soutenable avec des coûts asymétriques, nous proposons une caractérisation complète d'un équilibre de Nash markovien parfait au jeu différentiel correspondant à ce cas.

On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopoly

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.

Mixed oligopoly in education

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in education markets when schools can be private and public and when the quality of education depends on ìpeer groupî e§ects. In the Örst stage of our game schools set their quality and in the second stage they Öx their tuition fees. We examine how the (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium allocation (qualities, tuition fees and welfare) is a§ected by the presence of public schools and by their relative position in the quality range. When there are no peer group e§ects, e¢ ciency is achieved when (at least) all but one school are public. In particular in the two school case, the impact of a public school is spectacular as we go from a setting of extreme di§erentiation to an e¢ cient allocation. However, in the three school case, a single public school will lower welfare compared to the private equilibrium. We then introduce a peer group e§ect which, for any given school is determined by its student with the highest ability. These PGE do have a signiÖcant impact on the results. The mixed equilibrium is now never e¢ cient. However, welfare continues to be improved if all but one school are public. Overall, the presence of PGE reduces the e§ectiveness of public schools as regulatory tool in an otherwise private education sector.

Piecemeal Oligopoly, Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and Trade Policy.

Este artículo analiza el efecto sistemático de la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio, cuando un gobierno local debe evaluar políticas comerciales estratégicas lineales y cuadráticas. Este ejercicio se realiza para modelos de mercado Cournot y Bertran. El modelo prueba que tanto el esquema lineal como el cuadrático tienen el mismo efecto sobre el bienestar social de los países, y que la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio domestica lleva a los gobiernos a reducir los subsidios a las exportaciones o bajan los impuestos a las exportaciones, de acuerdo a la variable estratégica elegida por las firmas. La tasa de cambio extranjera tiene diferentes efectos dependiendo de si las firmas producen bajos rendimientos a escalas constantes o decrecientes.

Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.

Testing oligopoly theory in the lab

Previous literature is reviewed to account for the existing experimental tests of standard oligopoly-theoretic models.

Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly

In a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model. In the presence of intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms, strategies tend to confirm the non-cooperative multiproduct solution.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).