Orientation passport : using gamification to engage university students

Adding game elements to an application to motivate use and enhance the user experience is a growing trend known as gamification. This study explores the use of game achievements when applied to a mobile application designed to help new students at university. This paper describes the foundations of a design framework used to integrate game elements to Orientation Passport, a personalised orientation event application for smart phones. Orientation Passport utilises game achievements to present orientation information in an engaging way and to encourage use of the application. The system is explained in terms of the design framework, and the findings of a pilot study involving 26 new students are presented. This study contributes the foundations of a design framework for general gamified achievement design. It also suggests that added game elements can be enjoyable but can potentially encourage undesirable use by some, and aren't as enjoyable if not enforced properly by the technology. Consideration is also needed when enforcing stricter game rules as usability can be affected.

Security analysis of Australian and E.U. e-passport implementation

This paper makes a formal security analysis of the current Australian e-passport implementation using model checking tools CASPER/CSP/FDR. We highlight security issues in the current implementation and identify new threats when an e-passport system is integrated with an automated processing system like SmartGate. The paper also provides a security analysis of the European Union (EU) proposal for Extended Access Control (EAC) that is intended to provide improved security in protecting biometric information of the e-passport bearer. The current e-passport specification fails to provide a list of adequate security goals that could be used for security evaluation. We fill this gap; we present a collection of security goals for evaluation of e-passport protocols. Our analysis confirms existing security weaknesses that were previously identified and shows that both the Australian e-passport implementation and the EU proposal fail to address many security and privacy aspects that are paramount in implementing a secure border control mechanism. ACM Classification C.2.2 (Communication/Networking and Information Technology – Network Protocols – Model Checking), D.2.4 (Software Engineering – Software/Program Verification – Formal Methods), D.4.6 (Operating Systems – Security and Privacy Protection – Authentication)

Formal security analysis of Australian e-passport implementation

This paper provides a detailed description of the current Australian e-passport implementation and makes a formal verification using model checking tools CASPER/CSP/FDR. We highlight security issues present in the current e-passport implementation and identify new threats when an e-passport system is integrated with an automated processing systems like SmartGate. Because the current e-passport specification does not provide adequate security goals, to perform a rational security analysis we identify and describe a set of security goals for evaluation of e-passport protocols. Our analysis confirms existing security issues that were previously informally identified and presents weaknesses that exists in the current e-passport implementation.

An on-line secure e-passport protocol

The first generation e-passport standard is proven to be insecure and prone to various attacks. To strengthen, the European Union (EU) has proposed an Extended Access Control (EAC) mechanism for e-passports that intends to provide better security in protecting biometric information of the e-passport bearer. But, our analysis shows, the EU proposal fails to address many security and privacy issues that are paramount in implementing a strong security mechanism. In this paper we propose an on-line authentication mechanism for electronic passports that addresses the weakness in existing implementations, of both The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and EU. Our proposal utilises ICAO PKI implementation, thus requiring very little modifications to the existing infrastructure which is already well established.

Passport photo of Fritz Gottschalk Portraits Men

Photograph from Fritz Gottschalk's Nazi identification papers

Passport portrait of Ruth Augusta Beatrice Goldschmidt Portraits Children

Born 1923?

Signed passport portrait of Michael Lesch.

Son of Adolf and Maria Leschnitzer

Passport portrait of Adolf Leschnitzer.

Digital Image

Passport photo of Fritz Gottschalk Portraits Men

Photograph from Fritz Gottschalk's Nazi identification papers

Passport portrait of Maria Leschnitzer.

Wife of Adolf Leschnitzer

Passport portraits of Paula Goldschmidt née Harmelin Portraits Women

Born 1880?

Passport portraits of Abraham Guttmann Portraits Men

One photograph is stamped and signed, one is stamped with the Nazi seal