Into the silence of the objects : analyzing Samuel Beckett’s nothingness

Os objetos têm sempre desempenhado um papel fundamental nas nossas vidas, pela forma como eles, passivamente, fazem-nos companhia e transmitem tacitamente a sua quietude inata. Contudo, o que acontece quando os objetos se tornam uma presença tão poderosa que, como resultado, dominam a vida das pessoas? Noutras palavras, o que é que acontece quando os objetos sobrecarregam as pessoas com as suas potentes (falando literalmente, sempre lá) presenças? No silêncio dos objetos há um lugar onde nos tornamos conscientes da nossa insignificância, da nossa crise de identidade,ansiedade de linguagem e entorpecimento. Mas nas peças Endgame e Act without Words I de Samuel Beckett, o dramaturgo gradualmente capta a inutilidade da vida das personagens principais e a transformação das suas mentes e corpos numa coleção de objetos arquivados. Sem interagir com outras pessoas e por se autoencarcerarem estas personagens de Beckett esquecem-se o que é ser humano e tornam-se «uma não-coisa, nada». Pode haver um facto perturbador nesta realização, e, sem dúvida, até mesmo uma infeliz aliteração; mesmo assim, o que é ainda mais chocante é que estas personagens são paradigmáticas em relação ao que significa ter pisado uma aniquilação prematura ontológica e existencial. Estas são agora objetos abandonados entre outros objetos, uma espécie de coleção ineficaz. Com base nestes argumentos, este ensaio mostra uma tremenda influência de Beckett no desenvolvimento da teoria da descarnalizaçao e da desmaterialização do corpo e mente do povo, culminando na revolução tecnológica onde queremos ser empilhados dentro de incontáveis arquivos de computador. O principal argumento propõe uma reflexão sobre como podemos pôr em perigo a nossa sofisticação emocional e social, jogando este complicado «jogo» digital.

This infinite, unanimous dissonance : a study in mathematical existentialism through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Alain Badiou

This thesis seeks to elucidate a motif common to the work both of Jean-Paul Sartre and Alain Badiou (with special attention being given to Being and Nothingness and Being and Event respectively): the thesis that the subject 's existence precedes and determines its essence. To this end, the author aims to explicate the structural invariances, common to both philosophies, that allow this thesis to take shape. Their explication requires the construction of an overarching conceptual framework within which it may be possible to embed both the phenomenological ontology elaborated in Being and Event and the mathematical ontology outlined in Being and Event. Within this framework, whose axial concept is that of multiplicity, the precedence of essence by existence becomes intelligible in terms of a priority of extensional over intensional determination. A series of familiar existentialist concepts are reconstructed on this basis, such as lack and value, and these are set to work in the task of fleshing out the more or less skeletal theory of the subject presented in Being and Event.

Le statut de la liberté dans l’existentialisme, par-delà la théorie critique

Dans la philosophie existentialiste de Sartre, l’existence précède l’essence. C’est-à-dire que c’est la réalité humaine vécue qui définit l’homme, et non une essence abstraite qui précèderait l’existence. L’essence de la vie humaine ne serait donc pas à la portée de la philosophie, qui voudrait établir une essence qui transcenderait la réalité humaine. Pour Sartre, cette tentative d’établir une essence est vaine. L’homme n’est pas simplement, mais a à être. Sartre entrevoit dans cette exigence la seule vraie possibilité de la liberté : la liberté c’est précisément le néant qui est au cœur de l’homme et qui contraint la réalité humaine à se faire au lieu d’être. Cette notion de la liberté absolue de l’homme est très forte et a évidemment suscité la critique. Sartre s’est attiré notamment la désapprobation des penseurs de l’École de Francfort. Ils lui reprochent de ne pas rendre justice aux déterminations spécifiques qu’impose le contexte historique, social et matériel. Sa notion de liberté viendrait dissocier l’horizon des possibilités des processus qui les fixent et, du coup le mène à cautionner tacitement le statut quo, en empêchant la liberté de servir de critère pour critiquer la domination existante. Une philosophie existentialiste reste-t-elle possible par-delà cette critique? La croyance en le caractère absurde de la vie humaine et l’exigence à se faire pour donner un sens à l’existence peuvent-elles tenir sans postuler la liberté absolue? Ou bien cette liberté doit-elle nécessairement être circonscrite par une théorie sociale critique, sans quoi l’existentialisme colportera clandestinement le maintien du statu quo?

Être et image : une approche de la notion de sujet chez Maître Eckhart

Le présent mémoire constitue une tentative de circonscrire - par l’étude d’un corpus textuel principalement emprunté à l’œuvre vernaculaire (allemande) de Maître Eckhart de Hochheim (1260-1328) – le rôle joué par certains motifs conceptuels caractérisant la notion moderne de sujet-agent au sein de la pensée de ce philosophe, théologien et prédicateur. Plus précisément, il y est question de déterminer en quoi le « je » (ich) décrit en plusieurs lieux textuels de l’œuvre d’Eckhart présente les caractères d’autonomie et de transparence à soi qui sont l’apanage de la subjectivité telle que la conçoit majoritairement une certaine modernité postcartésienne. Notre argument, qui se déploie sur trois chapitres, adopte sur le corpus faisant l’objet de cette étude et la conceptualité qu’il déploie, trois perspectives différentes – lesquelles perspectives sont respectivement d’ordre ontologique (premier chapitre), existentiel ou éthique (second chapitre) et anthropologique (troisième chapitre). La première approche – ontologique – explicite le sens que donne Eckhart aux notions d’être, de néant, d’intellect et d’image, ainsi que la manière dont elles se définissent dialectiquement en rapport les unes avec les autres. Le second chapitre, dont l’approche est existentielle, expose les applications éthiques des concepts abordés au chapitre précédent, analysant la méthode de détachement prescrite par Eckhart pour parvenir à l’état de béatitude. Le troisième et dernier chapitre cherche, quant à lui, à définir de quelle manière l’homme se définit par rapport à l’union à laquelle l’invite Eckhart, et ce autant sur le plan spécifique que sur le plan individuel.

La négativité en litige : Heidegger, Hegel et l’origine de la négation dialectique

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous nous proposons d’explorer la patiente explication que Heidegger a poursuivie avec Hegel à propos de l’origine de la négativité – problème qui s’impose de fait à titre d’« unique pensée d’une pensée qui pose la question de l’être ». Partant du constat d’une affinité insoupçonnée entre les deux penseurs quant au rôle insigne qui doit revenir à la négation en philosophie, nous entendons percer à jour les motifs de la constante fin de non-recevoir que Heidegger oppose néanmoins à la méthode dialectique de son plus coriace adversaire. Afin de rendre justice aux différents rebondissements d’une explication en constante mutation, et qui, de surcroît, traverse l’ensemble de l’œuvre de Heidegger, nous procédons à une division chronologique qui en circonscrit les quatre principaux moments. I. En un premier temps, notre regard se porte ainsi sur l’opposition résolue que le jeune Heidegger manifeste à l’égard de la montée du néo-hégélianisme, au nom d’une appropriation toute personnelle de l’intuitionnisme husserlien. Les transformations auxquelles il soumet la méthode phénoménologique de son maître doivent néanmoins laisser transparaître un furtif emprunt à la dialectique hégélienne, dont le principal mérite serait d’avoir conféré une fonction productrice à la négation. II. Le propos d’Être et temps demeure toutefois bien discret quant à cette dette méthodologique, bien que ses vestiges se laissent exhumer, notamment sous la forme d’une négation contre-déchéante dont l’intervention essentielle ponctue l’analytique existentiale. C’est qu’un désaccord subsiste entre Heidegger et son prédécesseur quant à l’origine ontologique de la néantité, qui semble devoir se dérober à toute forme de sursomption dialectique. III. Loin d’être alors définitivement réglé, le problème de l’origine du négatif rejaillit au cœur d’une nouvelle mouture métaphysique du projet heideggérien, la minant peut-être même en son fond. Il s’agit en l’occurrence de disputer à Hegel une compréhension plus originaire du néant, comprise comme témoignage de la finitude de l’être lui-même et s’inscrivant en faux face à l’accomplissement spécifiquement hégélien de la métaphysique. IV. Des tensions qui ne sont pas étrangères à cette délicate entreprise entraînent toutefois Heidegger sur la voie d’un dépassement de l’onto-théo-logie et de l’achèvement technique que Hegel lui a préparé. Il s’agit dès lors de situer l’origine abyssale du négatif auprès d’un irréductible retrait de l’estre, à l’encontre de l’oubli nihiliste auquel Hegel l’aurait confinée en la résorbant au sein de l’absolue positivité de la présence. Par là même, Heidegger propose un concept de négation qu’il juge plus originaire que son contrepoids dialectique, négation à laquelle il attribue la forme d’une réponse interrogative, patiente et attentive à la réticence hésitante de l’événement appropriant. Mais est-ce suffisant pour soutenir qu’il parvient, en définitive, à se libérer de l’embarras dialectique qui semble coller à sa pensée et qui exige de lui un constant effort de distanciation ? Cette thèse entend contribuer à établir les conditions d’une décision à cet égard.

Le personnage-figurant : absence de monde et corps spectral dans l’œuvre de Béla Tarr

Ce mémoire examine le rapport du visible à l’invisible dans l’œuvre du cinéaste hongrois Béla Tarr afin de montrer comment cette œuvre fait sa plus grande place, quoique le plus souvent sous la forme d’une absence-présence, à la question du néant et de la mort. À travers une étude tripartite, tour à tour concernant le traitement cinématographique et thématique du monde, du temps et du personnage et de leurs fonctions, l’objectif de cette recherche est celui de montrer comment cette œuvre soustractive interroge le rapport de l’existant à un monde qui fait défaut. C’est la promesse, en partie telle que théorisée par Peter Sloterdijk, qui permettra ultimement d’éclairer la démarche tragique des personnages tarriens : lutte contre la mort au moyen d’un constant effort de soi et ce, jusqu’à l’épuisement radical. La notion de personnage-figurant développée dans ce mémoire se propose d’articuler ensemble les valeurs figuratives et thématiques communes aux différents personnages qui traversent l’œuvre afin d’en mieux comprendre, malgré les ruptures stylistiques et narratives, la continuité. Enfin, le dialogue engagé ici entre l’œuvre du cinéaste et certains concepts-clé de la tradition philosophique (le monde, le soi, le temps) entend montrer comment la première ouvre des pistes pertinentes pour une réflexion sur le sujet contemporain et son époque.

Cual los imbéciles, buscando un bastón (En torno al enmarañado viaje de Henri Michaux al Ecuador)[Estudio]

En Ecuador. Journal de Voyage (1929) Henri Michaux quisiera ir más allá del vértigo del vacío y de la nada, dar con los significados que se le escapan, dar quizás con lo “transreal”. Con esa lente, y teniendo en cuenta el contexto histórico e ideológico, hay que entrar en la relación del autor belga-francés a lo largo del Atlántico, por la región andina ecuatoriana, y por la Amazonía. Por eso vale ilustrar, aunque sea tangencialmente, la práctica literaria que caracteriza esa obra para no hacer de ella un mero reportaje de viaje cuando, en efecto, se trata de un libro de exigente lectura, de un esfuerzo, por no decir de un tratado, de inspiración poética, teórica, que responde a una estética y a un diseño, a una estilizada y hasta sistemática cosmovisión. Las analogías y yuxtaposiciones de inspiración vanguardista entregan un mundo en que coinciden, estallan y contrastan lo exterior y lo interior, lo dinámico y lo estático, lo cotidiano y lo extraño, lo íntimo y lo vasto, lo sagrado y lo profano, lo limitado y lo infinito. Palabras clave: Henri Michaux, viaje, búsqueda, historia, Ecuador/ecuador, Europa, Atlántico, Andes, Amazonía, yuxtaposición, contraste, analogías, espacio, viviendas rústicas, música, remedos, límites, borroso, infinito.

Liberdade e negação da vontade: análise do ser-livre como representação e na angústia

Common understanding about what freedom means has always been more or less related to the power to realize something intended, desired, a capability. Therefore, being free is commonly interpreted under the concept of free-will and the category of possibility to act. Although there are predecessors in History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer refuses the thesis of free will proposing otherwise the denial of willing (to live) as the ultimate possibility for human freedom, if not the only one left. The thesis that would make him famous was deeply misunderstood and so miscarried somewhat due to the way it was many times presented by the means of exotic examples wrapped in a mystical mood besides exaltations to Eastern traditions, which may satisfy anthropological curiosity instead of being capable to satisfy the reader in a philosophical way. It seems to result from Schopenhauer s thought a kind of pessimism against life. Otherwise, typical readings on the Schopenhauerian thesis are found full of inconsistencies once closely regarded, which blame does not belong to the author but to his interpreters. A new reading about the denial of willing as the ultimate possibility for human freedom demands a criticism on the inconsistencies and prejudgments deep grounded. For this, we firstly clarify the ways of understanding the willing nothing , which cannot be reduced to the mere refusal or conformism, being instead positively understood as a special manner of willing: the admission of oneself for the sake of one is. A few more than a century later The world as will and representation came to light, Heidegger proposes in his fundamental ontology that the proper being-free concerns to originary decision by which, in anguish of being suspended in nothingness, Dasein renders itself singular as the being who is in-a-world and to-death, concluding that the ultimate possibility of freedom is being-free-to-death. Developing the hypothesis that freedom, properly understood, concerns to nothingness as to indeterminate possibilities, we seek for a dialogue between Schopenhauer s thought and existential philosophy aiming to reconstitute and overcome Metaphysics tradition turning the question about freedom into a matter of Ontology. From the factual existence perspective, as we must show, every human activity (or inactivity) is ordinarily mediated by representations, in which me and world appear as distinct entities. So, each one among determininate individuals finds itself connected to the things in the world by interest, which proper concept must be sufficiently explored. Starting from this point, we may proceed to detailed analysis of usual representations of freedom aiming their destruction by Ontology and then reaching existential thesis according to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Turning back to the analysis of Schopenhauer s work, we conclude existential understanding of freedom as will-to-be can also be found in Schopenhauer. In this way, denial of willing means ultimate freedom once the Will turns back to its own essence by suppressing the world as representation, which means the originary absolute indetermination of the extreme possibility to-be

O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre

This dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life

Existência e liberdade: a trans-descendência extática da vida no livro A religião e o nada de Nishitani Keiji

The dialog between the East philosophy and the Western thinking allow us to think the problems inherent to our time from several point of views. Nishitani Keiji, from the Kyoto School, sees the contemporaneity, or the time of the technic, for Heidegger, as derivation and as an immediate consequence of perspective introduced in the modern era form the Cartesian s cogito which creates a barrier that separates man and world. Scientific thinking that dominates our era was created from the thinking that ennobles human reason to the detriment of the others things in the world, determining that the knowledge just can be produced by the man himself and his set of rational powers. However, alerts us Nishitani, this point of view derived from modern thought which imposes subjectivity egocentric type besides not apprehend things in their truth, neither achieves the true self of man. In an attempt to overcome the abuses produced in modernity and that reverberates in our way of be until today, our philosopher will propose the point of view of the nothingness (śūnyatā) as a way to trans-descendance, that is, to overcome the traditional thinking overvalues the reason for the encounter with the original face of man, which by no longer impose its cognitive power can know all things in their true, in the tathatā

O conceito de consciência em o ser e o nada de J.-P. Sartre

This current discourse intends to prove how consciousness or Being-for-itself presents the idea that in its operation one can emphasize that it s Nothingness, transience and liberty in Jean-Paul Sartre s work O Ser e o Nada. To testify the proposed idea, the conception that Sartre gives to consciousness, representing nothingness, without any content that is connected to the possessor objects of a transphenomenal existence will be the starting point. This way, consciousness will be analyzed transcendently to the object that it s not, demonstrating its revealer-revealed condition, because it unveils a concrete world that exists against its idea, functioning as the revealer intentionality that there are beings instead of nothingness, obeying the ontological proof defended by Sartre. From this idea, every kind of consciousness will always be consciousness of something, a glance of the world, avoiding the fact that the consciousness could be considered nothing in the world. In order to live its original negation state of the world, apprehending this same world, with the purpose of a knowledge, it needs to be divided in two: the first degree consciousness or previous-reflexive cogito, that turns the proper reflexion possible, because, it s the consciousness proper transphenomenality of being different of all that connected to its existence being only its consequence; and the cogito, responsible to the positioning of the first degree consciousness, while aware of its own consciousness, that is, while being certain that knows. From this point, the way to untangle the consciousness or Being-for-itself will be developed as being Chasm, Liberty and transience. From this idea, it s intended to know how consciousness, that in Sartre s thoughts is originally nothing, could turn into Liberty that is presented in the field of transience? In other words, how these three internal structures imbricate one another to form consciousness in Sartre? First of all, it has to be considered the review of a conduct of human reality, the inquiry, that will be possible to understand how Nothingness exists as the mold of all kind of negation. After this, it will be shown, considering its way of existence, the human reality that is connected to Para-si, determined like nothingness, still is proposed like Liberty. Form this point, it will be possible to gleam how Liberty is lived deeply by Para-si in the shape of chasm, trying to how Para-si turns into nothingness, creating a chasm based on its proper liberty. Then, Liberty will be the proper mechanism used by Para-si to modificate its original chasm. The way Being-for-itself has to build to gain its goal will be projecting in transience, the building of something possible that brings one being back. However, will be demonstrated like Chasm can occupy the moment of a choice turning the decision instant an anguish stage, based on the failing of stability of the Being-for-itself, once nothingness persists in the field of the possibilities that human beings preserves in its essence while being essentially Liberty. From this idea, anguish will be studied as the proper consciousness of Liberty, being bad-faith the attempt of avoid Liberty trying to gain a shelter contradicting the fact that life is done of continual choices

Tres versiones contemporáneas de la comunidad : Hacia una teoría política post-fundacionalista

Ante el embate del particularismo, la emergencia de los nacionalismos reaccionarios en el mundo contemporáneo, y la difusión del comunitarismo en la filosofía política, es necesario que la teoría política asuma un rol crítico ante estos procesos teóricos y políticos. Esa es la tarea que desde el postfundacionalismo se plantean la obra de Jean-Luc Nancy, Roberto Espósito y Ernesto Laclau. En este trabajo intentamos escrutar la visión que estos autores postulan sobre la comunidad. Se verá que, mas allá de sus distintas estrategias argumentativas y de perspectiva, se desarrolla en estos tres autores una idea de la comunidad fundamentalmente anti-esencialista, una comunidad improductiva (Nancy), estructurada en torno a una nada (Espósito) y cuya única manera de reconstitución es a través de la articulación política (Laclau)

Tres versiones contemporáneas de la comunidad : Hacia una teoría política post-fundacionalista

Ante el embate del particularismo, la emergencia de los nacionalismos reaccionarios en el mundo contemporáneo, y la difusión del comunitarismo en la filosofía política, es necesario que la teoría política asuma un rol crítico ante estos procesos teóricos y políticos. Esa es la tarea que desde el postfundacionalismo se plantean la obra de Jean-Luc Nancy, Roberto Espósito y Ernesto Laclau. En este trabajo intentamos escrutar la visión que estos autores postulan sobre la comunidad. Se verá que, mas allá de sus distintas estrategias argumentativas y de perspectiva, se desarrolla en estos tres autores una idea de la comunidad fundamentalmente anti-esencialista, una comunidad improductiva (Nancy), estructurada en torno a una nada (Espósito) y cuya única manera de reconstitución es a través de la articulación política (Laclau)

Tres versiones contemporáneas de la comunidad : Hacia una teoría política post-fundacionalista

Ante el embate del particularismo, la emergencia de los nacionalismos reaccionarios en el mundo contemporáneo, y la difusión del comunitarismo en la filosofía política, es necesario que la teoría política asuma un rol crítico ante estos procesos teóricos y políticos. Esa es la tarea que desde el postfundacionalismo se plantean la obra de Jean-Luc Nancy, Roberto Espósito y Ernesto Laclau. En este trabajo intentamos escrutar la visión que estos autores postulan sobre la comunidad. Se verá que, mas allá de sus distintas estrategias argumentativas y de perspectiva, se desarrolla en estos tres autores una idea de la comunidad fundamentalmente anti-esencialista, una comunidad improductiva (Nancy), estructurada en torno a una nada (Espósito) y cuya única manera de reconstitución es a través de la articulación política (Laclau)

A ―CORAGEM DE SER‖ CLARICE: a centralidade da existência humana como expressão da religião na obra de Clarice Lispector estudada a partir da teologia da cultura de Paul Tillich

O presente trabalho estuda a centralidade da existência humana como expressão de religião na obra de Clarice Lispector. A noção de religião trabalhada deriva do conceito de teologia da cultura proposta pelo filósofo e teólogo teuto-estadunidense Paul Tillich e de seus desdobramentos, como o conceito de coragem de ser, fé, revelação, nãoser e Ser-em-si. O estudo é feito sobre os contos e romances publicados por Clarice Lispector, passando por diversas temáticas tangentes, como corpo, sexualidade, gênero, pobreza, identidade, pertença e alteridade. A tese que se defende é de que existem preocupações existenciais em sentido profundo que podem ser consideradas preocupações religiosas na literatura de Clarice Lispector, considerando o sentido tillichiano. Tal problemática se expressa tanto nos contos quanto nos romances clariceanos, a partir tanto das temáticas quanto das estruturas textuais. A obra de Clarice Lispector exibe amplo questionamento existencial, sobretudo aqueles que se dão de maneira profunda, como a questão da origem, do fim, da finalidade e da significação da existência, tocando assim no fundamento religioso da expressão cultural. Esse fundamento religioso se apresenta como uma constante, uma linha contínua a partir da qual pode se entender de maneira mais profunda tanto o sentido de unidade da completude da obra da escritora brasileira quanto as particularidades de suas narrativas sobre diferentes temáticas. Partimos da hipótese de que há, na literatura clariceana, um momento no qual as suas personagens experimentam um evento que as fazem encarar de maneira nova ou diferenciada as suas situações existenciais. Esses eventos são basicamente o choque como nãoser, a experiência de encontro com o nada que há na profundidade da construção literária das personagens.