The non-existence of a utility function and the structure of non-representable preference relations

In this paper we investigate the structure of non-representable preference relations. While there is a vast literature on different kinds of preference relations that can be represented by a real-valued utility function, very little is known or understood about preference relations that cannot be represented by a real-valued utility function. There has been no systematic analysis of the non-representation problem. In this paper we give a complete description of non-representable preference relations which are total preorders or chains. We introduce and study the properties of four classes of non-representable chains: long chains, planar chains, Aronszajn-like chains and Souslin chains. In the main theorem of the paper we prove that a chain is non-representable if and only it is a long chain, a planar chain, an Aronszajn-like chain or a Souslin chain. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.

Non-emptiness of the alpha-core

We prove non-emptiness of the alpha-core for balanced games with non-ordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991) and Kajii (1992). In particular we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the non-emptiness results to models with infinite dimensional strategy spaces. We provide two models with Knightian and voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied while our non-emptiness result applies.

Continuous Paretian Preferences

Two forms of continuity are defined for Pareto representations of preferences. They are designated continuity and coordinate continuity. Characterizations are given of those Pareto representable preferences that are continuously representable and, in dimension two, of those that are coordinate-continuously representable.

Don’t expect me to vote for you just because I like you, even if you do make me feel warm inside: a comparison of the validity of non-ipsative measures of party support

The inclusion of non-ipsative measures of party preference (in essence ratings for each of the parties of a political system) has become established practice in mass surveys conducted for election studies. They exist in different forms, known as thermometer ratings or feeling scores, likes and dislikes scores, or support propensities. Usually only one of these is included in a single survey, which makes it difficult to assess the relative merits of each. The questionnaire of the Irish National Election Study 2002 (INES2002) contained three different batteries of non-ipsative party preferences. This paper investigates some of the properties of these different indicators. We focus in particular on two phenomena. First, the relationship between non-ipsative preferences and the choices actually made on the ballot. In Ireland this relationship is more revealing than in most other countries owing to the electoral system (STV) which allows voters to cast multiple ordered votes for candidates from different parties. Second, we investigate the latent structure of each of the batteries of party preferences and the relationships between them. We conclude that the three instruments are not interchangeable, that they measure different orientations, and that one –the propensity to vote for a party– is by far preferable if the purpose of the study is the explanation of voters’ actual choice behaviour. This finding has important ramifications for the design of election study questionnaires.

Lexicographic decomposition of chains and the concept of a planar chain

In an earlier paper [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 37 (2002) 17-38], we proved that if a preference relation on a commodity space is non-representable by a real-valued function then that chain is necessarily a long chain, a planar chain, an Aronszajn-like chain or a Souslin chain. In this paper, we study the class of planar chains, the simplest example of which is the Debreu chain (R-2, <(l)). (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Reciprocity, inequity aversion, and oligopolistic competition

This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion influence the behavior of firms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if reciprocal firms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse firms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where firms feel compassion toward each other. However, in equilibria where inequity averse firms are envious of each other consumers are better off than if firms were selfish. The paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper shows that non-selfish preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium outcomes in markets with a small number of firms.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

Essays on International trade and economic growth

At present, we are witnessing globalization as a truly worldwide phenomenon. Trade agreements among differing countries, a reduction in trade costs, the mobility of production factors, the free flow of information and so on are all proof of the present day era of globalization. Countries are trading with one another more and more every day and the effects of international trade on economies represent a central discussion in all economic spheres. In spite of increasing trade around the world and the promotion of globalization by multilateral organisms such as WTO and IMF, the effects of international trade are not yet clear. Economics literature concerning the effects of international trade on economic growth and welfare remains ambiguous in terms of both theoretical models and empirical research. The present thesis tries to contribute to the theoretical debate surrounding the effects of dynamic international trade, focusing in particular on the implications for economic growth, welfare and changes in the preferences of individuals.

Productivity, demand and the home market effect

The causality between international trade and industrialization is still ambiguous. We consider a model of international trade with the Home Market Effect - with differences in income and productivity between sectors and between countries - in order to identify additional channels for determining the effects of international trade on industrialization. Introducing non-homothetic preferences and differences in productivity aids in the interpretation of any apparent paradoxes within international trade, such as the commercial relations between more populated countries like China and India and large economies such as the U.S. Population size, demand composition and productivity levels constitute the three main channels for determining the effects of international trade. Interactions among these channels define the results obtained in terms of industrialization, while welfare levels are always higher in relation to autarky.

Sets of probability distributions, independence, and convexity

This paper analyzes concepts of independence and assumptions of convexity in the theory of sets of probability distributions. The starting point is Kyburg and Pittarelli's discussion of "convex Bayesianism" (in particular their proposals concerning E-admissibility, independence, and convexity). The paper offers an organized review of the literature on independence for sets of probability distributions; new results on graphoid properties and on the justification of "strong independence" (using exchangeability) are presented. Finally, the connection between Kyburg and Pittarelli's results and recent developments on the axiomatization of non-binary preferences, and its impact on "complete" independence, are described.

Calibrating a CGE model with NTBs that Incorporates Standard Models of Modern Trade Theory

We propose a way to incorporate NTBs for the four workhorse models of the modern trade literature in computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGE models feature intermediate linkages and thus allow us to study global value chains (GVCs). We show that the Ethier-Krugman monopolistic competition model, the Melitz firm heterogeneity model and the Eaton and Kortum model can be defined as an Armington model with generalized marginal costs, generalized trade costs and a demand externality. As already known in the literature in both the Ethier-Krugman model and the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are a function of the amount of factor input bundles. In the Melitz model generalized marginal costs are also a function of the price of the factor input bundles. Lower factor prices raise the number of firms that can enter the market profitably (extensive margin), reducing generalized marginal costs of a representative firm. For the same reason the Melitz model features a demand externality: in a larger market more firms can enter. We implement the different models in a CGE setting with multiple sectors, intermediate linkages, non-homothetic preferences and detailed data on trade costs. We find the largest welfare effects from trade cost reductions in the Melitz model. We also employ the Melitz model to mimic changes in Non tariff Barriers (NTBs) with a fixed cost-character by analysing the effect of changes in fixed trade costs. While we work here with a model calibrated to the GTAP database, the methods developed can also be applied to CGE models based on the WIOD database.

Situational-Context: A Unified View of Everything Involved at a Particular Situation

As the interest in the Web of Things increases, specially for the general population, the barriers to entry for the use of these technologies should decrease. Current applications can be developed to adapt their behaviour to predefined conditions and users preferences, facilitating their use. In the future,Web of Things software should be able to automatically adjust its behaviour to non-predefined preferences or context of its users. In this vision paper we define the Situational-Context as the combination of the virtual profiles of the entities (things or people) that concur at a particular place and time. The computation of the Situational-Context allow us to predict the expected system behaviour and the required interaction between devices to meet the entities’ goals, achieving a better adjustment of the system to variable contexts.

Evidence that risk adjustment is unnecessary in estimates of the User cost of money

Investors value the special attributes of monetary assets (e.g., exchangeability, liquidity, and safety) and pay a premium for holding them in the form of a lower return rate -- The user cost of holding monetary assets can be measured approximately by the difference between the returns on illiquid risky assets and those of safer liquid assets -- A more appropriate measure should adjust this difference by the differential risk of the assets in question -- We investigate the impact that time non-separable preferences has on the estimation of the risk-adjusted user cost of money -- Using U.K. data from 1965Q1 to 2011Q1, we estimate a habit-based asset pricing model with money in the utility function and find that the risk adjustment for risky monetary assets is negligible -- Thus, researchers can dispense with risk adjusting the user cost of money in constructing monetary aggregate indexes

Does international trade produce convergence?

In spite of increasing globalization around the world, the effects of international trade on economic growth are not very clear. I consider an endogenous economic growth model in an open economy with the Home Market Effect (HME) and non-homothetic preferences in order to identify some determinants of the different results in this relationship. The model shows how trade between similar countries leads to convergence in economic growth when knowledge spillovers are present, while trade between very asymmetric countries produces divergence and may become trade in a poverty or growth trap. The results for welfare move in the same direction as economic growth since convergence implies increases in welfare for both countries, while divergence leads to increases in welfare for the largest country and the opposite for its commercial partner in the absence of knowledge spillovers. International trade does not implicate greater welfare as is usual in a static context under CES preferences.