Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [microform] : hearing before the subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security, and Science and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, first session, August 1, 1985.

CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 86 H381-49

1963-1968. Dall'avvento dell'amministrazione di Lyndon B. Johnson al Trattato di Non-Proliferazione. gli Stati Uniti, la Francia, la NATO e l'Europa agli esordi della distensione. Storia di una "non-crisi" transatlantica e della riorganizzazione dell'Alleanza.

The aim of this proposal is to explain the paradigm of the American foreign policy during the Johnson Administration, especially toward Europe, within the NATO framework, and toward URSS, in the context of the détente, just emerged during the decade of the sixties. During that period, after the passing of the J. F. Kennedy, President L. B. Johnson inherited a complex and very high-powered world politics, which wanted to get a new phase off the ground in the transatlantic relations and share the burden of the Cold war with a refractory Europe. Known as the grand design, it was a policy that needed the support of the allies and a clear purpose which appealed to the Europeans. At first, President Johnson detected in the problem of the nuclear sharing the good deal to make with the NATO allies. At the same time, he understood that the United States needed to reassert their leadeship within the new stage of relations with the Soviet Union. Soon, the “transatlantic bargain” became something not so easy to dealt with. The Federal Germany wanted to say a word in the nuclear affairs and, why not, put the finger on the trigger of the atlantic nuclear weapons. URSS, on the other hand, wanted to keep Germany down. The other allies did not want to share the onus of the defense of Europe, at most the responsability for the use of the weapons and, at least, to participate in the decision-making process. France, which wanted to detach herself from the policy of the United States and regained a world role, added difficulties to the manage of this course of action. Through the years of the Johnson’s office, the divergences of the policies placed by his advisers to gain the goal put the American foreign policy in deep water. The withdrawal of France from the organization but not from the Alliance, give Washington a chance to carry out his goal. The development of a clear-cut disarm policy leaded the Johnson’s administration to the core of the matter. The Non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, solved in a business-like fashion the problem with the allies. The question of nuclear sharing faded away with the acceptance of more deep consultative role in the nuclear affairs by the allies, the burden for the defense of Europe became more bearable through the offset agreement with the FRG and a new doctrine, the flexible response, put an end, at least formally, to the taboo of the nuclear age. The Johnson’s grand design proved to be different from the Kennedy’s one, but all things considered, it was more workable. The unpredictable result was a real détente with the Soviet Union, which, we can say, was a merit of President Johnson.

Toward international peace and security: Addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation in a globalized world. ACES Working Papers, August 2010

With a growing number of threats to governance in the international system that result from globalization and technological innovation, it is no surprise that states have come to rely more heavily on each other and the global community for support. While the EU is partially constrained by the ultimate outcome of its own integration process, limited knowledge on this issue, and the national interests of its Member States, other governments are also experiencing difficulty in domestic implementation of international resolutions. To better understand the impact of the most recent sanctioning efforts, this paper will explore the development of the non-proliferation regime, examine implementation mechanisms of non-proliferation agreements, and analyze the impact of increased cooperation among states to thwart the spread of WMD technology and material. Case studies of unilateral measures undertaken by the US and EU against Iran will provide insight into the political and economic implications of economic sanctions from individual governments. New and emerging methods for limiting rogue states and non-state actors from acquiring the means to develop WMD will also be discussed in an effort to further discussion for future policy debates on this critical topic.

Cryptographic Software Export Controls in the EU

Certain software products employing digital techniques for encryption of data are subject to export controls in the EU Member States pursuant to Community law and relevant laws in the Member States. These controls are agreed globally in the framework of the so-called Wassenaar Arrangement. Wassenaar is an informal non-proliferation regime aimed at promoting international stability and responsibility in transfers of strategic (dual-use) products and technology. This thesis covers provisions of Wassenaar, Community export control laws and export control laws of Finland, Sweden, Germany, France and United Kingdom. This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter discusses the ratio of export control laws and the impact they have on global trade. The ratio is originally defence-related - in general to prevent potential adversaries of participating States from having the same tools, and in particular in the case of cryptographic software to enable signals intelligence efforts. Increasingly as the use of cryptography in a civilian context has mushroomed, export restrictions can have negative effects on civilian trade. Information security solutions may also be took weak because of export restrictions on cryptography. The second chapter covers the OECD's Cryptography Policy, which had a significant effect on its member nations' national cryptography policies and legislation. The OECD is a significant organization,because it acts as a meeting forum for most important industrialized nations. The third chapter covers the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Arrangement is covered from the viewpoint of international law and politics. The Wassenaar control list provisions affecting cryptographic software transfers are also covered in detail. Control lists in the EU and in Member States are usually directly copied from Wassenaar control lists. Controls agreed in its framework set only a minimum level for participating States. However, Wassenaar countries can adopt stricter controls. The fourth chapter covers Community export control law. Export controls are viewed in Community law as falling within the domain of Common Commercial Policy pursuant to Article 133 of the EC Treaty. Therefore the Community has exclusive competence in export matters, save where a national measure is authorized by the Community or falls under foreign or security policy derogations established in Community law. The Member States still have a considerable amount of power in the domain of Common Foreign and Security Policy. They are able to maintain national export controls because export control laws are not fully harmonized. This can also have possible detrimental effects on the functioning of internal market and common export policies. In 1995 the EU adopted Dual-Use Regulation 3381/94/EC, which sets common rules for exports in Member States. Provisions of this regulation receive detailed coverage in this chapter. The fifth chapter covers national legislation and export authorization practices in five different Member States - in Finland, Sweden, Germany, France and in United Kingdom. Export control laws of those Member States are covered when the national laws differ from the uniform approach of the Community's acquis communautaire. Keywords: export control, encryption, software, dual-use, license, foreign trade, e-commerce, Internet

The Septin-Binding Protein Anillin is Over-Expressed in Diverse Human Tumours

Anillin is an actin-binding protein that can bind septins and is a component of the cytokinetic ring. We assessed the anillin expression in 7,579 human tissue samples and cell lines by DNA micro-array analysis. Anillin is expressed ubiquitously but with variable levels of expression, being highest in the central nervous system. The median level of anillin mRNA expression was higher in tumors than normal tissues (median fold increase 2.58; 95% confidence intervals, 2.19-5.68, P < 0.0001) except in the central nervous system where anillin in RNA levels were lower in tumors. We developed a sensitive reverse transcription-PCR strategy to show that anillin mRNA is expressed in cell lines and in cDNA panels derived from fetal and adult tissues, thus validating the microarray data. We compared anillin with Ki67 in RNA expression and found a significant linear relationship between anillin and Ki67 mRNA expression (Spearmann r similar to 0.6, P < 0.0001). Anillin mRNA expression was analyzed during tumor progression in breast, ovarian, kidney, colorectal, hepatic, lung, endometrial, and pancreatic tumors and in all tissues there was progressive, increase in anillin mRNA expression from normal to benign to malignant to metastatic disease. Finally, we used anti-anillin sera and found nuclear anillin immuncireactivity to be widespread in normal tissues, often not correlating with proliferative compartments. These data provide insight into the existence of non proliferation-associated activities of anillin and roles in interphase nuclei. Thus, anillin is overexpressed in diverse common human tumors, but not simply as a consequence of being a proliferation marker. Anillin may have potential as a novel biomarker.