ARISTOTLE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF VIRTUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POLITICS AND THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS AND ITS RELATION TO TODAY

While much of Aristotle's works are preserved in various volumes, two of his famous works are the Nichmachean Ethics and the Politics, both of which contain a rich compilation of ethical and political thought. In the Ethics, Aristotle describes a thorough understanding of ethical and intellectual virtue. By pursuing these virtues, Aristotle argues that a person can achieve a life of fulfilling happiness. The ideal polis as described in the Politics serves as a place where the virtuous life is attained in the best manner.Citizens who pursue virtue make the polis better, and the rulers that guide the polis ensure that the citizens have every opportunity to pursue the virtuous life. In this thesis, I see how relevant Aristotle's theory is by laying out the basic principles of the Ethics and the Politics and the connections between the two works. Indoing so, I found that Aristotle's ideal theory points out a significant flaw in our political system: the fact that we do not share a common moral conception such as the one concerned with the virtuous life as Aristotle proposes. This does not suggest thatAristotle's view was actualized during his time period, but that Aristotle conceives of an ideal life and an ideal polis that could be realized. Certainly there are issues with Aristotle's thesis concerning the inferiority of slaves and women. But what is morepoignant is the impracticality of instituting a shared common conception when today's political system permits various ideas about ethics and morality.

The fifth book of the Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle. Edited for the syndics of the University Press

Greek and English on opposite pages.

The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle.

Mode of access: Internet.

The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle /

Mode of access: Internet.

The ethics of Aristotle: with introductory essay by George Henry Lewes. (The Nicomachean ethics.) Chase's translation, newly revised.

Mode of access: Internet.

The paraphrase of an anonymous Greek writer (hitherto published under the name of Andronicus Rhodius) on the Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle /

Paraphrase erroneously attributed to Andronicus Rhodius, or to Andronicus Callistus, and by Constantinus Palaeokappa falsely to an unknown Heliodorus of Prusa

The ethics of professional accountants: An Aristotelian perspective

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how Aristotle’s ethics can be applied to the ethics of professional accountants, in relation to the approach adopted by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and to consider the reasons that justify the Aristotelian approach. Design/methodology/approach The paper outlines IFAC’s approach and identifies several weaknesses. Three themes of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are applied to the work of professional accountants. Reasons why this perspective is more suitable for professional accountants are then articulated. Findings Several aspects of Aristotle’s ethics can be fruitfully applied to the ethics of professional accountants. These include the relationship between function, goals and the good, an awareness of the human goal to achieve eudaimonia, the development of both excellences of character and of intelligence, and the significance of non-rational aspects of morality, including emotions, will, responsibility and choice. Research limitations/implications This perspective provides an alternative conceptualisation of the ethics of professional accountants. Although it does not provide concrete guidance regarding what the ethical approach to specific situations may be, it presents a useful counterpoint to existing approaches that are largely deontological and utilitarian. Practical implications This paper provides accountants in practice with a more comprehensive and adequate perspective on what it means for a professional accountant to be ethical, and raises several issues related to how ethics is included in the education and training of accountants. Originality/value Investigating the philosophical basis for professional ethics approaches professional codes of ethics in a way that it is not typically considered. The paper also provides a more comprehensive application of Aristotelian ethics than previous work.

Medical education as moral formation: an Aristotelian account of medical professionalsim.

The medical professionalism movement, bolstered by many influential medical organizations and institutions, has in the last decade produced a number of conceptual definitions of professionalism and a number of concrete proposals for its measurement and teaching. These projects, however laudable, are misguided when they treat professionalism as a unitary descriptive concept rather than as a contested and therefore primarily evaluative one; when they conceive professionalism as a domain of medical practice separable in principle from other domains; and when they treat professionalism as, in principle, a specifiable goal or product of sufficiently well designed educational curricula. The logic of professionalism-as-product corresponds to the logic of techne (art or practical skill) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle provides a cogent argument, however, that the moral excellences denoted by "professionalism" cannot be "produced" or even prespecified in the concrete; rather, they must be acquired through long practice under the careful concrete guidance of teachers who themselves embody these moral excellences. Phronesis (practical wisdom) rather than techne must therefore be the guiding logic of educational initiatives in medical professional formation, with particular emphasis on close mentorship and on the moral character both of students and of those who teach them.

Averroes y las cosas justas por naturaleza

En su comentario a la Ética a Nicómaco, Averroes se ocupó del pasaje donde Aristóteles distingue entre las cosas que son justas por naturaleza y aquéllas que lo son en virtud de la ley (V, 7 1134b18-1135a5). Su comentario es particularmente breve, pero plantea algunas dificultades importantes, como su alusión a un derecho naturale legale, que, según Leo Strauss, vendría a ser simplemente un derecho positivo de aceptación general. En este artículo se busca caracterizar lo justo natural y lo justo positivo en el comentario de Averroes y mostrar el alcance de la variación de los criterios propios de la justicia positiva.

The philosopher and the rhetorician : a study of persuasion in Plato's Gorgias and Aristotle's Rhetoric /

In his treatise, On Rhetoric, Aristotle argues that there are three species within an art of rhetoric, judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Aristotle's threefold rhetorical art, which is based on the functioning of the soul toward justice, reveals the possibilities for persuasive speech found in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle suggests that the soul and political life can be ordered according to reason through speeches pursuing justice, efficiency, and noble action. The relation between rhetoric and the soul also demonstrates how Socrates' rhetoric in Plato's Gorgias is based on an well-ordered soul, which is a just soul. In contrast to his own persuasion, Socrates demonstrates that the persuasive speech employed and taught by Gorgias, the rhetorician, is based on disorder and injustice. These two texts reveal that the intent of rhetoric is not separate from its practice. A study of the art of rhetoric, based on a study of the just soul and the good life, leads to the higher inquiries into politics and philosophy. Thus, political life and philosophy may benefit when citizens examine the nature of rhetoric, and subsequently, justice, within a community and within a soul.

Phronesis and Energeia : a reading of Heidegger's early appropriation of Aristotelian Phronesis (1922-24) in the light of Energeia

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien.

Aristotle on Thumos and Phantasia

What is Aristotle’s conception of thumos? This question can be broken down into two separate but related questions: (a) what is the object of desire for thumos, and (b) in which faculty of the soul is thumos grounded? The latter question is the focus of this paper. In this paper, “grounded in” is to be taken physiologically; the second question can be rephrased as “Which faculty of the soul is thumos a function of?” As a general rule Aristotle employs both a colloquial and a technical sense of thumos throughout the corpus. When I ask “What is thumos?,” I am interested in the technical sense that appears primarily in On the Soul and in the Nicomachean Ethics, where thumos is defined as a category of desire (a subset of orexis). The main argument of this paper is that Aristotle’s thumos is grounded in the faculty of phantasia – specifically, a sub-faculty called definite phantasia.

Sobre a importância da deliberação e da escolha na ética a Nicômaco

Pós-graduação em Filosofia - FFC

O bem como guia da ação: a ética na formação de estudantes de medicina e de enfermagem

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

Polis e virtude em Aristóteles

We will examine in this article to what extent the research about virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics aims enable happiness and how the happiness requires the common life in the polis. We will look for examine, through the relationship between virtue, someone’s happiness, polis and good of the polis, as how good organization of the polis is presented somehow as a necessary condition, but not enough, for the virtuous life and consequently for the happy life, the men’s last ending as evidenced by EN from its opening chapters.