Reforming the law of medical negligence: Solutions in search of a problem

The Commonwealth Government's Principles Based Review of the Law of Negligence recently recommended reforms aimed at limiting liability and damages arising from personal injury and death, in response to the growing perception that the current system of compensating personal injury had become financially unsustainable. Recent increases in medical liability and damages have eroded the confidence of doctors and their professional bodies, with fears of unprecedented desertion from and reduced recruitment into high risk areas, and one of the primary foci of the review concerned medical negligence. The article analyses proposals to redefine the principles necessary for the finding of negligence, against the terms of reference of the review. The article assumes that for the foreseeable future, Australia will persist with tort-based compensation for personal injury rather than developing a no-fault scheme. If the suggested changes to the fundamental principles of negligence are unlikely to reduce medical liability, greater attention might be given to the processes which come into play after the finding of negligence, where reform is more likely to benefit both plaintiffs and defendants.

Caution, children crossing: Heterogeneity of victim's cost of care and negligence rule

The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims haveheterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information,efficient care bythe injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observeat all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-bestcannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on thefirst-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care,and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. This second-bestsolution can be easily implemented by a negligence rule with second-best as duecare. We explore imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing theoptimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannotverify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is nodifference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and arule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate thefindings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Lawlegal systems.

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.

Contributory negligence involving overseas European banks in property valuation negligence cases in the UK

This paper examines the phenomenon of cross-border property lending and examines a number of issues regarding lending procedures and decision making processes in the context of the relationship between lender and professional advisor. It commences by placing these procedures and processes in the context of the development of cross border European property investment and finance. The UK has been a popular destination for overseas investors and lenders over the last decade and is therefore used as a case study to examine the additional institutional risk that overseas lenders may face when operating outside of their own country and obtaining advice from home professionals. The UK market was the subject of a boom period during the late 1980s, followed by a recession in the early 1990s. The losses triggered a number of professional negligence actions by lenders against valuers. These include a number of overseas lenders mainly from Europe and these cases have been examined for any particular features which, coupled with other data gained from overseas lenders as part of an interview survey, could be used to isolate any significant problems for European lenders in overseas markets. The research identified a lack of clarity in roles and relationships between lender and advisor, difficulties in communications both internally and between overseas branches and headquarters and failures in provision and interpretation of advice. The paper concludes by identifying the issues which may need to be addressed generally by lenders and their advisors, when the lenders are operating in overseas markets.

The vulnerable subject of negligence law

The approach taken by English courts to the duty of care question in negligence has been subject to harsh criticism in recent years. This article examines this fundamental issue in tort law, drawing upon Canadian and Australian jurisprudence by way of comparison. From this analysis, the concept of vulnerability is developed as a productive means of understanding the duty of care. Vulnerability is of increasing interest in legal and political theory and it is of particular relevance to the law of negligence. In addition to aiding doctrinal coherence, vulnerability – with its focus on relationships and care – has the potential to broaden the way in which the subject of tort law is conceived because it challenges dominant assumptions about autonomy as being prior to the relationships on which it is dependent.

Varying Injurer Costs of Care, Negligence, and Self-Selection

Standard economic models of negligence set a single standard of care to which all injurers must conform. When injurers differ in their costs of care, this leads to distortions in individual care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a negligence rule that induces optimal care by all injurers by means of self-selection. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard is set at the optimal care of the lowest cost injurer, and (2) liability increases gradually rather than abruptly as care falls below this standard. The results are consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

On Negligence Rules and Self-Selection

Economic models of negligence ordinarily involve a single standard of care that all injurers must meet to avoid liability. When injurers differ in their costs of care, however, this leads to distortions in their care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a generalized negligence rule that induces injurers to self-select their optimal care levels. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard of care is maximal, and (2) liability increases gradually as injurers depart further from this standard. The results are broadly consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

Principles of the law of negligence /

Includes bibliographical references and index.