Cabinet composition and assessment of a multiparty presidential system

This doctoral dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the Brazilian cabinet according to the concepts of a multiparty presidential system. Appointing politicians as ministers is one of the most important coalition-building tools and has been widely used by minority presidents. This dissertation will therefore analyze the high-level Brazilian national bureaucracy between 1995 and 2014. It argues that the ministries – or departments – are not equal, and that allied parties therefore take into account the different characteristics of a ministry when demanding positions as a patronage strategy or for use as other kinds of political assets. After reviewing the literature on the theme, followed by a comparative analysis of the Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, and Guatemalan cabinets, all the Brazilian ministries will be weighed and ranked on a scale that is able to measure their political importance and attractiveness. This rank takes into account variables such as the budgetary power, the ability to spend money according the ministers’ will, the ability to hire new employees, the ministries’ influence over other governmental agents such as companies, agencies, and so on, the ministers’ tenure in office. Finally, a proxy is provided that seeks to identify the normative power a department may hold. All of these characteristics will then be taken into account in considering the representatives’ opinion, thus helping to ascertain whether the cabinet appointment has been coalescent among the several parties that belong to the president’s coalition.

Too difficult to manage, too big to ignore: party choice in multiparty presidential systems

In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two historical choices to make or pathways to follow: i) playing a majoritarian role by offering credible candidates to the head of the executive; or ii) playing the median legislator game. Each of those choices will have important consequences not only for the party system but also for the government. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by median legislator parties on coalition management strategies of presidents in a comparative perspective. We analyze in depth the Brazilian case where the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) has basically functioned as the median legislator party in Congress by avoiding the approval of extreme policies, both on the left and on the right. Based on an expert survey in Latin America, we built an index of Pmdbismo and identified that there is a positive correlation between partisan fragmentation and median legislator parties. In addition, we investigate the effect of having a median legislator party in the governing coalition. We found that it is cheaper and less difficult for the government to manage the coalition having the median legislative party on board.

The executive toolbox: building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime

How do presidents win legislative support under conditions of extreme multipartism? Comparative presidential research has offered two parallel answers, one relying on distributive politics and the other claiming that legislative success is a function of coalition formation. We merge these insights in an integrated approach to executive-legislative relations, also adding contextual factors related to dynamism and bargaining conditions. We find that the two presidential “tools” – pork and coalition goods – are substitutable resources, with pork functioning as a fine-tuning instrument that interacts reciprocally with legislative support. Pork expenditures also depend upon a president’s bargaining leverage and the distribution of legislative seats.

Interaction of powers in the Philippine presidential system

The executive - legislative relations in the Philippines have been described in two contrasting stories, namely the "strong president" story, and the "strong congress" story. This paper tries to consolidate the existing arguments and propose a new perspective focusing on the "compromise exchange" between the president and the congress across the different policy areas. It considers that the policy outcome is not brought by unilateral power of the president or the congress, but formed as the product of such an exchange. Interaction of powers and their complementary function are addressed. Furthermore, aside from the constitutional power, the weak party discipline is pointed out as a key factor in making the exchange possible.

Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

Medidas Provisórias e a relação Executivo x Legislativo : uma visão do sobrestamento de pauta

Verifica o impacto que o sobrestamento de pauta, instituído pela Emenda Constitucional n. 32/2001, concebida para refrear o uso exacerbado de medidas provisórias, ocasionou na agenda do Legislativo. Tendo-se como premissa que a relação entre o Legislativo e o Executivo caracteriza-se pelo sistema presidencialista de coalizão e que as medidas provisórias configuram o principal instrumento utilizado pelo Executivo para controlar a agenda política do País, aborda o instituto das MP desde a sua inserção na Constituição de 1988 até as propostas atuais de modificação para se traçar um histórico do caminho percorrido pelo Parlamento brasileiro na tentativa de conter o abuso do poder legiferante do Executivo e impedir o esvaziamento das competências precípuas do Poder Legislativo. Investiga por que o Legislativo não tem conseguido frear a produção de medidas provisórias, considerando-se que essa é a vontade de seus representantes. Concentra-se no problema do sobrestamento de pauta do Poder Legislativo decorrente da não apreciação de medida provisória em até quarenta e cinco dias contados da sua publicação, como determina o § 6º do art. 62 do atual texto da Constituição Federal.

A produção de leis dentro do presidencialismo de coalizão: o caso da CPMF

Dentre os fatores que condicionam a governabilidade nas modernas democracias, encontram-se as relações entre o Poder Executivo e o Poder Legislativo. Em países que adotam o chamado presidencialismo de coalizão, o Presidente da República, em geral, tende a formar uma ampla base com diversos partidos do Congresso, frequentemente com diferentes orientações políticas, a fim de obter uma base parlamentar que viabilize seu governo. Apesar de ser um recurso de governo típico do parlamentarismo, o presidencialismo brasileiro tem adotado a coalizão a partir das atribuições e formas de relacionamento estabelecidas pela Constituição Federal de 1988, para os dois Poderes. Se, nesse período, o Poder Executivo tem logrado êxito em mobilizar a coalizão parlamentar para aprovação da maioria de suas iniciativas, isto não é verdadeiro para algumas importantes oportunidades. É o caso examinado neste estudo. Em 2007, apesar de a base governista representar a maioria no Congresso Nacional, a Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação Financeira (CPMF) foi extinta.

Definición y factores del ‘ultrapresidencialismo’: hacia la construcción de un problema de política pública

A partir del estudio del sistema presidencial clásico y algunas de sus deformaciones en Latinoamérica, el presente artículo propone una definición del concepto de “ultrapresidencialismo” y avanza en el entendimiento de los diversos factores que lo pueden ocasionar.---Defining and explaining ‘ultrapresidencialism’: towards the construction of a public-policy problemAfter reviewing the Classic Presidential System and some of its distortions in Latin America, this article proposes a new definition of the concept “ultrapresidentialism” and advances in the understanding of the different factors that may cause it.Key words: ultrapresidentialism, presidential system, balance of power, checks and balances, public policy problem definition.---Definição e fatores do ‘ultrapresidencialismo’: para a construção de um problema de política públicaA partir do estudo do sistema presidencial clássico e algumas de suas deformações em Latino América, o presente artigo propõe uma definição do conceito de “ultra-presidencialismo” e avança no entendimento dos diversos fatores que podem ocasioná-lo.Palavras chave: ultra-presidencialismo, sistema presidencial, equilíbrio de poderes, freios e contrapses, definição de problemas de política pública.

Controle político da burocracia no presidencialismo americano: uma perspectiva comparada com o Brasil

Pretende-se examinar os mecanismos institucionais de controle político da burocracia no presidencialismo americano, bem como os diferentes enfoques teóricos que explicam sua eficácia ou não. Enfatizando os limites do controle pelo poder legislativo, a estudo estabelece comparação com o Brasil e também indica, com base na literatura, algumas propostas para ampliar a responsabilidade política dos governantes.

The Good Society. A Comparative Study of Denmark and Switzerland

Denmark and Switzerland are small and successful countries with exceptionally content populations. However, they have very different political institutions and economic models. They have followed the general tendency in the West toward economic convergence, but both countries have managed to stay on top. They both have a strong liberal tradition, but otherwise their economic strategies are a welfare state model for Denmark and a safe haven model for Switzerland. The Danish welfare state is tax-based, while the expenditures for social welfare are insurance-based in Switzerland. The political institutions are a multiparty unicameral system in Denmark, and a permanent coalition system with many referenda and strong local government in Switzerland. Both approaches have managed to ensure smoothly working political power-sharing and economic systems that allocate resources in a fairly efficient way. To date, they have also managed to adapt the economies to changes in the external environment with a combination of stability and flexibility.

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? 　　　The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. 　　　Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.

Is the Indonesian President strong or weak?

This paper analyzes the newly institutionalized political system in democratizing Indonesia, with particular reference to the presidential system. Consensus has not yet been reached among scholars on whether the Indonesian president is strong or weak. This paper tries to answer this question by analyzing the legislative and partisan powers of the Indonesian president. It must be acknowledged, however, that these two functions do not on their own explain the strengths and weaknesses of the president. This paper suggests that in order to fully understand the presidential system in Indonesia, we need to take into account not just the president's legislative and partisan powers, but also the legislative process and the characteristics of coalition government.

Georgia- between a dream and reality. OSW Commentary no. 133, 15.04.2014

Following several years of political turmoil triggered by constitutional reform (a shift from a presidential to a semi-presidential system) and electoral reshuffles (parliamentary elections in 2012; presidential elections in 2013), the political situation in Georgia has stabilised: key posts in the country are now in the hands of democratically elected members of the Geor-gian Dream coalition. Despite its mosaic-like structure and internaltensions, Georgian Dream remains strong and enjoys high levels of public support. This puts it in good stead to play a central role in Georgian politics in the foreseeable future, including securing victory in the local government elections scheduled for June. However, local billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili does not currently hold a political office - despite the fact that he is the founder, sponsor and undisputed leader of the coalition, as well as former prime minister and the most popular public figure in Georgia (besides Patriarch Ilia II). This raises several questions, for example: Who is really at the helm of the Georgian state? What is the lon-g-term vision of the current government? The past achievements of the politically heterogeneo-us Georgian Dream - dominated by Mr Ivanishvili - offer little help in answering these questions. In addition to a series of challenges on the domestic front, the new Georgian leadership is also facing strategic geopolitical challenges, compounded by the current conflict in Ukraine. These include the future of Georgia’s relations with the West (including the process of EU and NATO integration) and with Russia (in response to repeated attempts to re-integrate the post-Soviet republics). The scale and dynamism of the changes in both the geopolitical order in the post-Soviet region and in the relations between Russia and the West are causing further questions to be raised about their impact on the position of the Georgian political elite and about their consequences for the entire country.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

Turkey’s 7 June parliamentary elections – Part I. A pivotal moment for Turkey’s future. EPC Commentary, 3 June 2015

On 7 June, Turks will head to the polls to elect a new parliament. This election is a pivotal moment for Turkey’s future, with two battles being played out. While the first is about securing a majority in parliament, the second is related to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his goal of creating a presidential system of governance. Furthermore, the future of the Kurdish Peace Process and the stability in the southeast of the country will almost certainly hinge on the outcome. Hence, this election is a battle for Turkey's future.