Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality (Part 1)

Formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. The conclusion that the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm's-length model that applies to multinational banks, despite significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues, is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks. The formulary apportionment model looks to the economic substance of the multinational entity and, in this sense, adopts a substance-over- form approach. Formulary apportionment further recognizes the impossibility of using arm's-length pricing for economically interdependent multinational entities. A final advantage to formulary apportionment, which is also a consequence of this model achieving greater inter-nation equity, is the elimination of double taxation.

The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality (Part 2)

As stated in Part 1 of this article, formulary appointment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity; rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on economically justifiable formula. This article argues that the unitary taxation model is superior to the current arms-lenght model for the taxation of multinational banks despite significant implementation, complicance and enforcement issues. Part one of the article gave some background on the taxation of multinational banks, followed by a discussion of their uniqueness, and the theoretical benefits of the unitary tax model for multinational banking. Part 2 below covers the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an 'optimal' regime for taxing multinational banks.

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks is currently governed by general principles of international tax. However, there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant consideration of a separate taxing regime, as the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment.

Arm’s length pricing and multinational banks : an old fashioned approach in a modern world

In “Arm’s Length Pricing and Multinational Banks: An Old Fashioned Approach in a Modern World”, Kerrie Sadiq, describes the high level of integration of multinational financial institutions and argues that treating each element within a given operation as a separate entity for transfer pricing purposes is not economically or legally realistic. She proposes instead formulary apportionment as a device for managing this complexity.

Executives as Agents: Expatriate managers in subsidiaries of multinational banks. ACES Working Papers, June 2012

Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.

The taxation of multinational banking income : is the traditional rationale correct?

This article argues that multinational banks have characteristics which are unique and distinguishable from traditional multinational entities. The first distinguishing feature is the unique nature of the services and consequent products supplied by multinational banks, which are aimed at meeting client global demand. The second distinguishing feature is the non-traditional organisational structure that is adopted. This structure, also designed to meet client global demand, introduces issues previously not recognised in the traditional taxation system, which is designed for the structure of traditional multinational entities. The unique differences between traditional multinational entities and multinational banks means there may be the need for a distinct international tax regime. It is argued that there are “outmoded economic assumptions” upon which the present tax laws relating to multinational banks are based. An examination of the unique nature of multinational banks leads to the conclusion that the appropriate tax treatment of these banks is different from the appropriate tax treatment of multinational entities generally.

The traditional rationale of the arm’s length approach to transfer pricing : should the separate accounting model be maintained for modern multinational entities?

This article examines the current transfer pricing regime to consider whether it is a sound model to be applied to modern multinational entities. The arm's length price methodology is examined to enable a discussion of the arguments in favour of such a regime. The article then refutes these arguments concluding that, contrary to the very reason multinational entities exist, applying arm's length rules involves a legal fiction of imagining transactions between unrelated parties. Multinational entities exist to operate in a way that independent entities would not, which the arm's length rules fail to take into account. As such, there is clearly an air of artificiality in applying the arm's length standard. To demonstrate this artificiality with respect to modern multinational entities, multinational banks are used as an example. The article concluded that the separate entity paradigm adopted by the traditional transfer pricing regime is incongruous with the economic theory of modern multinational enterprises.

Transfer pricing and multinational financial institutions : the case for replacing arm’s length price with a unitary approach

The international tax system, designed a century ago, has not kept pace with the modern multinational entity rendering it ineffective in taxing many modern businesses according to economic activity. One of those modern multinational entities is the multinational financial institution (MNFI). The recent global financial crisis provides a particularly relevant and significant example of the failure of the current system on a global scale. The modern MNFI is increasingly undertaking more globalised and complex trading operations. A primary reason for the globalisation of financial institutions is that they typically ‘follow-the-customer’ into jurisdictions where international capital and international investors are required. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently reported that from 1995-2009, foreign bank presence in developing countries grew by 122 per cent. The same study indicates that foreign banks have a 20 per cent market share in OECD countries and 50 per cent in emerging markets and developing countries. Hence, most significant is that fact that MNFIs are increasingly undertaking an intermediary role in developing economies where they are financing core business activities such as mining and tourism. IMF analysis also suggests that in the future, foreign bank expansion will be greatest in emerging economies. The difficulties for developing countries in applying current international tax rules, especially the current traditional transfer pricing regime, are particularly acute in relation to MNFIs, which are the biggest users of tax havens and offshore finance. This paper investigates whether a unitary taxation approach which reflects economic reality would more easily and effectively ensure that the profits of MNFIs are taxed in the jurisdictions which give rise to those profits. It has previously been argued that the uniqueness of MNFIs results in a failure of the current system to accurately allocate profits and that unitary tax as an alternative could provide a sounder allocation model for international tax purposes. This paper goes a step further, and examines the practicalities of the implementation of unitary taxation for MNFIs in terms of the key components of such a regime, along with their their implications. This paper adopts a two-step approach in considering the implications of unitary taxation as a means of improved corporate tax coordination which requires international acceptance and agreement. First, the definitional issues of the unitary MNFI are examined and second, an appropriate allocation formula for this sector is investigated. To achieve this, the paper asks first, how the financial sector should be defined for the purposes of unitary taxation and what should constitute a unitary business for that sector and second, what is the ‘best practice’ model of an allocation formula for the purposes of the apportionment of the profits of the unitary business of a financial institution.

Multinational corporations and United States foreign policy : hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-third - [Ninety-fourth] Congress.

Hearings held March 1973-Sept. 1976.

The traditional rationale of the arm's length approach to transfer pricing - should the separate accounting model be maintained for modern multinational entities?

This article examines the current transfer pricing regime to consider whether it is a sound model to be applied to modern multinational entities. The arm's length price methodology is examined to enable a discussion of the arguments in favour of such a regime. The article then refutes these arguments concluding that, contrary to the very reason multinational entities exist, applying arm's length rules involves a legal fiction of imagining transactions between unrelated parties. Multinational entities exist to operate in a way that independent entities would not, which the arm's length rules fail to take into account. As such, there is clearly an air of artificiality in applying the arm's length standard. To demonstrate this artificiality with respect to modern multinational entities, multinational banks are used as an example. The article concluded that the separate entity paradigm adopted by the traditional transfer pricing regime is incongruous with the economic theory of modern multinational enterprises.